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Contemporary United Nations (UN) peace operations are characterised by multilateral interventions in 
‘failed states’. Often assuming responsibility for part, or all, of the state’s administration, they undertake 
tasks as diverse as conducting elections, providing a police force, and managing the return of displaced 
people. Contextualising these operations within geopolitical transformations after the Cold War, this thesis 
examines the relationship between the UN and the state, and considers what their interaction reveals about 
the possibilities for peace in today’s globalised politics.  
Through a systematic examination of resolutions, policy documents, and mission reports, I identify how the 
UN conceptualises peace as an ideal, and the role it attributes to the state in the pursuit of peace. I then 
consider how this geopolitical vision was manifest in the UN’s efforts to develop autonomy and self-
government in post-war Kosovo. The analysis is informed by a combination of assemblage theory and the 
political philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. These theories offer a useful explanatory framework for 
apprehending the complex interplay and co-constitution of ‘local’, ‘national’, and ‘international’ actors that 
shape the possibilities for peace in any given context. 
The thesis therefore responds to a conceptual tension present in existing geographical literature on peace – 
the tension between understanding peace as a localised ‘bottom-up’ process, and peace as maintained by 
transnational authorities and state institutions. In my analysis of the UN intervention in Kosovo, I aim to 
demonstrate a productive way of including states, institutions, and international organisations in the 
geographical study of peace, but without losing the critical sensibility of the existing literature, nor a 
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1 Introduction: Geopolitical transformations and peace 
1.1 Peace after the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 is often understood as a geopolitical turning point. The characteristics and 
extent of geopolitical change in the years since are a source of rich debate. These range from Fukuyama’s 
(1989) famous assertion of the ‘End of History’, to considerations of how the end of the Cold War 
influenced national culture and identity (Sharp, 1998), to discussions regarding new sources of international 
tension and how they relate to the ‘old’ Cold War geopolitics (Buzan, 2006; Ciută and Klinke, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it seems to be broadly accepted that the post-Cold War era has seen changes in the character 
and patterns of violent conflicts (Human Security Centre, 2005; Yilmaz, 2007). The threat of nuclear war 
between antagonist superpowers has lessened. Indeed, wars between states, featuring battles fought by two 
or more national armies, have become an exception,2 meaning almost all ongoing conflicts today are 
intrastate (Pettersson et al., 2019). These include, however, an increasing number of ‘internationalized 
intrastate’ conflicts, in which ‘external states contributed troops to one or both sides in the conflict’ 
(Allansson et al., 2017: 576). The locations of violence and war seem also to have changed. Logics of security 
are rendering cities increasingly militarised (Graham, 2011; Sassen, 2010), and the response of governments 
to contemporary threats has blurred and broadened the spaces in which war is fought (Gregory, 2011a; 
Thrift, 2007). The influence of new technologies must also be acknowledged, with their capacity to alter the 
methods and time-space of what Gregory (2011b) calls ‘late modern war’ – a term which he uses to designate 
the highly specialised, technologized methods of contemporary warfare, such as the use of drones (see also 
Gregory, 2018). As Gregory’s term implies, some scholars suggest that these changes are such that they 
represent ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor, 2012; Münkler, 2005). While this assertion is contested (see Henderson and 
Singer, 2002; Newman, 2004), Kaldor (2013) argues that ‘New War’ remains a useful conceptual tool for 
getting past traditional assumptions about war, and so for developing research agendas that can account for 
how globalisation and new technologies are influencing current violent conflicts.  
Related to the changing geopolitics of violence, the end of the Cold War has also seen a proliferation of 
peace activities implemented by organisations of varying size and influence. Perhaps most notable among 
these activities has been ‘the widespread practice of external intervention undertaken with the express aim 
of building “sustainable peace” within societies ravaged by war and violent conflict’ (Berdal, 2009: 11). This, 
too, is a trend associated with globalisation - the convergence of political norms and integration into a world 
market (Ben-Porat, 2006). The principal organisation to undertake such peace operations is the United 
Nations (UN). While its initial peacekeeping mission was in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the majority of 
UN peace operations have occurred since the Cold War ended.3 Not only did the number of operations 
increase in the 1990s, but so too did the scope of the tasks they undertook. During the Cold War, UN peace 
 
2 The most recent data from the Upsala Conflict Data Program record two interstate conflicts – between India and 
Pakistan, and between Iran and Israel. The further 50 ongoing state-based conflicts are all intrastate (Pettersson et al., 
2019). 
3 Between 1945 and 1988, the UN mandated 15 peace missions. From 1989 to the time of writing, there have been a 
further 56 missions (for a full list, see United Nations, 2018).  
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missions were, in the main, mandated to observe ceasefires and maintain the separation of forces, usually 
national armies. By contrast, the 1990s saw the development of the ‘multi-dimensional’ peace operation. 
Much broader in the scope of their activities, multi-dimensional operations combine a traditional security 
presence with tasks including the delivery of aid, the development of institutions, and the promotion of 
human rights (Bellamy et al., 2010; UN DPKO, 2003). Despite the proliferation of new missions deployed 
in the 1990s, that period of peacekeeping is also notable for its failures, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda. The failures resulted in part from the fact that these conflicts, characterised by ethnic-civil violence 
and the internal breakdown of national governments, were ‘simply not covered in the [UN] Charter at all’ 
(Kennedy, 2007: 67). As conflict patterns changed, therefore, the UN’s peace institutions had to respond 
by developing new policies and approaches as they struggled to deal with crisis after crisis.  
In addition to the UN, there are many other organisations involved in contemporary peace activities. These 
include other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), both global (e.g. the World Bank) and regional (e.g. 
the European Union, the African Union); state-based institutions (e.g. the US Institute for Peace, the UK’s 
Department for International Development etc.); and numerous charities and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), some international in their operations, some smaller and more localised. Today’s 
multi-dimensional peace processes are therefore ‘institutionalized in the work of the UN and international 
agencies, international financial institutions, NGOs, and the many actors engaged in conflict environments’ 
(Richmond, 2004: 87-88). 
The international character of organisations involved in peace processes, and particularly the UN, raises 
questions regarding the role of the traditional political organisation, the nation state. This is not because 
they render the state less relevant – indeed, as shall be seen, the UN emphasises the reconstruction of liberal 
democratic states as a primary goal of its peace operations – but rather because the intervention of external 
organisations represents an alternative and unprecedented form of political agency shaping the possibilities 
for peace. A UN peacekeeping mission is authorised by the UN Security Council, a deliberative body of 
representatives from 15 national governments. The personnel who make up a peace operation are 
voluntarily contributed by the UN Member States (UN DPKO, 2008). A UN peace operation is therefore 
an inherently international, multilateral, geopolitical agent. Although a peacekeeping mission is ‘deployed 
with the consent of the main parties to the conflict’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 31), it is a distinct geopolitical force, 
acting outside of the authority of the host country.  
A further reason to consider the role of the state in contemporary peace operations is the prevalence of so-
called ‘state failure’. State-failure is sometimes argued to be a key reason behind the aforementioned ‘new 
wars’ that characterise the post-Cold War period (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Helman and Ratner, 1992). 
From the perspective of state failure, civil and ethnic violence is viewed as resulting from the collapse of 
state functions, and so a peace operation attempts to provide the security and stability which the host 
government has failed to maintain. Hence, the UN’s approach to peacekeeping has involved taking on more 
administrative and governance roles in host countries (Richmond, 2004; Zanotti, 2006).  
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While this form of international authority represents an unprecedented development in international 
politics, ‘the State’, as an ideal and as a practical political reality, remains deeply relevant to contemporary 
peace processes. Richmond (2004: 91) maintains that ‘contemporary peace operations have aimed at the 
reconstitution of liberal states’, and that ‘states underpin the key organizations through which peace 
operations occur’. Mahapatra (2016), too, emphasises the relevance of individual state politics in UN 
decision making, particularly that of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5).4 Even if 
interventions are fundamentally an international political process, the end goal of a ‘sustainable peace’ seems 
to rely on the reconstruction of a liberal democratic state.  
Peace, then, is geopolitical. If changing patterns of geopolitics after the Cold War have shaped the 
characteristics on contemporary conflict, then it is reasonable to assume that the same geopolitical patterns 
determine the possibilities for peace. The starting point for this thesis is therefore to concur with Simon 
Dalby (2014: 30) that these geopolitical transformations ‘need to be incorporated into new thinking within 
geography about war, peace, [and] violence’. Peace processes occur within, shape, and are shaped by, the 
context of these changing spatial and territorial patterns (Dalby, 2014). Peace is also geopolitical in the 
discursive sense of the term denoted by proponents of critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail and 
Agnew, 1992). That is, the actors involved in the pursuit of peace adhere to certain presuppositions, 
narratives, and representations about the world and the nature of politics. Their policies, and perhaps the 
extent to which their responses have the potential to contribute to peace, will therefore differ according to 
their respective geopolitical visions.  
Investigations into such geopolitical visions, as they relate to peace, are rare within political geography 
(Megoran, 2010b). Indeed, attending to peace from any perspective at all was rare in geography until a series 
of articles kickstarted ‘geographies of peace’ as a research agenda (Inwood and Tyner, 2011; McConnell et 
al., 2014; Megoran, 2011; Williams and McConnell, 2011). Subsequent geographical work on peace has 
explored a range of conceptual and empirical approaches, engaging with the meaning of peace, its spatiality, 
and its complex entanglements with violence. In general, however, this literature has not addressed the kinds 
of geopolitical trends just outlined, or the associated political actors (Megoran and Dalby, 2018). It has 
tended instead to emphasise an understanding of peace as an everyday, localised process – embodied, 
emotional, and varying across different contexts (for example Brickell, 2015; Daley, 2014; Williams, 2013). 
Where an organisation like the UN is discussed, it is usually to critique it as a key proponent of the inadequate 
‘liberal model’ of peace; that is, peace as guaranteed by the universal statist norms of democracy, rule of law, 
and market-led development (Joas, 2003; Richmond, 2006). As Megoran (2013: 190) notes, ‘for liberalism, 
international institutions and organisations representing universal norms make peace achievable’. The UN 
is certainly associated with such a liberal model of peace, as indeed are many NGOs, which Richmond 
(2004: 90) claims ‘operate solely in the context of a Western development discourse’ (see also Jeffrey, 2013). 
For this reason, the liberal model has been criticised as an imposition of western values parading as universal, 
and one that has frequently failed in its declared purpose (Daley, 2014; Vogel, 2018). Some even argue that 
 
4 China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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the liberal model of peace paradoxically justifies further violence, as dominant states and powerful 
organisations enforce conformity to their liberal norms (Dillon and Reid, 2009; Joas, 2003).  
Perhaps the UN and the state have been peripheral in the peace geographies literature because to focus on 
them would seem to remain within this paradigm of the liberal peace, rather than pushing at its boundaries 
and promoting or imagining alternatives. The emphasis on the local as the site of peace’s production would 
seem to fit a recent tendency within political geography to ‘avoid the topic of the state’ (Dittmer, 2017: 5). 
Indeed, a traditional view of ‘the State’, as a unified political actor, with a coherent identity and identifiable 
‘state interests’, has frequently been dismissed in political geography. To understand states in these terms is 
to fall into the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994), to perpetuate ‘methodological nationalism’ (Kuus, 2019: 165) 
and the myth of natural state boundaries (Fall, 2010). It has therefore been a central task of critical 
geopolitics to critique and denaturalise what statist discourse presents as natural ‘truths’ about states and 
their interaction (Dalby, 1991; Dodds, 2001). 
To take the state as a central concept in this thesis, therefore, it is necessary to do so in a careful way; one 
that is mindful of critiques of statist explanation, and which avoids returning to a so-called ‘realist’ 
(Wohlforth, 2009) understanding of states and international relations. This is necessary, furthermore, 
because of the geopolitical transformations that have just been outlined. International organisations, 
transnational political agency, and cross-border flows of people and ideas, all question the primacy of the 
state as the category through which to adequately explain contemporary politics. They challenge 
assumptions about ‘the centrality of states to world politics, and the primacy of fixed national identities in 
political psychology’ (Agnew, 2003: 2). This implies the need not only to maintain an awareness of ‘the local’ 
in political explanation, but also for explanatory concepts that attend to categories cutting across the nation-
state (see also Kearns, 2008).  
Rather than taking UN peace operations as the model against which to justify studying alternative, localised, 
more radical productions of peace, this thesis makes them the central focus through which to explore 
transnational political agency and the state. This is not so much to disagree with the critiques of the liberal 
peace, or with the need to understand local productions of peace, than it is to recognise that contemporary 
geopolitics and transnational networks of authority unavoidably shape the possibilities for peace in local 
contexts (Megoran and Dalby, 2018). As such, there is a need for them to be included in the geographical 
study of peace. The first question that this thesis therefore seeks to develop an answer for is: how might 
this be done? How can we develop a conceptual framework that can account for the unavoidable influence 
of states, institutions and IGOs like the UN, but which maintains, first, an appreciation for ‘the local’ in the 
production of peace, and second, the critical sensibility of the literature, particularly regarding criticism of 
the liberal peace? Such a question requires consideration of the nature of states and the UN themselves, of 
political agency, and of their relation to the local. This thesis argues that a relational ontology can provide 
productive ways of addressing these factors, and of responding to the tension between thinking about peace 
as shaped by local level relationships, and peace as shaped by state institutions and international 
organisations. A relational ontology blurs the boundaries between scales in political enquiry – that is, 
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between state and non-state, or local/national/international – and instead draws our attention to their co-
constitution.  
1.2 A relational ontological approach: Assemblage theory and Spinoza  
In considering the place of the state in political explanation, I am following Jason Dittmer’s (2017: 6) desire 
‘to rehabilitate the state within political geography’. Recognising the tensions between a statist politics and 
an everyday politics, Dittmer disrupts the boundaries between the two by utilising assemblage theory. 
Originating in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), assemblage theory has more recently been 
developed by Manuel DeLanda (2006, 2016). Ontologically, assemblage theory asserts that things are always 
a product of relations. Nothing exists as a self-caused unified entity, they are always an arrangement of 
‘different entities linked together to form a new whole’ (Müller, 2015: 28).  
An assemblage, therefore, is an arrangement and ordering of various constituent parts, both human and 
non-human, whose orientation and interaction are such that they realise capacities that the parts by 
themselves would be unable to achieve. This definition applies to the state, as well as to any other assemblage 
– a university, a government, a football team, the human body. From these examples, it can be seen that 
‘Assemblages can become component parts of larger assemblages’ (DeLanda, 2016: 20). Thus the UK 
Foreign Office (to use one of Dittmer’s examples) is an assemblage; which in turn is a constituent part of 
the UK government assemblage; which is in turn a constituent part of the UK state assemblage. 5  The 
functioning of assemblages – the process by which their capacities are made manifest – is a product of 
everyday chains of interaction between the people, materials, and ideas of which they consist. By 
understanding the state as an assemblage, rather than a ‘transcendental subject’, Dittmer attends to states as 
an effect of these processes of interaction – a process by which the state assemblage emerges and maintains 
its identity (see also Mitchell, 1991; Painter, 2006). An assemblage’s cohesion over time is not taken for 
granted, therefore, but is continually produced through everyday interactions between parts. By 
conceptualising the state as an assemblage, Dittmer (2017) joins state theory to a consideration of the 
everyday, and argues that using assemblage theory allows the researcher greater understanding of how the 
state is itself an everyday production.  
This understanding therefore makes no ontological distinctions between different levels or scales. It does 
not consider the local relationship and the state institution as separate political spheres. They differ in their 
capacities, but not in their nature. As Dittmer (2017: 11) writes, ‘the state is not special; it is simply one body 
politic among many’. Furthermore, the assemblage process is both bottom-up and top-down (DeLanda, 
2016) The identity and agency of an assemblage is emergent from the continuous interaction between its 
components, ‘but once an assemblage is in place it immediately starts acting as a source of limitations and 
opportunities for its components (downward causality)’ (DeLanda, 2016: 21).The nature of social existence 
is therefore bottom-up and top-down, simultaneously. If there is a conceptual tension between peace as 
produced in localised everyday relationships, and peace as produced in state institutions and international 
actors, then the utility of assemblage theory is that it is not beholden to a logic of either/or. It allows for 
 
5 See DeLanda (2016: 46), on the distinction between government and state. 
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including the agency of states and international organisations in the study of peace, but does not reify them 
as unified actors with rational intent. For the purposes of this thesis, then, the state is understood as an 
assemblage, and so too is the UN. In a case of UN intervention, the UN mission can no more be understood 
as a unified actor than we can say the state is a unified actor. Through the deployment of people, technology, 
and a set of ideals and aims, a UN mission becomes part of the assemblage process in the region in which 
it intervenes – part of the interaction of elements that determine the capacities, limitations, and potentiality 
of the assemblage. 
The next question, and one which this thesis aims to respond to, is how this relational ontology can help us 
think about the meaning of peace, and the kinds of processes that are productive of more peaceful 
assemblages. I argue that productive answers to this question can be found in the philosophy of Baruch 
Spinoza (1632-77). Spinoza, too, adheres to a relational ontology, which he set out in detail in his Ethics 
(1996 [1677]). Like assemblage theory, Spinoza conceptualises the state as an effect of a relational process 
whereby the combined powers of individuals realise a greater capacity to survive and thrive.6 In his Political 
Treatise (2000 [1677]) and Theological-Political Treatise (2007 [1670]), Spinoza applies his relational 
understanding of reality to the question of the governance of states. Written at a period in European history 
that had seen prolonged warfare, religious fragmentation, and subsequent attempts to establish a more stable 
political system (i.e. The Peace of Westphalia), Spinoza’s political works are deeply concerned with the 
possibility of ‘peaceful diversity’ (Frank and Waller, 2016: 9). Indeed, the purpose of the state, says Spinoza, 
is ‘peace and security of life’ (TP 5/2), and his political works consider how this purpose is to be achieved 
in consideration of the relational processes that determine society.  
Spinoza, then, can offer concepts and measures by which to describe the relational process of state-building, 
and to assess the extent to which the process is productive of what he calls ‘harmony’ (TP 5/2, 5/5).7 The 
question of whether and how a state can contribute to social harmony remains equally relevant to 
understanding the problems of conflict and division that exist today. In addition, this thesis considers how 
international organisations might contribute to social harmony as well. While Spinoza’s political philosophy 
only briefly raises the question of a sphere ‘above’ the level of states, his relational ontology provides the 
analytic tools by which to address such transnational agency, as well as the influence of regional blocs and 
the development of international law (Altwicker, 2019; Sharp, 2005). It is for this reason that the present 
thesis utilises Spinoza’s political philosophy, in combination with assemblage theory, to address the 
relationship between the UN, states, and the possibilities for peace. 
Before turning to the objectives and structure of the thesis, I want to raise again the issue of ‘liberal peace’ 
and its critiques. The UN is rightly associated with the liberal model of peace. My purpose in adopting a 
relational ontology as the means to analyse UN peace operations is not to defend the UN from these 
critiques. But neither do I rule out from the beginning the possibility that institutions, states, and 
 
6 Note, this combining is not a conscious rational decision – Spinoza views it as a natural process determined by every 
being’s striving to persevere. See chapter 4 for more detail. 
7 The original Latin term used by Spinoza is concordia. Both Samuel Shirley’s and Edwin Curley’s translations of the 
Political Treatise render it as ‘harmony’. Further discussion of Spinoza’s meaning of the term is provided in chapter 4. 
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organisations contribute to the possibilities for peace. Therefore, while some will always reject the notion 
that a state or governmental institution might contribute to peace (see, for example, the anarchist geography 
of Springer, 2012, 2017), I want to note here how adopting a relational ontology might in fact aid critiques 
of, and political opposition to, liberal operations of peace. As a relational approach views states, institutions, 
and organisations not as unified actors but as processes, it draws our attention to the actual workings of 
policies understood to represent the liberal peace. ‘[M]ak[ing] this assemblage visible’ - as Jason Dittmer 
(2017: 22) puts it – reveals the concrete arrangements, orderings, actions and interactions, against which to 
direct critique. Thus the liberal peace can be examined in its actuality, and not as what DeLanda (2016: 48) 
calls a ‘reified generality’. It is in this that these authors see the political potential of assemblage thinking. 
Gaining insight into the relational process of a peace operation in today’s globalised politics can therefore 
contribute to ‘careful analysis of how the world is being changed, so that useful advocacy is possible’ (Dalby, 
2014: 41). 
1.3 Objectives and structure 
1.3.1 Aim of the research 
The UN is representative of an unprecedented geopolitical trend that occurred over the 20th century – the 
attempt to develop multilateral systems of governmental collaboration in order to collectively pursue 
common goals; in this case, in order to prevent war and so maintain peace (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018; 
Kennedy, 2007). As noted above, however, nation states remain the standard form of political organisation. 
This thesis therefore preserves a focus on ‘the State’ as a political ideal and a political reality. The question 
is not whether peace is a product of internationalism, state sovereignty, or the local level. It is rather about 
their interaction and co-constitution, and what this can reveal about the geopolitics of peace today. 
Taking all of the above into account, the thesis can be summarised as an investigation into the relationship 
between the UN, ‘the State’, and peace. It investigates this relationship in relation to changing conflict 
patterns following the Cold War, and the accompanying development of new forms of international 
authority and intervention. As such, the thesis seeks to contribute towards efforts to account for 
contemporary geopolitical transformations, including transnational political agency, cross-border flows of 
people and ideas, and the influence of international organisations (for overviews, see Kuus, 2018, 2019). It 
does so by drawing on political theory that disputes any clear distinctions between state and non-state, or 
local and national, in political explanation. Spinoza’s philosophy asserts the relationality of all beings - how 
they affect others and the world, and how they are affected by others and the world. While Spinoza’s political 
theory only briefly addresses a sphere of politics ‘above’ the state (TP 3/11-18), his relational account of 
reality make his work particularly applicable to considering transboundary networks of communication and 
influence (Sharp, 2005). Assemblage theory similarly disputes a state/non-state binary, and is therefore 
useful for thinking about those contemporary geopolitical phenomena that seem to question the primacy of 




The overarching objective of this thesis, therefore, is to apply a relational ontology to the geopolitics of 
peace, and to consider the implications of such an approach. I explore the implications along three themes. 
First, the meaning of peace, as a political and ethical category, and how it relates to the agencies that shape 
it in contemporary geopolitics. Second, the attempts by the UN to secure peace via the development of state 
institutions. Third, the issue of communal difference as it relates to both conflict, independence movements, 
and peace, and how UN peace operations have sought to manage these issues. The discussion of these 
themes is illustrated by a focus on United Nations peace operations in general, and the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo in particular. The UN is an organisation that particularly represents multilateral 
peace interventions in the post-Cold War era. The mission in Kosovo is a relevant case for considering the 
role of the state because of the extent of the UN’s sovereignty over the region, Kosovo’s subsequent 
unilateral declaration of independence, and the fact of Kosovo’s still unresolved independent status. Kosovo 
is therefore a suitable case through which to explore the interaction between the UN, the state as a model 
of political organisation, and peace. In exploring these themes, the thesis aims ‘to illustrate, support or 
challenge pre-existing theoretical assumptions’ (Muvingi and Duckworth, 2014: 96) regarding the meaning 
of peace and the role of the state. 
1.3.2 Research questions 
Conceptually, the thesis therefore responds to two questions: 
- How can states and international organisations be included in the geographical study of peace, 
whilst maintaining an appreciation of ‘the local’? 
- How does adopting a relational ontology help us think about the meaning of peace, and the political 
processes that are productive of peace? 
These conceptual questions are addressed predominantly in chapters 3 and 4. Thereafter, the thesis turns to 
the analysis of the United Nations policy documents. To this end, it addresses two further questions: 
- What is the UN’s geopolitical vision regarding peace and the state in its contemporary peace 
operations? 
- To what effect has this vision been manifest in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo? 
1.3.3 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of UN peace operations, in order to further justify their inclusion in the 
geographical study of peace, and also to provide the necessary context and background information for the 
later analysis. This chapter particularly emphasises that a tension between the global aspirations of the UN 
and the primacy of the sovereign state has been present in the organisation from its beginning. This chapter 
also introduces the chosen case study of the UN Mission in Kosovo, providing an overview of the conflict 
and subsequent UN intervention that emphasises how the geopolitical trends of the post-Cold War era are 
manifest there. I argue that Kosovo’s situation within the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and its unresolved 
independent status, make it a particularly suitable case for investigating the role of the state in the 
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contemporary geopolitics of peace. There are a number of other cases which could have served as the 
chosen example through which to investigate these themes. During my document analysis, in addition to 
Kosovo, I also examined the UN peace operations in South Sudan and Timor-Leste. In all three of these 
cases, the UN facilitated autonomy, self-government, and in the case of South Sudan and Timor-Leste, full 
legal independence. Each of these three interventions can therefore contribute to understanding how the 
UN pursues peace through the development of state institutions. The reason for choosing to focus 
specifically on Kosovo, however, is because the question of its independence remains unresolved. In Timor-
Leste and South Sudan, the UN organised and monitored independence referendums, and subsequently 
aided the countries in their transfer to independence. In Kosovo, however, the UN mandate was not to 
assist a move to independence, but to promote ‘substantial autonomy and self-government’ while formally 
the region would remain a part of Serbia (S/RES/1244[1999]: § 11a). In 2008, however, against the authority 
of the UN, the Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Today, Kosovo’s independence is 
recognised by 115 states (Seymour, 2017), but it has not been granted membership of the United Nations.8 
Since the outbreak of war in 1998, therefore, the region of Kosovo has been under UN administration, has 
been subject to an internationally mediated peace process, and has emerged as a de facto state without official 
independent status. It has been determined by the agencies of ‘international society’, and yet cannot fully 
participate in international society. It is therefore the very fact of Kosovo’s unsettled status – and thus its 
unsettled stateness - that means it can shed light on the geopolitics of peace and the state. Regarding another 
anomalous expression of statehood, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, McConnell (2016: 5) writes that 
‘polities such as dependencies, stateless nations and de facto states can provide a valuable window on the 
nature of international politics’. This thesis argues that Kosovo can serve such a function for thinking about 
the relationship between the UN and the state in the contemporary geopolitics of peace. The question of 
peace in Kosovo, and the question of Kosovo’s stateness, are deeply connected. Analysing the peace process 
in Kosovo over the past two decades therefore requires questioning assumptions about what a ‘state’ is, and 
how states interact with the relatively new forms of international political organisation like the UN. The 
analysis of these themes in relation to Kosovo might furthermore serve to inform research into other cases 
of peace/conflict that involve matters of international intervention, statehood, and territory, such as Israel-
Palestine, Cyprus, Kashmir, and so on. 
The overview of the UN and its mission in Kosovo is followed by the literature review, chapter 3, which 
places the thesis at the intersection of geographical research on peace, organisations, and new 
understandings of the state. By focussing on the UN and its state-building policies, this thesis is to an extent 
turning away from what have emerged as the central tenets of the peace geographies literature, in particular, 
understanding peace as a localised everyday process, and criticisms of the liberal model of peace. The 
literature review therefore carefully draws out the tension between peace as a local process and peace as the 
responsibility of state institutions and international organisations. Looking for a productive route through 
 
8 All five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as two-thirds of the General Assembly (i.e. the organ 
consisting of representatives of all 193 Member States), must agree before a new country can be admitted to the UN 
as a Member State (see United Nations, 1945: Articles 4 and 18). Of the P-5 members, Russia and China both continue 
to reject Kosovo’s independence. Neither would Kosovo meet the two-thirds threshold in the General Assembly at 
its current number of recognitions.  
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this tension, the chapter then introduces Spinoza’s relational ontology as a way of blurring distinctions 
between state and non-state, and so to develop alternative explanatory frameworks of political agency. It 
finishes by considering how the Spinozan approach relates to existing literature on the study of international 
organisations and their influence on states.  
Building upon the themes and conceptual debates presented in the literature review, the fourth chapter 
presents the conceptual framework advanced by the thesis. Drawing from assemblage theory and Spinoza’s 
political philosophy, this chapter offers an exposition of the relationship between the UN, the state, and 
peace. The need for such a theoretical chapter is to ensure that none of these three things – the three central 
topics of this thesis – are taken for granted. This chapter therefore develops a line of thought which 
questions the nature of the state as a political organisation, and of its interactions with international forms 
of political agency represented by the UN. It also develops an argument regarding how these are involved 
in the production of peace. The merits of a relational ontology in this regard is that it views the influence of 
the state and the UN as both inevitable and unavoidable, even while it disrupts any understanding of them 
as unified political actors. Accepting that causality is both top-down and bottom-up (DeLanda, 2016), a 
relational ontology leads us to consider how the local and the relational are already constitutive of 
institutional and state systems, and that, in turn, institutions and the patterns of social life they engender can 
shape the affects and passions of the population. The question, therefore, is how a state assemblage 
contributes to social/political life, and how might it contribute towards peace? The tendency towards peace 
and cooperation or towards division and violence is dependent on the kinds of affects and passions that 
circulate through a population (Armstrong, 2009; Sharp, 2005).  
Having established the theoretical argument, the thesis then turns to textual analysis. This begins with 
chapter 5, the methodology, which explains my approach to the UN documents and how I use them to 
inform the discussion of the main themes of the thesis. After first considering organisations as objects of 
study more generally, the chapter turns to discourse analysis as it has been utilised in political geography. I 
argue that the relational ontology which underlies this thesis has implications for the method of discourse 
analysis. Drawing especially on Hasana Sharp’s (2011) ‘renaturalized’ understanding of ideas, the analysis of 
the UN documents becomes an 'an engagement with the "life force" of ideas' (Sharp, 2011: 57), and the task 
is to identify how successfully the UN has mobilised the power of its ideas and what the consequences have 
been. I then describe the process by which I chose and analysed the UN documents. 
Following the methodology are two chapters presenting an analysis of the UN documents in relation to the 
principle themes of the thesis. The first of these, chapter 6, concerns the UN’s attempts to institutionalise 
peace. The term ‘institution’ here has a broad meaning, following Merje Kuus’s (2018: 2) definition: ‘more 
or less stable patterns in, and mechanisms for, organizing social and political life’. Where these patterns have 
reflected division and violence, the UN seeks to alter them towards more peaceful relations, ultimately with 
the aim that the society can achieve a self-sustaining peace. This chapter therefore addresses the UN peace 
policy and documentation in the UN’s attempts to institutionalise peace in the regions in which it intervenes, 
and particularly how this has played out in the Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The chapter 
therefore presents the findings from the UN documentation regarding how peace is conceptualised by the 
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UN, including its vision of the role of the state. While the UN places considerable emphasis on the role of 
the state for securing a lasting peace, it is apparent that this statist vision sits in tension with the organisation’s 
universal ideals, as well as with the need for multilateralism.  To consider the implications of this vision, and 
geopolitical tension, in Kosovo, I consider how the UN participated in the ‘Kosovo assemblage’. The 
mission in Kosovo was deployed in 1999 and is still in operation at the time of writing. The length of 
deployment, combined with the breadth of the mission, means that is not possible to address all aspects of 
UNMIK throughout its 20 years of existence. I therefore focus on two key events from the history of 
UNMIK, those which are particularly indicative of the geopolitical tensions that are manifest in Kosovo, 
and how these tensions have shaped the possibilities for peace there. The first of these two is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the government of Kosovo, which was a direct challenge and to the UN’s 
authority in the region, and an assertion of statehood. The second key event is the resistance to the 
production of the state assemblage by Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo – the so-called 
‘North Kosovo crisis’ 
Chapter 7 deals with the problem of difference as it relates to both conflict and peace. Conflicts are often 
manifest along lines of communal difference – national, ethnic, religious, and so on. In cases of 
independence movements, a political movement claiming to represent a defined social group campaigns to 
achieve the demarcation of their own territory as distinct from the larger state within which they used to be 
formally included. In Kosovo, (and also in other cases, including Timor-Leste and South Sudan), the UN 
has facilitated this demarcation with the intention that it would be conducive of peace. Drawing on a further 
contemporary reading of Spinoza, this chapter characterises independence movements as a ‘rejection of 
parthood’ (Lord, 2017: 64). One of the fundamental tenets of Spinoza’s ontology is the inability to make 
absolute distinctions between bodies. Bodies are both constituted and determined by other bodies, 
ultimately making up a single substance, ‘God or Nature’ (Spinoza, E IV pref; also IV p4d). This section 
therefore elaborates upon differentiation and relationality. I argue that such an understanding does not deny 
the existence of differences, nor that these differences are implicated in violence. But these differences are 
not seen as pre-given. Rather difference is viewed as produced by processes of differentiation, and this is a 
relational and affective process. Not only that, but the process is always ongoing, and so is potentially open 
to change. The passions and relations that are productive of group identity, and of conflict between groups, 
are not fixed. They can be subject to new affects, which can alter the patterns by which groups have 
organised themselves. Investigating difference and peace processes from this position is therefore about 
examining a ‘network of passionate relationships’ (Sharp, 2005: 607). Difference need not necessarily be a 
cause of conflict – whether it is or not is dependent on the types of affects circulating among people. I 
investigate how the UN’s management of ethnic difference has played out in Kosovo by focusing on the 





2 United Nations peace operations and the Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo 
2.1 Introduction 
Searching in the journals Political Geography and Geopolitics reveals few articles about the United Nations. 
There are fewer still specifically about peace operations.9 Despite a call, 25 years ago, for a ‘political 
geography of UN peacekeeping’ (Grundy-Warr, 1994), such a field of study has largely failed to develop. 
Political Geography published a special issue on the UN in 1996, in which only one article was about 
peacekeeping (Chopra, 1996). A handful of articles can be found in other journals on aspects of UN peace 
operations (for example Korson, 2015; Lemay-Hébert, 2018; Mahapatra, 2016; Mason, 2014).10 Yet peace 
operations connect to, and raise questions about, themes of globalisation, transnational political agency, 
sovereignty, governmentality, territory, and the nature of states themselves. There is therefore broad 
potential for political geographies of the UN. This chapter provides an overview of UN peace operations 
and introduces the case mission on which the thesis focuses: the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). Throughout, I show how the geopolitical transformations discussed in the introduction 
are implicated in, and demonstrated by, the evolution of UN peace operations.  
I open this chapter by summarising peace operations between the UN’s formation in 1945 and the end of 
the Cold War, to demonstrate the unprecedented nature of peace missions as a geopolitical phenomenon. 
The discussion of the UN’s attempts to pursue peace raises a tension that has pervaded the UN throughout 
its history, and which remains significant today – the tension between the international scope of the 
organisation, and the principle of state sovereignty in international law. Given that this thesis deals with the 
UN’s facilitation of autonomy and self-government in the pursuit of peace – a perhaps paradoxical 
undertaking – this geopolitical tension remains an underlying concern when analysing the mission in 
Kosovo. 
Having established the broader context, the second section turns to peace operations after the Cold War, a 
period of ‘expansion, failure, and reform’ (Sharland, 2018: 8). During this period, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established and several new missions were deployed in rapid 
succession. This development and expansion immediately following the Cold War is attributed to improved 
relations amongst Security Council members (notably between the USA and Russia), as well as to an 
increased demand for intervention as outbreaks of internal armed conflict increased (Koops et al., 2015b). 
The defining events of the UN peace operations in the 1990s, however, are the failures to prevent the 
 
9 I use ‘peace operations’ as the broadest term to capture the UN’s involvement in peace processes. As will be seen, 
the UN makes distinctions in how it defines its peace activities (peacekeeping, peacebuilding, etc.), but in practice they 
all happen simultaneously in any given intervention.  
10 I am here referring only to geographical journals. There are hundreds of articles on UN peace operations in journals 
outside of geography. I do not mean to say that if a paper does not appear in a nominally geographical journal it cannot 
contribute to a political geography of the UN. I make the distinction here only to demonstrate the dearth of research 
on the UN that is explicitly situated within political geography, an observation made also by McConnell (2019) and 
Megoran and Dalby (2018). 
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Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. The re-assessment of peacekeeping 
practices and policy recommendations that followed these failures have therefore shaped the policy and 
practice of UN peace operations in the 21st century. Two of the most important reform agendas are 
represented by the ‘Brahimi Report’ (UN General Assembly, 2000) and the Principles and Guidelines (UN 
DPKO, 2008). I summarise the definitions of peace activities that can be found in these two documents, to 
demonstrate how the UN itself defines its role in 21st century peace processes. I end this section by focussing 
on the most comprehensive form of peace operation – so-called ‘transitional administrations’. In a 
transitional administration, the UN assumes sovereignty over the region in which it intervenes and, 
subsequently, takes on the responsibility of state administration. A transitional administration is therefore 
an excellent example of a trend by which states are today more and more subject to the influence of 
international organisations imposing governmental norms (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010). A UN 
transitional administration is a prime example of how a peace process is shaped in the interaction between 
a state and new forms of international political agency. 
This leads to the third section, which introduces the UN’s facilitation of autonomy in Kosovo. The UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is representative of a modern ‘multi-dimensional’ peace 
operation. Multi-dimensional operations developed in the ‘transformation of the international environment’ 
following the end of the Cold War (UN DPKO, 2008: 22). A trend towards civil conflicts in ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ 
states meant that UN interventions more often engaged in matters of internal governance. Multi-
dimensional missions therefore differ from ‘traditional’ peacekeeping in their broader and more active 
participation in the political and social processes of the country in which they are deployed. In addition to 
the traditional role of observing ceasefires and maintaining the separation of forces, a multi-dimensional 
mission also includes supporting policing and rule of law, developing institutions of governance, conducting 
elections, protecting civilians, and promoting dialogue and reconciliation (UN DPKO, 2003, 2008). As a 
transitional administration, UNMIK took the multi-dimensional approach to an unprecedented extent. It 
was, at the time, the broadest and most comprehensive mandate that the UN had ever undertaken. 
Established in 1999, and still present in Kosovo today, UNMIK has been in operation alongside some major 
policy initiatives in UN peacekeeping/building, not least those following the failures of the UN peace 
missions in Bosnia and Rwanda. Kosovo is therefore particularly suitable for examining UN peace policies 
as they have developed in the aftermath of the 1990s failures. Its status as one of the first, and the longest 
running, multi-dimensional transitional administrations makes it a landmark case through which to consider 
the relationships between states, internationalism, and peace.  
2.2 A brief overview of the United Nations and its peace operations, 1945-1989 
The UN was established in 1945. Initiated during WWII, and organised principally by the ‘Great Powers’ of 
the USA, the USSR, and the UK (Morris, 2018), the UN Charter was eventually signed in San Francisco by 
the governments of 50 countries (United Nations, 1945). At the time of writing there are 193 Member 
States. The UN is part of an unprecedented trend in the 20th century towards inter-state cooperation on 
matters of war and peace, development, and international law (Kennedy, 2007). Hathaway and Shapiro 
(2018) designate this the emergence of a ‘New World Order’. For centuries, war, conquest, aggression, and 
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coercion had been both legal and accepted in relations between states (the ‘Old World Order’). By contrast, 
the 20th century saw the development of new laws and principles for international order; conquest and 
aggression were outlawed, and cooperation became, in principle at least, the only legitimate way to pursue 
state interests (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018). The UN is a key organisation in this ‘New World Order’, 
founded on the assumption that security and prosperity for all states is to be pursued cooperatively.  
The immediate predecessor of the UN was the League of Nations (1920-1946). One of the first ever 
intergovernmental organisations, the League had been established after World War I as a means of 
peacefully settling disputes between states (see Housden, 2014; Northedge, 1986). Although it represents a 
significant part in the development of international law and human rights (Redman, 1994), the League 
ultimately failed in its purpose to prevent war. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 is considered 
the first major test, and failure, of the League of Nations (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018; Kennedy, 2007). 
This was precisely the kind of aggressive action by one state upon another that the League was designed to 
resolve. And yet, according to the League’s Covenant, there was no obligation on member states to take 
military or economic action against an aggressor (Kennedy, 2007). Furthermore, because the USA and the 
USSR were not members of the League at the time of the Manchurian occupation, a counter to Japan’s 
aggression would have had to rely on Britain and France, neither of whose governments committed to 
action. Instead, the League commissioned an investigation into the incident, the Lytton Commission, which 
concluded that the Japanese invasion was not legitimate (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018). In response, the 
Japanese simply withdrew their membership from the League of Nations. No further measures were taken 
by the League. By the time Adolf Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain decided to negotiate with Hitler directly, rather than rely on the League of Nations. In 
demonstrating that the British government no longer had faith in it, Chamberlain’s decision was ‘a 
deathblow to the League’ (Kennedy, 2007: 21). 
The Charter of the United Nations, therefore, is in part influenced by the failure of the League; that is, the 
founders tried to organise the UN such that it would avoid the same problems that made the League 
ineffectual (Bellamy et al., 2010; Kennedy, 2007). For example, it was imperative that both the USA and the 
USSR would be members. The USA had never joined the League of Nations, despite President Woodrow 
Wilson’s pioneering role in its formation (Knock, 1995). The US Senate voted against joining, for fear that 
doing so would legally oblige the USA to enter future conflicts (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018). The USSR 
was only admitted to the League in 1934, and was expelled again in 1939 when it invaded Finland (Gross, 
1945). In order to ensure the participation of the USA and USSR in the United Nations, it was agreed that 
permanent Security Council membership, and veto-power, would be grated to the ‘Permanent Five’ (P-5) 
countries – the USA, USSR, UK, China, and France (Morris, 2018; United Nations, 1945: Article 23; Article 
27). With power of veto, these countries’ governments could ensure that they would not be obliged to obey 
the authority of the organisation; they could prevent any decisions being made that they deemed to be 
against their interest.  
Regarding peace, the UN inherited the League of Nations’ principle of inter-governmental cooperation in 
the prevention of war. Indeed, the first declared purpose of UN is ‘To maintain international peace and 
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security’ (United Nations, 1945: Article 1). The first UN peace operation was established in 1948. It was 
called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and it was mandated to monitor a 
ceasefire in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (S/RES/50[1948]). 11 The peace missions deployed during the Cold 
War are generally referred to as ‘traditional peacekeeping’. It should be noted, however, that there are still 
some ‘traditional’ operations ongoing today, for example the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, which was 
established in 1964 (Bellamy et al., 2010). Traditional operations are deployed to monitor the implementation 
of peace agreements, with tasks including observing ceasefires and maintaining the separation of forces. The 
majority of these operations in the Cold War intervened in conflicts between states, and were deployed with 
the consent of the parties to the conflict. The limits of a principal of consent are apparent. For example, 
before the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, Egypt simply withdrew consent and told the UN peace 
operation to leave.12 
The need for consent from a host government was not the only way in which the ideals of the UN Charter 
have proved difficult to realise in practice. No peace operation can be mandated without the agreement of 
the P-5, even if all other Member States are in support. Kennedy (2007) cites this as the reason that there 
were no UN interventions in Algeria (because of French interests) or in Vietnam (because of US interests). 
During the Cold War, the P-5 were seldom in consensus, limiting the Security Council’s capacity to make 
decisions and authorise action. No peace operations were mandated between 1974 and 1987, for example. 
Disagreement among the P-5 also meant that a proposed UN standing army, which could have increased 
the speed of response to crises, was never implemented (Bellamy et al., 2010).  
The difficulties presented by the P-5 veto, and by the need for consent from the parties to a conflict, reflect 
a tension that remains at the heart of the UN as an organisation – the tension between a global organisation 
with universal ideals, and the principle of state sovereignty (Kennedy, 2007; Weiss and Daws, 2018). While 
state sovereignty is itself a universal ideal, and one that the UN promotes, the tension arises when a sovereign 
state acts contrarily to the other ideals adhered to by the UN, such as peace, democracy, or human rights. 
The principle of state sovereignty is written into the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945: Article 2), even 
while the Security Council is supposed to constitute an authority which Member States agree to obey (ibid., 
Articles 24-25; Article 49). As Weiss and Daws (2018: 7-8) put it, ‘the UN has been responsible for both the 
triumph and the erosion of state sovereignty’.   
This tension is present also in the concept of multilateralism. Organising collective responses to problems 
that transcend borders requires that individual state governments participate in, and are accountable to, the 
decision making of a broader coalition of states. Multilateralism is central to the functioning of international 
organisations like the UN, and by definition it involves a reduction in absolute sovereignty on the part of 
individual governments. Governments are not always willing to make such concessions, and so multilateral 
action can become stalled and ineffectual. In the case of the P-5 countries, the problem is exacerbated yet 
further. If a P-5 government wants to protect its own interests against a multilateral decision or programme, 
not only can it refuse to cooperate, it can also use its veto to prevent the other members of the Security 
 
11  UNTSO remains in operation at the time of writing.  
12 The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) had been deployed to Egypt in response to the Suez Crisis in 1956. 
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Council from implementing the decision. Hence the ‘everlasting dilemma: how to reconcile national interests 
[…] with international aspirations’ (Hanhimäki, 2015: 27). As the next section will discuss, the end of the 
Cold War saw a rapid expansion in the UN’s multilateral peace operations, as well as innovations in 
peacekeeping policy and practice. The apparently fundamental tension between internationalism and 
sovereignty has not gone away, however, and it remains a factor in the politics of intervention. 
2.3 Peacekeeping after the Cold War: ‘expansion, failure, and reform’ 
The evolution of peacekeeping following the end of the Cold War is a recurrent theme in the literature on 
modern peace activities (Bellamy et al., 2010; Berdal, 2009; Koops et al., 2015c). The early 1990s saw a 
significant expansion of UN peacekeeping efforts. No longer constrained by the politics of competing 
superpowers in the Security Council, there was a rapid deployment of new peace missions. Twenty new 
operations were mandated between 1988 and 1993, in contrast to just 13 operations in the 40 years before 
1988. In 1992, the newly appointed Secretary-General established the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), and published his vision for the future of UN peace operations, the Agenda for Peace 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The Agenda laid out a more interventionist approach to UN peace operations. It even 
questioned the assumption of inviolable state sovereignty (Peou, 2002), stating that ‘[t]he time of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty[…] has passed’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: § 17). The Agenda was therefore a distinct 
development in the UN’s conceptualisation of peace. It expanded the responsibilities of UN peace missions 
to include institution building following civil war, as well as to ‘address the deepest causes of conflict: 
economic despair, social injustice and political oppression’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: § 15). The role of the UN 
envisioned by Boutros-Ghali thus far surpassed that of ‘traditional’ peace operations.  
The initial optimism and expansion were soon dampened, however, by the failure of UN peacekeepers to 
prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. A ‘period of introspection’ 
began (Bellamy et al., 2010: 75), alongside a steep reduction in the numbers of personnel deployed across all 
missions, from over 70,000 in 1994, to fewer than 15,000 in 1998 (International Peace Institute, n.d.). The 
1990s were, therefore, a transformational period of ‘expansion, failure, and reform’ (Sharland, 2018: 8) in 
international peacekeeping. 
In subsequent years, the UN developed new doctrines and policies in response to its failures, and began 
once again to expand its operations (Koops et al., 2015a). The start of the 21st century saw the release and 
partial implementation of the ‘Brahimi report’ (UN General Assembly, 2000), which supplied a full review 
of UN peace activities, including recommendations, as a direct response to peacekeeping failures. In 2008, 
new Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008) were established, providing a coherent overview of 
peacekeeping doctrine intended to guide ‘planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations’ (p. 8). The numbers of personnel deployed also returned to, and surpassed, those of the 1990s, 
with 2010 seeing over 100,000 peacekeepers in the field (Koops et al., 2015a).  
This research focuses on this recent period in peacekeeping history, because of the sustained effort to 
develop new and more effective policies. The peace operations that are ongoing today have been shaped by 
the policies and practices introduced as the UN struggled to learn from its failures in the 1990s. An 
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understanding and analysis of these policies and practices is therefore necessary in order to develop broader 
arguments about the contemporary geopolitics of peace. 
2.3.1 Defining UN peace activities 
Two of the most important policy initiatives for the reform and improvement of UN peace operations are 
the ‘Brahimi Report’ and the Principles and Guidelines (Koops et al., 2015a). The ‘Brahimi Report’ – or the 
‘Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’, to use its official title – was commissioned in light of the 
UN’s failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre (UN General Assembly, 2000). 
The Principles and Guidelines – also called the Capstone Doctrine – is the UN’s guide to the normative 
framework of its peace operations (UN DPKO, 2008). Its publication was the first time that the DPKO 
had produced a single text setting out ‘the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United 
Nations peacekeeping’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 9). Both of these documents offer definitions of the main 
activities undertaken in UN peace operations. The Brahimi report names three: conflict prevention and 
peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peacebuilding (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 10). The Principles and 
Guidelines separates conflict prevention and peacemaking into distinct elements, and adds a further concept, 
peace enforcement, to total five overarching activities that the UN carries out in the pursuit of ‘international 
peace and security’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 17).  
Conflict prevention and peacemaking are defined as the diplomatic efforts to prevent the escalation of 
violent conflict, and to ‘bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 17). As stated, 
while the Brahimi report presents these as one category, the Principles distinguishes between them. According 
to the Principles, conflict prevention is an intervention in a dispute before it has escalated to direct violence. 
Peacemaking is the diplomatic action taken once a conflict has already become violent, to try and negotiate 
a cease-fire and formal peace agreement. Peace enforcement is the use of ‘coercive measures’ to counter ‘a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). It can include the use 
of military force. These three activities are therefore presented as taking place before and during a violent 
conflict. 
Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is defined as the effort to maintain security in the immediate aftermath of 
a violent conflict, once the hostile parties have signed a peace agreement. The documents recognise the 
Figure 1 - 'The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (UN DPKO, 2008: 23) 
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distinction between ‘traditional’ peacekeeping during the Cold War period, and broader ‘multi-dimensional’ 
peace operations that have been mandated since the 1990s. Traditional peacekeeping is defined as a 
principally military operation, observing ceasefires and maintaining the separation of hostile forces. While 
some traditional missions are still ongoing, the majority of contemporary peace operations are multi-
dimensional, combining a traditional military presence with police and civilian personnel, and engaging with 
politics, governance, and social issues (Figure 1). The scope of such operations means that peacekeepers 
work in collaboration with various partners, including The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, NGOs, and humanitarian agencies. The Principles acknowledge that UN peacekeeping has limitations. 
It is ‘neither designed nor equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts’ (UN 
DPKO, 2008: 28), and must be ‘deployed as one part of a much broader international effort’ (ibid., 22). 
The limits of peacekeeping therefore lead to peacebuilding. Originally conceptualised in An Agenda for Peace 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992), peacebuilding measures aim to produce ‘something that is more than just the absence 
of war’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). According to the Principles and Guidelines, peacebuilding is part 
of the development work of the UN Country Team (UNCT),13 a distinct part of the organisation from the 
DPKO. Peacebuilding encompasses a broad range of ideas and activities. As the Brahimi report states: 
[P]eace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, 
strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and 
judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education 
and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic 
development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict 
resolution and reconciliation techniques (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). 
 
13  Country teams are part of the UN Development Group. Their purpose is to coordinate, and take overall 
responsibility for, the various distinct UN agencies involved in the development of a specific country.  
Figure 2 - UN peace activities. Note the overlapping 'grey areas', indicating the lack of strict separation 
between them (UN DPKO, 2008: 19) 
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The Principles and Guidelines state: ‘Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect [sic] the functioning 
of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry 
out its core functions’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). These definitions therefore associate peacebuilding with state 
functions such as law and order, with social measures such as reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as with 
international concepts such as universal human rights. They demonstrate the broad understanding of the 
responsibilities of UN peace operations that Boutros-Ghali championed in An Agenda for Peace. The 
definitions confirm, once again, that the UN’s vision for contemporary peace operations goes far beyond 
that of ‘traditional’ missions to include social, legal, and political measures.  
The documents acknowledge, however, that there is not a strict separation between peacemaking, peace 
enforcement, and peacekeeping (Figure 2). The linear conceptualization of distinct activities before, during, 
and after, a conflict is not necessarily how peace operations unfold in practice. Furthermore, peacekeeping, 
and to an extent peacemaking and enforcement, are seen as constituent parts of the overall peacebuilding 
efforts (Figure 2). The Brahimi report says, ‘peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners’ (§ 28), 
while the Principles and Guidelines confirms that the boundaries between the various concepts are blurred, 
such that ‘Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity’ (p. 18). This is particularly so since the 
end of the Cold War, as evidenced by the development of the multi-dimensional approach to peace 
operations.  
The broad understanding of peacebuilding was further re-emphasised, and indeed broadened further, in 
2016, when the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted a new concept: ‘sustaining peace’ (UN 
Secretary-General, 2016: § 60). The term was proposed in a ‘Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture’ that 
was commissioned by the presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council (A/69/968-
S/2015/490). The concept ‘sustaining peace’ aims to develop the definition of peacebuilding as a strategy 
across all the other peace activities, including before tensions and divisions become violent. Indeed, the 
review suggested that the ‘post-conflict’ prefix should be removed from ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, to 
emphasise the all-encompassing understanding of peacebuilding (A/69/968-S/2015/420: § 26). 
Furthermore, the review emphasised that ‘sustaining peace’ is inextricable from the other ‘pillars’ of the UN 
– namely, development and human rights (ibid., see section ‘D’). ‘Sustaining peace’ would therefore require 
the above figure 2 to be adjusted, to show that the measures for a sustainable peace should be supported 
before the outbreak of conflict. The introduction of yet another adjustment to the definition of its peace 
activities demonstrates the ongoing endeavour for the UN to improve its approach to peace, in response to 
both experience and changing circumstances. 
The above definitions demonstrate just how broad the approach to peace has become, and that it continues 
to broaden. Indeed, a UN peace operation is not even exclusive to the UN, but involves collaboration with 
other international, regional, and non-governmental organisations. When the UN deploys a mission, 
therefore, the local context becomes subject to the influence of a global network of actors, whose policies 
and practices shape the possibilities for peace, for both better and worse. The broadest and most 
comprehensive form of peace intervention is a ‘transitional administration’.  
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2.3.2 Transitional administrations 
A characteristic of 21st century peace operations, therefore, is their increasingly complex and multi-
dimensional nature (Berdal, 2009; Zanotti, 2006). New peacekeeping missions have tended ‘towards broad 
and complex mandates’ (Koops et al., 2015a: 613). They entail ‘supervising and conducting elections’, 
‘strengthening the rule of law’, and ‘promoting respect for human rights’ (UN DPKO, 2003: 2). Such aims 
necessitate the use of more police and civilian personnel, in addition to the traditional military presence, as 
missions increasingly take on ‘the functions of state administration’ (Zanotti, 2006: 151; see also Richmond, 
2004). Since the mid-1990s, four peace operations have provided so-called ‘transitional administrations’ – 
in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Bosnia. These missions were distinct in the extent of the 
authority that they were granted over the territory in which they intervened (Bellamy et al., 2010; Caplan, 
2004). They ‘assumed a sovereign-like responsibility’ for the governance of their respective regions (Bellamy 
et al., 2010: 256).  
Writing in 1996, Chopra (1996: 339) reflected on the necessity of UN peace operations to establish 
‘jurisdiction over the entire territory, and ought to deploy throughout if it can’. In countries where state 
authority has failed, Chopra argues, and where there is factionalism and conflict between different groups, 
then a partial deployment of the UN merely makes the peacekeepers into one of the groups competing for 
power (Chopra, 1996). Although Chopra expresses doubt at the capacity of the UN to establish the kind of 
authority he advocates, this is in fact what the organisation would go on to attempt in Kosovo and Timor-
Leste. In these cases, both established in 1999, the UN took on responsibility for the administration of the 
regions, including making and enforcing the law, conducting elections, delivering humanitarian aid, and 
maintaining the provision of public services such as water and electricity.  
Transitional administrations are therefore the type of peace mission which represent the fullest extent of 
the changes in peace processes that have developed since the end of the Cold War. While each one occurs 
in a specific context with its own unique history, culture, and politics, the fact that these operations are led 
by the UN means that they also involve networks of transnational political agency, the imposition of 
‘universal’ political and legal norms, and integration into regional organisations. This thesis therefore agrees 
with Dalby (2014: 30) that changes in the ‘geopolitical scene’ ought to be incorporated into geographies of 
peace, and suggests that examining UN transitional administrations is a way in which to do so. Transitional 
administrations are particularly suitable for examining the transnational character of today’s peace processes, 
and what they reveal about political agency and the responsibility for peace. While any of the states 
mentioned here would be a suitable focus, for the purposes of this thesis I have chosen to use Kosovo as 
the main case in which to explore these themes. The next section outlines how post-Cold War 
transformations in geopolitics are manifest in the case of the UN’s intervention in the Kosovo War. 
2.4 The UN Interim Administration in Kosovo 
The remainder of this chapter introduces Kosovo as an important case through which to investigate the 
UN, the state, and peace. The account of the conflict given here is necessarily simplified, its purpose being 
to contextualise the analysis later in the thesis, rather than to provide a sufficient historical explanation. As 
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such, the summary focuses mainly on the contemporary violent events that prompted the deployment of a 
UN peace mission. Yet, the modern conflict did not occur in a vacuum. The history of Kosovo includes the 
history of the Ottoman empire in Europe, the Kingdom of Serbia, Austria-Hungary, the creation of 
Yugoslavia, the first and second world wars, and other factors besides. When tracing the ‘geopolitical 
becoming’ (Dittmer, 2014a: 395) of a state assemblage, there is no point at which a formal origin can be 
established in the chains of causation that determine the present. This is not only an academic point. The 
Battle of Kosovo, fought in 1389 between Serbian forces and the invading Ottoman Empire, still holds 
significance for contemporary Serbian identity. A narrative of the battle is mobilised in Serbian nationalism, 
which is implicated in the war that led to UN intervention (see Bieber, 2002; Erjavec and Volčič, 2007). 
With this caveat in mind, I turn to the Kosovo War. 
2.4.1 The conflict 
The Kosovo War (Feb 1998 – June 1999) was fought in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), of which 
Kosovo was a constituent region. It was one of several conflicts that occurred during the breakup of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Cohen, 1995; Denitch, 1994), and can more broadly be situated in the history of 
ethnic, religious, and nationalist conflicts in the Balkans (Glenny, 1999). In the 1990s, the FRY consisted of 
Serbia and Montenegro, which were the two remaining republics following the secession of the other 
Yugoslav constituent countries.14 Kosovo was formally a part of Serbia, but it had long been the focus of 
competing national territorial claims – Serbian on the one hand, and Albanian on the other (see Daskalovski, 
2005). It was part of Serbia, then, but within the Kosovo region the population was majority ethnic Albanian 
(Brunborg, 2002). It was this national/ethnic division along which the war in 1998 was fought.  
Kosovo had a certain amount of autonomy under Josip Broz Tito’s rule in socialist Yugoslavia.15 This was 
particularly so after a new Yugoslav constitution, in 1974, made Kosovo an ‘autonomous province’, with its 
own assembly, judiciary, and veto power in the Serbian government (Daskalovski, 2005; Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Such freedoms did not prevent an Albanian nationalist 
movement, however, which favoured Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, and in some cases also wanted 
integration into Albania (Arhsien and Howells, 1981). When Tito died in 1980, Albanian separatist sentiment 
increased, as did incidents of ethnic based violence against Serbs in Kosovo (Daskalovski, 2005). At the end 
of the Cold War, however, Kosovo remained a part of Serbia. 
In 1990, the newly elected President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, began a series of discriminatory policies 
against Albanians in Kosovo. These included dissolving the Kosovo Assembly, changing street names from 
Albanian to Serbian, and firing Albanian teachers who refused to adopt a new Serbian curriculum 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Albanian resistance to Serbian authority over 
Kosovo was initially peaceful, exemplified by a boycott of Serbian schools and establishing in their place a 
parallel Albanian education system (Daskalovski, 2005). By the mid-90s, however, more radical separatist 
groups began to carry out acts of armed resistance, under the name of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
 
14 The six constituent republics of Yugoslavia were: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Slovenia. 
15 Tito was Prime Minister of Yugoslavia 1944-1963; he was President of Yugoslavia from 1953 until his death in 1980. 
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(Judah, 2000). The eventual outbreak of war at the beginning of 1998 is considered to have been sparked 
when Serbian anti-terrorist police killed a KLA leader and almost 60 further Kosovo Albanians in the village 
of Prekaz (Judah, 2000; Özerdem, 2003). The KLA reacted with more widespread mobilisation, and Serbian 
forces responded in kind. The ensuing violence included ethnically motivated killing of civilians 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000).  
The Serbian forces were more numerous and better organised than the Albanian militias, and they advanced 
rapidly through the regions of Kosovo where the KLA operated, sometimes burning villages and carrying 
out executions (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Judah (2000) suggests that this 
excessive use of force prompted international sympathy for the Kosovo Albanians, sympathy that eventually 
led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to launch a bombing campaign against the Serbs in 
March 1999. By June of the same year, Milošević accepted an agreement to remove all Serbian forces from 
Kosovo (NATO, 1999), and agreed to an international presence in Kosovo, to be led by the UN. On 10 
June 1999, therefore, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244 [1999]) to establish the 
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 
2.4.2 The UN intervention 
While the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia was not mandated by the UN, the intervention 
following it was a collaboration between the two organisations. The Security Council resolution authorised 
an ‘international security presence’ and an ‘international civil presence’, with distinct responsibilities 
designated to each. The security presence, Kosovo Force (KFOR), is led by NATO, while the civil presence 
is led by the UN, in partnership with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). The security presence was mandated to ensure the withdrawal of military, 
police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, to demilitarize the KLA, and to monitor the border. The 
intention was to maintain a secure territory within which the civil presence could carry out their 
responsibilities, and so that ‘other international organizations’ could move freely and safely within the region 
(S/RES/1244[1999]: § 9).  
The borders of Kosovo were established based on the Serbian districts of Kosovo and Metohija. These 
districts had been defined as part of the Constitution of Serbia. When the war ended with the signing of the 
Military Technical Agreement, Serbian forces agreed to withdraw beyond these boundaries (NATO, 1999). 
The UN’s ‘operational boundary’ therefore conforms to what were the existing district boundaries. The UN 
documentation, in adherence to its official neutrality on the question of Kosovo’s independence, always 
notes that its maps of the operational boundary ‘do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations’ (see for example S/2004/348: p. 19).  
The first responsibility that the civil presence was given in the mandate was to promote ‘substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo’ (S/RES/1244[1999]: § 11a). This was to be achieved through 
the establishment of ‘provisional institutions’ of government and the gradual transfer of powers to them. 
The mission established the Assembly of Kosovo and organised the elections by which members of the 
Assembly were selected. The civil side of the mission was also instructed to facilitate negotiations on the 
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final status of Kosovo in relation to Serbia, a matter which has yet to be resolved at the time of writing. The 
resolution also mandates UNMIK to maintain law and order using an international police force. In addition 
to these institutional measures, the mandate also includes measures directed at the needs and rights of the 
citizens, notably the provision of humanitarian aid (in cooperation with aid organizations), the protection 
of human rights, and the safe return of ‘refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo’ (ibid., 
§ 11). 
The mission in Kosovo therefore had the broadest mandate that had ever been given to a UN peace 
operation (Caplan, 2015). Along with the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established 
later in the same year, Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that they were ‘charged with nothing less 
than helping to rebuild shattered societies almost from scratch’ (UN Secretary-General, 2000: § 5). The 
model of state-building by which UNMIK set out to achieve this task can be observed in two key 
documents: the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (UNMIK, 2001), 
and the Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004). The Constitutional Framework provided the constitution 
by which Kosovo was to be governed, including the organisation of the Assembly of Kosovo and the judicial 
system. It also laid out which powers were to be transferred to the Assembly, and which were to be reserved 
by UNMIK’s Special Representative to the Secretary-General. The reserved powers included the right to 
dissolve the Kosovo Assembly should it act in contradiction to the Security Council mandate (UNMIK, 
2001: § 8.1), demonstrating that ultimate authority was vested in UNMIK rather than the Assembly. 
Meanwhile, the Standards for Kosovo lay out a series of benchmarks that the UN Security Council deemed 
necessary to have been achieved before the independent status of Kosovo would be considered – the so-
called ‘standards before status’ policy (see S/PRST/2004/13). The Standards cover a broad range of aspects, 
including criteria for the functioning of democratic institutions, freedom of movement of all citizens, 
management of the economy, and dialogue between the Kosovo and Serbian governments (UNMIK, 2004). 
While the Constitutional Framework and the Standards for Kosovo indicate the unprecedented extent of 
the authority that the UN took over Kosovo, UNMIK’s authority was directly challenged in 2008, when the 
Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. The Assembly then started a process 
of assuming the powers that, until then, had been reserved by UNMIK, and adopted a new constitution 
‘that does not envisage a real role for UNMIK’ (S/2008/458: § 2). The USA, the UK, and France 
immediately recognised Kosovo’s independence. Russia and China, however, did not. Such disparity among 
the P-5 meant that the Security Council could provide no guidance as to how UNMIK should respond, thus 
leaving it up to the Secretary-General alone to manage (ibid., § 3). The outcome was a loss of authority for 
UNMIK, and ultimately a significant downsizing of the mission. Shortly following the declaration of 
independence, UNMIK recommended that the European Union take on a greater role in Kosovo 
(S/2008/354: § 13). For example, responsibility for ‘policing, justice and customs’ (S/2008/692: § 23) was 
handed over to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Equipment, vehicles, and office space 
were transferred from UNMIK to EULEX (ibid.).  
It can be seen that, in the case of Kosovo, the principal of the consent of the parties was not respected as 
it was in the previously mentioned example of Egypt and Israel. Serbia did agree to the deployment of the 
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UN mission, but coming as it did in the aftermath of NATO’s bombing campaign, the consent of the 
Serbian government could not have been withdrawn as it was in Egypt. This point recalls the previously 
mentioned tension regarding state sovereignty and the aspirations of the UN as responsible for maintaining 
peace and adherence to human rights. In the case of Kosovo, NATO and the UN forced Serbia to relinquish 
sovereignty over Kosovo as a way of stopping the war. The UN mission in Kosovo can therefore be 
understood, in its initial years at least, as representative of the changing attitude to sovereignty that was 
presented in An Agenda for Peace. The sovereign right of the Serbian government was subordinated to the 
need to stop the war. When Kosovo itself had sufficiently developed its governmental institutions, however, 
it was the Kosovo government that in effect withdrew consent to be under UN authority. The support for 
independence from three members of the P-5 has effectively allowed the Assembly of Kosovo to take 
authority away from UNMIK, even while, formally, Resolution 1244 is still in place. As of September 2019, 
UNMIK consists of only 347 personnel.16 
2.4.3 The geopolitics of peace in Kosovo 
The preamble of the Security Council mandate for UNMIK affirms the UN’s commitment to the 
‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, but supports ‘substantial 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo’ (S/RES/1244[1999]: p. 2). These two 
commitments, appearing one after the other, summarise the geopolitical tension into which the United 
Nations deployed. Kosovo is today a de facto independent state, but is only partially recognised. The 
governments of Serbia and Kosovo have engaged in EU facilitated dialogue, but the fundamental question 
of Kosovo’s independence remains unresolved (Bieber, 2015). Within Kosovo itself, four Serb-majority 
municipalities in the north of the region do not recognise the independence of Kosovo, and look instead to 
the Serbian government as legitimate (see later chapters for more on northern Kosovo).17 Kosovo Serbs in 
these municipalities have been allowed to vote in Serbia’s elections, even after Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence (see S/2012/603: §§ 4-5). In the more recent past there have even been 
discussions of a potential ‘land swap’, whereby portions of Kosovo would be ceded to Serbia and vice-versa 
(Capussela, 2018). These are some of the contradictions and tensions that UNMIK operates within, which 
have shaped the possibilities for peace in Kosovo over the past two decades, and will continue to do so.  
Kosovo is therefore an exceptional case through which to consider the interaction between international 
organisations and the state, and how geopolitics can shape possibilities for peace. Nationalism and the 
assertion of statehood were central to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and its corresponding wars (Denitch, 
1994). In Kosovo, the UN assisted in ‘autonomy and self-government’ as a means towards establishing a 
lasting peace. The question of the state is central to the case of Kosovo. A consideration of the politics of 
‘stateness’ (Painter, 2006) is required for explanations of both the war, and the attempts to build peace. This 
thesis examines the ambiguities and paradoxes that are implicated in the Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo as a way of shedding light on the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace. 
 
16 Figure taken from the official UNMIK webpage. See  https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmik  
17 The four municipalities are: North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of United Nations peace operations and has sought to demonstrate 
their potential as a topic through which to explore the geopolitics of peace. In particular, I have noted the 
changing character and methods of UN peace missions following the Cold War. The chapter has also 
introduced the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and emphasised the geopolitical factors that 
shape the possibilities for peace in Kosovo.  
The UN is a prominent actor in what has been termed ‘international society’ (Gorman, 2012; Mayall, 1990) 
–  the organisations, networks, and ideas, that form and operate across national boundaries. As such, it has 
from its beginnings involved tensions between its multilateral methods in the pursuit of universal norms, 
and the assertion of sovereign interests on the part of national governments. The interaction between the 
UN and its individual Member States therefore shapes the capacities of the organisation. Cooperation 
among states across the world means that the UN has the potential to orchestrate ambitious multilateral 
action on global issues. And yet, as the example of the P-5 veto demonstrates, multilateralism has often 
been stalled by the disagreement of individual governments.  
This is just one of the ways in which the UN’s pursuit of peace is a geopolitical matter. As relations among 
the P-5 improved after the Cold War, there was a burst of activity in the UN’s efforts for peace. Not only 
was there a rapid increase in the number of missions deployed, but the mandates and methods of the 
operations began to change dramatically as well. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace laid out 
a vision for UN peace operations that was more interventionist and broader in scope. This, too, was shaped 
by geopolitics. The end of the Cold War saw a trend towards the dissolution of some states, not least the 
break-up of the USSR in 1991. Central governments in some states found their authority challenged by 
separatist movements, sometimes breaking down along ethnic lines (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995). 
This process resulted in ‘the dissolution of multiethnic empires and states, and the emergence of new states 
with contested boundaries’ (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010: 416). The problem of state break-up and civil war, 
combined with a more interventionist vision for peace, meant that UN peace operations began to engage 
far more with matters of internal governance. In particular, the development of transitional administrations 
saw the most comprehensive peace operations that had yet been mandated in the UN’s history. As conflicts 
have changed, therefore, so have the methods of the UN’s attempts to maintain peace.  
All of these factors come together in the case of Kosovo. The Kosovo War occurred in the wake of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, which resulted in a series of ethno-nationalist conflicts. Kosovo was the last of 
these Yugoslav wars, as the ethnic-Albanian majority in the region sought to achieve independence from 
Serbia. The UN’s response was to launch its most comprehensive transitional administration operation. The 
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is therefore an example of the capacity of international 
society to shape the politics of war and peace in a region, with UNMIK actually assuming sovereignty over 
Kosovo. While UNMIK might in part be placed among the ‘proliferation of nation-building’ (McConnell, 
2016: 20) that occurred after the Cold War, it is significant that the transfer to independence is stalled; 
Kosovo has not achieved formal legal independence from Serbia, and is only partially recognised by other 
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states. The post-conflict efforts towards peace in Kosovo are therefore intimately connected to the question 
of its ‘stateness’. It is a case in which the international networks of authority that intervened have both 
enabled and disabled Kosovo’s transfer to independence. The UN mission in Kosovo developed Kosovo’s 
governmental institutions, monitored its borders, dismissed Serbian sovereignty over the region, and so 
greatly aided its autonomy and its capacity to function as a state. And yet, at the same time, the UN never 
committed to Kosovo’s independence and has not recognised its status since the Kosovo Assembly 
unilaterally declared independence in 2008.  
All of the above factors make UNMIK an especially useful example through which to explore the geopolitics 
of a contemporary peace process and the influence of international organisations on the possibilities for 
peace. Patterns of the contemporary political world ‘cannot be neatly summarized in terms of nation-based 
categories’ (Kuus, 2018: 6), and this is certainly true of the politics of peace in Kosovo. Investigating the 
UN’s approach to peace in Kosovo can therefore contribute to efforts in political geography, as a discipline, 
to develop analyses of the transnational character of political agency, and how this agency interacts with the 
more traditional politics of the nation state (Bachmann, 2013; Dittmer, 2014a, 2017; Jeffrey, 2013; Kuus, 
2018, 2019). Having now introduced the main research topics, the next chapter aims to demonstrate how 










3 Literature review: Geographies of peace, the ‘local turn’, and 
international organisations 
3.1 Introduction 
The origins of this thesis can be traced to a module on geopolitics I undertook in my final year as an 
undergraduate. Writing an assignment on external intervention in the Israel-Palestine conflict, I came across 
Nick Megoran’s (2011) call for the study of peace within geography. His assertion was straightforward - 
geographers and geography are ‘better at studying war than peace’ (p. 178). If they want to more effectively 
respond to today’s global problems, geographers must examine the meaning of peace, as well as commit to 
‘building cultures of peace’ (p. 187). In subsequent years, several geographers have critically responded to, 
supported, and broadened the literature on peace (for example Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018; Brickell, 2015; 
Courtheyn, 2018; Koopman, 2011b; Loyd, 2012; Ross, 2011; Springer, 2014; Williams and McConnell, 2011; 
Woon, 2014, 2015). An edited volume dedicated specifically to peace as a geographical topic of study has 
also been published (McConnell et al., 2014). This chapter begins by identifying the key themes in this 
literature regarding how peace can be understood as a concept, and specifically as a geographical concept. 
Peace is not easily defined, and the literature embraces this complexity rather than seeking to be definitive 
about the meaning of peace. How peace is understood varies not only over time and in different places, but 
also according to the frames of reference used to discuss it. To this complexity I apply Simon Dalby’s basic 
definition of critical geopolitical analysis: to ‘explicate the implicit or explicit political implications of 
knowing the world in particular ways’ (Dalby, 2003, in Megoran, 2010b: 385). The present thesis therefore 
becomes an investigation into how the UN knows the world – its ideals of peace – and the implications of 
these ideals when they are pursued in the policies and practice of a peace operation. 
A particularly prominent theme across the peace geographies literature is an attention to ‘the local’ as the 
site of peace’s production, and so of its study. The meaning of ‘the local’ in this literature broadly consists 
of two main elements. The first element regards the meaning of peace itself – that is, it seeks to foreground 
how peace is understood in a specific local context, by the people who live there. Such local understandings, 
it is suggested, are marginalised by a hegemonic, western, ‘liberal’ understanding of peace, which presumes 
to be universally applicable (Daley, 2014). The second element of ‘the local’ regards the forms of political 
agency that are involved in producing peace. Rather than looking at the role of powerful actors such as 
governments, statesmen, and elites, a local approach attends to the everyday forms of interaction and agency 
among ordinary people (Williams, 2014). Foregrounding the local and the everyday in this way is sometimes 
referred to as a ‘bottom-up’ account of peace. Focus on the local is not limited to geographers; there has 
also been a ‘local turn’ in peace studies and peacebuilding literature more broadly (Leonardsson and Rudd, 
2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013).  
In examining the United Nations and its state-building practices, this thesis is in some ways moving away 
from a focus on ‘the local’. Indeed, the UN represents precisely the kind of universal, ‘top-down’ version 
of peace that the local-turn wants to disrupt and resist. The second section of this chapter therefore identifies 
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the key arguments regarding this tension between peace as a local process, and peace as guaranteed by 
international organisations and state institutions which the UN would seem to represent. In particular, I 
discuss critiques of the so-called ‘liberal model of peace’, as this is a model with which the UN is especially 
associated (Richmond, 2004). Arguments for peace as a localised process are often framed in opposition to 
the liberal peace. Engaging with these arguments, I justify attending to international organisations like the 
UN, while also maintaining that the critical sensibility of the literature ought not to be lost. A research 
agenda to understand the geopolitics of UN peace operations does not amount to a desire to defend them 
from criticism; but to only dismiss the UN as inadequate risks ignoring what is in fact a key political agent 
shaping peace as a spatial and territorial process in a globalised world.  
As a means of thinking through the tension between ‘the local’ and the ‘liberal peace’, therefore, I turn to 
Spinoza’s relational account of human agency. A Spinozan approach views political agency as a continual 
process of interactions and relations between ideas, people, and the material environment. As such, the 
distinctions between state and non-state in political explanation become blurred, as agency from this 
perspective is considered as a dispersed network of affects, rather than as the rational intent of a unified actor. 
I argue that this is a particularly useful framework through which to study UN peace missions. Each mission 
unfolds within a specific place, but is enabled and constrained by an international network of relations.  
The final section reflects further on the relationship between international organisations and their influence 
on the governance of states. While the literature has critiqued the imposition of dominant models of 
statehood by such organisations, this thesis will develop a line of argument which does not dismiss their 
capacity to positively contribute towards peace.  
3.2 Peace as a geographical concept 
It is difficult to pick a point at which to start a discussion of the meaning of peace. The concept has a long 
history in both western and eastern philosophies, various religions give it prominence in their scriptures, 
and it is deployed politically in numerous and contradictory ways. For the present, however, I begin with 
two distinctions in the understanding of peace, the first made by a pioneering peace campaigner, Jane 
Addams, and the second by the founder of modern peace studies, Johan Galtung. Each demonstrates that 
peace is not a neatly contained category. 
Jane Addams was a pioneering activist for peace, who founded the Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom in 1919. She also established Hull House in Chicago in 1889 as part of the broader ‘Settlement 
Movement’ to alleviate poverty. In her work and activism, Addams collaborated with the philosopher John 
Dewey, with civil rights activist W. E. B. Du Bois, and with lawyer Salmon Levinson, who drafted the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact.18 Her ideas and activism were thus formed in relation to a breadth of political spheres, 
from formal attempts to proscribe war in international law, to radical grassroots movements for peace, social 
reform, and civil rights. In her text, Newer Ideals of Peace, Addams (2008 [1906]) distinguishes between 
different ideals of peace, identifying what she calls the old ideals and the newer ideals. The older ideals, she 
 
18 The Kellogg-Briand Pact was an international treaty ratified in 1928. Representatives of 63 states became signatories 
to the pact, pledging to renounce war as a means of settling disputes (see Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017). 
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argues, have taken two forms: an appeal to morality (e.g. the command to cease from evil), or an appeal to 
prudence (e.g. demonstrating the material cost of war). She recognises the value of such appeals, but argues 
that they are dogmatic, ‘soft and literary’, and articulated in ‘unreal and high-sounding phrases’ (Addams, 
2008 [1906]: 14). These are contrasted with the newer ideals, which Addams sees as manifest in the mixed 
immigrant communities of cosmopolitan US cities. She contends that the mix of different people produces 
an ‘opportunity and necessity for breaking through the tribal bond’ (p. 6), which erases the group morality 
of us vs. them and ‘soak[s] up the notion of nationalism’ (p. 9). It is these newer ideals that Addams suggests 
can provide the principles and foundations for peace as a political force (Mueller, 2011). From this 
proposition comes the central aim of her text: ‘to uncover these newer ideals as we may daily experience 
them in the modern city’ (Addams, 2008 [1906]: 14). Although Addams can be criticised for a certain degree 
of romanticising, even essentialising, poor urban communities (see Brown, 2008), she nevertheless 
anticipates a concern for ‘the local’ in contemporary understandings of peace. Her newer ideals situate the 
meaning and production of peace in an embodied politics of everyday life, with a particular emphasis on 
interaction between different nationalities.  
Johan Galtung (1969) made prominent the distinction between negative and positive peace. Negative peace, 
by Galtung’s definition, is the absence of direct personal violence. Negative peace does not account for 
‘structural’ violence, however. Galtung calls structural violence that which cannot be attributed to an acting 
subject, which may not be readily perceived, and yet which still negatively impacts people’s lives. Examples 
of structural violence include social injustice, forms of inequality, and the ‘unequal life chances’ that follow 
from them (Galtung, 1969: 171; 1990). Positive peace, therefore, is not only the absence of direct violence, 
but also the presence of social justice, which in Galtung’s terms involves ‘egalitarian distribution of power 
and resources’ (Galtung, 1969: 183). This designation of different types of peace begins to destabilize a 
conception of war and peace as being binary opposites. Galtung’s analysis suggests degrees of peace and 
violence, rather than fixed unitary definitions. 
These two distinctions regarding how peace can be conceptualised begin to demonstrate its complexity, and 
indicate the theoretical and methodological breadth that might be brought to bear on questions of peace. 
The literature that specifically examines the geographies of peace maintains an appreciation for this complexity. 
It also seeks ‘to demonstrate the utility of geographical analysis to an interdisciplinary community of scholars 
who study peace’ (Williams et al., 2014: 2). This means approaching peace as a spatial concept: ‘peace is 
inherently spatial: that is to say, it is always shaped by the spaces through which it is produced and 
reproduced’ (Williams et al., 2014: 19). A consequence of a spatial approach is to acknowledge that peace 
has different meanings in different places and times. Indeed, this is a reason why it can be said that peace 
has a geography, and why geographers are in a position to contribute to broader scholarship about peace.  
The study of the spatiality of peace also involves considering how space is shaped by peace and violence, 
and how the possibilities for peace and violence are shaped by space. The segregation of communities along 
the lines of their group identity in cities such as Belfast (Harrowell, 2018) or Mitrovica (Gusic, 2019) is a key 
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example of the spatiality of peace/conflict.19 Such spatiality is, as Gusic (2019: 53) notes, ‘constantly 
produced’, through everyday patterns of behaviour. While both Northern Ireland and Kosovo are more 
peaceful today than when they were experiencing direct violence, the legacy of their respective conflicts is 
manifest in these spatial divisions of the population. If the maintenance of security perhaps relies on such 
segregation, a more radical, positive vision of peace would hope to see these patterns begin to change, 
lessening the degree of separation. Williams and McConnell (2011: 930) therefore speak of a ‘spectrum of 
violence and non-violence’, a conceptualization that accounts for the complex mix of factors that are 
involved in peace as an ongoing process. Varying across different contexts, peace can involve ‘processes of 
negotiation, co-existence and friendship, as well as tension and hostility’ (ibid., 930). It can have setbacks, it 
needs to be negotiated and renewed, and requires commitment in the face of adversity.  
Laliberte (2014) demonstrates the sometimes paradoxical connections between peace and conflict 
empirically. Her example is a voluntary human rights organisation in Uganda, run by women, who organise 
and facilitate the provision of services and resources for communities impacted by the war in the 2000s. 
Laliberte notes that, whilst this organisation enacts peaceful practices in a context of war, it was precisely 
the ‘social upheaval’ of the war that allowed a group of women to ‘participate in realms of life formerly 
deemed masculine’ (ibid., 50). Williams (2007, 2013, 2014) similarly reveals such contradictory elements in 
her account of Hindu-Muslim relations in northern India. Focusing particularly on Hindu-Muslim 
collaboration in the silk industry, Williams observes that whilst this has led to cooperation, friendship, and 
a prevalent discourse of ‘Hindu-Muslim brotherhood’, it also maintains the Muslim populations’ 
subordinate status in the city. Cooperation, stability, tension, conflict, peaceful practices and violent 
practices thus occur simultaneously, and can be inter-connected in paradoxical ways. It is important that the 
study of peace acknowledges and investigates such intricacies in order to pursue a greater understanding of 
the elements at play in any context of conflict resolution or peace process. Failure to take these factors into 
account risks portraying peace ‘as a mythical singular […] so abstract as to be unobtainable’ (Koopman, 
2011b: 194). Like Jane Addams’ newer ideals, the incentive is to study peace as something which is 
experienced, amongst people, in places. There is thus an incentive for research in multiple contexts, thereby 
adding to our understanding of the ‘highly differentiated landscape’ (Williams and McConnell, 2011: 930) 
of peace.  
Taking into account the complexity of peace just outlined, it is clear that there is broad scope for different 
understandings of peace. As is implied by Jane Addams’s distinction between old and newer ideals, the 
different ways that peace is understood will have differing political implications. Addams promoted her 
newer ideals because she felt they would provide greater political utility than the old ideals – that is, she felt 
the pursuit of peace would be more successful if it was informed by the newer ideals of peace which she 
derived from her experience among poor immigrant communities of US cities. This thesis is likewise 
 
19  In parts of Belfast, Northern Ireland, Protestants and Catholics reside in distinct neighbourhoods, often 
distinguishable by the flags and murals displayed in each area. Some of these neighbourhoods are separated by high 
barriers – so-called ‘peace-walls’ – intended to maintain the security of residents. 
Mitrovica, in Kosovo, is characterised by the near total segregation of ethnic Serbs from ethnic Albanians. The Ibar 
river, which flows through the city, forms the demarcation line, with Serbs resident in the northern part of the city, 
and Albanians resident in the southern part. 
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concerned with the ideas that shape the pursuit of peace, but focuses on a quite different political actor: the 
United Nations. While a contemporary UN peace mission is a radically different context to that in which 
Addams worked, it is nevertheless the case that the UN, too, operates according to its own ideals of peace. 
This thesis therefore seeks to identify the UNs peaceful ideals, and to investigate how they have been put 
into practice in Kosovo. In this way, I see the thesis as following Simon Dalby’s definition of critical 
geopolitics, to ‘explicate the implicit or explicit political implications of knowing the world in particular 
ways’ (Dalby, 2003, in Megoran, 2010b: 385). How the UN ‘knows the world’ – in this case, how it 
conceptualises peace and the causes of peace – has shaped the possibilities for peace in Kosovo over the 
last two decades.  
As well as being applied in a different context, the UN’s ideals are a product of a very different environment 
to those that Addams promoted. The UN Charter was developed by the leaders of the ‘Great Powers’ during 
WWII; peace operations are directed from the UN HQ in New York, by Secretaries-General who are elite 
statesmen; and policy reviews are carried out by panels of expert diplomats (for more on the UN's policy 
making process, see Sharland, 2018). While I therefore see this thesis as contributing to the peace 
geographies literature, it must be acknowledged that a focus on UN peace policy would appear to disregard 
those accounts which advocate a focus on the local in our understanding of peace. Indeed, the hegemonic, 
‘top-down’ nature of the UN’s approach to peace has been explicitly critiqued within the peace geographies 
literature (Daley, 2014; Vogel, 2018). The following section therefore takes up this challenge, to consider 
the question of political scale and where the production of peace is located.  
3.3 The ‘local turn’ and the ‘liberal peace’: who is responsible for peace? 
One of the claims Megoran (2011) makes, in his call for geographies of peace, is that geographers have 
studied warfare and violence in greater depth than they have peace or nonviolence. Geopolitics, as a sub-
discipline within geography, has been particularly associated with issues of violence, conflict, and warfare. 
In its original ‘classical’ form, geopolitics was concerned with empires and ‘Great Powers’ (Dittmer, 2014b; 
Ó Tuathail, 2006). It was a branch of geographical inquiry that related to imperialist strategy and competition 
over territories, notable examples being the work of Halford Mackinder (e.g., 1904) and Friedrich Ratzel 
(e.g., 2018 [1901]). After falling into disrepute post-World War II,20 the present day engagement with 
geopolitics is from a critical perspective, seeking to deconstruct the logics and power relations that were 
present in classical geopolitical scripts, and those that continue today (Dalby, 1991; Megoran, 2010a; Ó 
Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). A critical approach argues that the politics of space, identity, 
and competition - which classical geopolitics treats as natural facts - are in fact constructed through 
geopolitical discourse and are imbued with relations of power. 
Much of critical geopolitics has maintained a focus on nation states and the powerful actors involved in 
governing them (Gilmartin and Kofman, 2004; J.P. Sharp, 2000). In response, feminist geographers have 
expressed the need to understand the manifestation of geopolitics at other scales, particularly the ways in 
which global processes and discourses are experienced in different local contexts, that is, as reflected in 
 
20 Although see Klinke (2018) for an investigation into the continuation of classical German geopolitics after the War. 
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embodied practices and relations  (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001). An important part of this shift 
towards embodied understandings is its project of political alternatives. This, too, is seen as being absent 
from the critical approach to geopolitics. As Hyndman (2004: 309) puts it, ‘feminist geopolitics is 
distinguished from critical geopolitics by adding a potentially reconstructive political dimension to the 
crucial but at times unsatisfactory deconstructionist political impulses’. For Koopman (2011a), this means 
engaging with geopolitics ‘as it is being done by bodies “in the streets”’ (p. 277).  
Related, and building upon the outlined feminist critique, are those who advocate attention to the emotional 
elements that influence social processes and subjective experiences of space and place (Anderson and Smith, 
2001; Pain, 2009). ‘Emotions are an intensely political issue’ (Anderson and Smith, 2001: 2), and they play a 
role in structuring people’s lives. Take, for example, an analysis of women’s fear of violence and their use 
of public space (Valentine, 1989; see also Pain and Smith, 2008). Similarly, Shuttleworth and Anderson 
(2002) examine fear as a factor in the structuring of the Northern Irish labour market. This latter example 
corroborates the above point that broader geopolitical processes (in this case the history of British-Irish 
political relations) have practical and spatial implications in people’s everyday lives. Woon (2014) has also 
demonstrated the value of a focus on emotion, specifically in the study of nonviolence. He argues that 
recognizing nonviolence only as a logically planned strategy ignores the way emotions can be ‘motivating 
factors for nonviolent actions’ (p. 663). Attending to emotion is part of his project to understand the actual 
workings of nonviolence – to understand the ways in which nonviolence comes to be chosen as an alternative 
to violence in the face of provocation. From this perspective, to ignore emotion leaves a void in our 
knowledge about the world and how to intervene in it.  
These differing approaches to the study of geopolitics raise a key question to explore in the examination of 
contemporary peace activities. The question is one of political scale, and at which level peace is best 
understood. That peace is achieved through the agreement of political power-holders is a prominent view, 
derived from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and present still in the ‘liberal’ model of peace that 
organisations such as the UN represent today. The liberal understanding of peace, as discussed in chapter 
1, sees peace as guaranteed by democracy, rule of law, and market-led development. Yet the feminist and 
emotional approaches just outlined would urge attention to how a politics of peace is embodied and 
experienced amongst individuals and communities. This latter understanding is particularly convincing in 
consideration of conflicts between different self-identifying ‘communities’ who live in the same place, such 
as Loyalists and Republicans in the Northern Irish Troubles, or in Williams’ example of Muslims and Hindus 
in Varanasi. In these cases, peace is not just a matter of legal agreement and stable governance, it is also 
about transforming the relationships between people whose everyday lives are shaped by social division and 
fear.  
This concern for peace as a ‘bottom-up’ local process is not limited to human geography – there has similarly 
been a ‘local turn’ in peace studies more broadly (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2013). Advocates of the local approach justify it in similar ways to those in political geography, including as 
part of a critique and response to the liberal peace. They see it as a way of including marginalised voices, 
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and marginalised agency, that have been ignored by mainstream peacebuilding discourse, leading to insensitive 
and ineffective interventions (Berents, 2015).  
Laliberté (2016: 28), however, criticises what she calls the ‘downscaling of responsibility to the site of the 
individual’ in discourses of peace. Her evidence is drawn from Uganda, and the various governmental and 
NGO discourses regarding the peace process following civil war. Laliberté shows that there are a series of 
othering narratives within this context, which locate the problem of violence in northern Uganda, more 
specifically among the Acholi people, and more specifically still, rural Acholi men. She shows that this is 
where peacebuilding NGOs have focused their efforts, addressing domestic violence and local disputes in 
rural areas, instituting training programmes for non-violent dispute resolution, and thus treating ‘the 
“bellicose” nature of Acholi masculinity’ (p. 29, quotation from an interviewee). The history of conflict in 
Uganda, Laliberté argues, comprises a complex mix of international, national, and regional factors. Yet when 
the problem of violence is discursively situated at the level of the individual, the task for peacebuilders 
becomes to change individuals’ behaviour, rather than engage the broader structural/political factors. She 
writes that, ‘By isolating the causes of violence in the bodies of rural Acholi men, professional peacebuilders 
are able to simultaneously establish a site of violence and identify the behaviour that needs modification 
(Laliberté, 2016: 29). Therefore, as a neat antithesis to critiques of peace in state and legal structures, 
Laliberté observes that making peace the duty of localised individuals is not without its own problems and 
exclusions. Namely, that it ‘obscures the causes and implications of war’ (p. 31), and essentialises certain 
people and places as violent, thus ignoring the roles of international and national actors who can ‘perpetuate 
the idea that they are outside the systems of violence’ (p. 30).   
Laliberté’s critique warns the researcher to be alert to the discursive framings of space in programmes of 
development and peacebuilding. The construction of such narratives shapes the practice of the organisations 
and justifies their actions. Laliberté here argues that the orientalism she identifies functions across the 
various actors involved in peace activities:  
their ability to agree upon a site of intervention – in the case of northern Uganda this is the rural 
home of the prominent ethnic group, the Acholi – says less about the centrality of this site to the 
creation of peace than it does about the centrality of this site in maintaining the networks of mutual 
legitimization between peacebuilding partners (Laliberté, 2016: 25). 
The critique also cautions against an understanding of peace that focuses on localised issues to the extent 
that the broader forces shaping contexts of conflict and peace are ignored. It seems, then, that what is 
required is to take seriously both the critiques of the liberal peace justifying the attention on local 
articulations of peace, and the inevitable influence of states, institutions, and organisations. Indeed, there is 
a danger of creating a binary here – the liberal peace vs. the local peace. This tendency has been noticed by 
other scholars reflecting on the ‘local turn’ in peace studies (Behr, 2018; Heathershaw, 2013). Furthermore, 
as Macaspac (2019) points out, the local should not be romanticised. There is an immediate problem in the 
very assumption that there are more ‘authentic’ peaceful agencies manifest locally, as opposed to the 
‘inauthentic’ liberal peace. By what measure is it decided what is authentic and what is not? In this regard, 
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Randazzo (2016: 1357) observes an ‘unwillingness to engage with the local turn’s own normative 
aspirations’. That is, while these studies choose to focus on local agencies as an alternative to the liberal 
peace, there is normative judgement in what they choose to foreground. It is quite possible for forms of 
local agency to resist the liberal norms of peacebuilding, and yet at the same time these agencies might 
themselves be violent, or ethno-nationalist. If these complexities are not sufficiently included in analyses of 
‘the local’, there is a risk that this kind of research ‘seeks to access these more “authentic” expressions of 
agency while “outlawing” other “unbecoming” actors and behaviours’ (Randazzo, 2016: 1357). 
I want my analysis of the UN in this thesis to remain cognizant of the critiques of the liberal peace. I also 
want to avoid reproducing any false binary between local peace and liberal peace. While a conceptual 
distinction between the two can usefully inform analysis of the different agencies shaping peace, it is possible 
to think of the international and the local not as distinct spheres but as co-constituted in any context of 
intervention and peacebuilding. As Heathershaw (2013: 280) writes regarding Kosovo: ‘The more interesting 
question is not the degree of internationalisation […] but how it combines with certain forms of localisation, 
licit or illicit, to produce more or less stable outcomes’. A more nuanced account of the relationship between 
‘global’ and ‘local’ is exemplified by Björkdahl and Gusic (2015), who discuss the ways in which local political 
actors in Kosovo engage with, co-opt, and resist the norms of the international peace operation. 
It is in light of this that I want to now turn to an aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy – his account of the external 
determination of human agency. I suggest that adopting Spinoza’s perspective on agency leads to 
understanding the politics of peace as something that emerges through inter-subjective relationships 
between people, but which nevertheless is shaped by larger institutions, by material environments, and by 
history, all of which are implicated in the present order of things. I argue that Spinoza’s philosophy provides 
a way of articulating the co-constitution of ‘bottom-up’ agency and ‘top-down’ agency, and so can avoid 
producing a binary between liberal and local peace. A Spinozan framework also provides a set of concepts 
and measures by which to assess the ways that institutions, states, and organisations contribute to the 
production of positive peace, notably through his account of affects. The consequences of this for analysing 
the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace are indicated in the following section, but are explored 
in greater detail in chapter 4.  
3.3.1 Spinoza, affect, and agency 
In his text, Ethics, Spinoza (1996 [1677]) offers an account of the nature of existence, which he 
conceptualises as constituting one connected whole (God, or Nature). This claim provides the foundation 
for all of his further philosophy, including his politics. From this starting point, Spinoza argues that human 
agency cannot be otherwise than a product of relations between the human and non-human bodies that 
constitute reality. This necessary relation to external causes means that humans are constantly subject to 
affects, modifications of our bodies and minds, which can be positive or negative for us (E III def3). If the 
change is positive, i.e. it increases the body’s power of acting, this is named joy (def aff II). If the change is 
negative, i.e. it decreases the body’s power of acting, this is named sadness (def aff III). By ‘power of acting’, 
Spinoza means an individual’s capacities to be an adequate cause of things – ‘joy and sadness are simply the 
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passage to a greater of lesser power of acting, a greater or lesser ability to bring about certain effects’ (Della 
Rocca, 2008: 156). Our power of acting is therefore constantly subject to modification by the things we 
encounter, and changes throughout our lives. A new-born baby, for example, has a relatively low power of 
acting – it has not yet developed the capacities to bring about effects that it will have as it gets older. Its 
capacities thus increase as it grows – but, crucially, the sources of these capacities are in large part external to 
it. Its capacities to act do not originate within itself, they are rather a product of its relations to external 
things. Our power of acting therefore relies on a great many things external to us which assist our capacity 
to persevere in our existence and to pursue our interests. These external things include the air we breathe, 
the food and drink that sustains us, our networks of friends and neighbours, the tools and appliances that 
allow us to achieve what we could not do with our bare hands – the list could go on and on. The point is 
that our capacities to think and act in the world are reliant on a whole host of things external to us. We are 
constantly enabled and disabled by the things in our environment.  
Elsewhere (Bregazzi, 2016), I have written about how the affects connect to explanations of conflict: 
These instances, by which we undergo changes that we neither control nor understand, Spinoza 
calls passions. So long as people are led by passions, they can be contrary to one another (E IV p34), 
as they are affected differently and have different desires. Such disparity of desire is the source of 
conflict, hatred, fear and so on. Importantly, the passions do not have to be based in truth – it is 
enough that we imagine or associate something with a positive or negative impact on us, and are 
thereby affected by it ‘accidentally’ (III p15) (see also Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018). 
A relational account of agency can therefore avoid a ‘neoliberal individualization of responsibility’ (Laliberté, 
2016: 28), because affect theory explicitly rejects the notion of a self-determined individual subject. Spinoza’s 
relational ontology posits the determination of external causes. It attends to the influences that are in the 
material environment, and the various elements, human and non-human, material and discursive, that shape 
any given context, or assemblage (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; Dittmer, 2014a). If people are contrary to 
each other, as in violent and divided societies, the source of the conflict does not originate in the individual 
human, but is a result of networks of causation that have shaped them – the passions that they have been 
subject to whereby they perceive the other to affect them negatively.21 It is this same attention to networks 
of causation that enables affect theory to avoid Laliberté’s charge of ignoring factors that are outside of the 
immediate context of peace or conflict, but which nevertheless have played a role in shaping it. 
Not only must a relational account attend to the influence of events in other places, it must also acknowledge 
the influence of history, which is always implicated in the current state of things. Feigenbaum et al. (2013) 
have demonstrated this in an examination of the micropolitics of affect in a Canadian Occupy protest camp. 
Their fieldwork found that the historic debates and tensions around use of the French or English language 
in Canada caused some upset in the protest camp. This tension was heightened at ‘General Assemblies’ in 
 
21 It is useful to note that the Latin passio, from which ‘passion’ derives, has shared etymological roots with ‘passive’ 
(passivus). That is, it refers to something that is undergone, or done to us, rather than something we do. In Spinoza’s 
account, it is impossible for an individual to avoid being determined by passions. This becomes a crucial aspect of his 
political theory, discussed further in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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a way that it was not in the everyday life of the camp, demonstrating how different spaces can provoke 
different affective responses; whether to speak in English or French became contentious in the assemblies, 
where outside of the formal meetings it was not (Feigenbaum et al. 2013). Similarly, Fregonese (2012) 
incorporates an analysis of how the Ottoman rule and French Colonial history of Lebanon is implicated in 
the contemporary social divisions and violence in Beirut. Ash Amin (2010), examining racism, has referred 
to such influences as ‘debris from the past’ (p.9) that remains present in the everyday affective ‘doings’ of 
racial difference. Furthermore, he uses the concept to explicitly critique any naturalized discourse of 
difference, and so supports Laliberté’s argument against the designation of a specific place or people as 
being inherently violent. What has been essentialised as a social given (e.g., Acholi men are violent) is 
revealed to be a product of history.  
The above examples focus on micropolitics in specific contexts, but also acknowledge the historical lines 
that shape the reality of the present, or the influence of events happening in other places. Such elements 
form part of the understanding of the present assemblage, and so thinking in terms of affect is compatible 
with, and arguably requires, this attention to broader historical and material factors – ‘what composes a 
human world may be anything but proximate to it, let alone human’ (Povinelli, 2011: 8).  
When developing political explanations, then, a relational understanding of agency blurs any distinctions 
between scales. Instead, relationality thinks in terms of networks of affect, whereby lines of causation 
incorporate bodies that are both local and further afield. An encounter between two people, for example, 
might produce an unexpected change in subjectivity and relation, through ‘challeng[ing] assumptions, 
normalised modes of perception and ways of thinking and acting’ (Wilson and Darling, 2016: 8). But from 
the perspective of Spinoza’s relational ontology, larger groups and institutions are still part of the complex 
of affects. It no longer makes sense to think of the local relationship and the state institution as separate 
political spheres, because all of reality is constituted through relations between things, and this is as true for 
a human body as it is for a nation state (E II L7s). Institutions also affect and are affected; the state, which 
is equally a product of a network of relations determining events, ‘can bring about the liberation of its 
citizens[…] by helping to reorient their emotions or affective dispositions’ (Steinberg, 2009: 47).  
Chapter 4 of this thesis will explore in more detail how a relational understanding of agency provides 
concepts and measures by which to assess the influence of institutions, states, and organisations on the 
possibilities for peace. The point that I want to emphasise, for now, is that a relational ontology, and its 
accompanying understanding of agency, can usefully guide an enquiry into how international organisations 
like the UN might contribute to peace. Indeed, as globalisation has increased, societies are increasingly 
subject to international determinants, both formal governmental institutions, and less formal networks of 
communication and organisation. A Spinozan account could even characterise globalisation as a process by 
which people’s power of acting becomes subject to the affects of ever broader networks, as a global 
economy, communication technology, and networks of transnational organisations mean that people are  
‘more immediately and easily affected by others’ (Sharp, 2005: 597). A further point to emphasise, therefore, 
is that these networks of affect spread across state boundaries, such that an explanation of events, e.g. 
outbreaks of war or movements towards peace, cannot be neatly contained within the domestic politics of 
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a state. The next section of this chapter elaborates further upon the relationship between international 
organisations and states, and how they have been understood as contributing to peace. 
3.4 International organisations and the nation state 
- [T]he state does not exist as such, but is an emergent effect of a range of practices occurring at a 
range of sites (Dittmer, 2017: 5). 
Peace, as a concept and ideal, has a long association with sovereign nation states. The Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) is a key reference point in literature on peace, international relations, and the nation state as 
understood in its modern form. Ending the Thirty Years War in Europe, the treaties Westphalia treaties 
included various territorial settlements among the major European powers (Croxton, 2013; Gross, 1948). 
The treaties therefore gave rise to, or at least have given a name to, the ‘Westphalian system’ of sovereign 
nation states. There is, in fact, disagreement among historians as to how far the Peace of Westphalia can be 
seen as establishing state sovereignty as it is understand today (Croxton, 1999; Osiander, 2001). For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, such debates are secondary to what the treaties have come to represent 
for understanding peace as a concept. The ‘Westphalian system’ represents a certain ideal of peace as 
something that is maintained through formal agreement between sovereign states.  
Kant’s (2009 [1795]) essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’, for example, maintains the necessity of legal agreement, 
specifically between ‘republics’, which Kant views as the legitimate form of government with which treaties 
can be established. It is the legacy of such ideas that exists in what contemporary scholars call the ‘liberal’ 
model of peace (Doyle, 2005), a model with which the UN is associated (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2006). 
Indeed, Gross (1948) interprets the UN Charter as part of a legacy of international law beginning with 
Westphalia. A key theme of this research, therefore, is a concern with the role of the state in relation to the 
geopolitics of peace. The tendency of peacekeeping mandates to increasingly contain elements of building 
state-capacity, juxtaposed alongside the transnational character of the UN and other peace organisations, 
raises lines of enquiry regarding political agency and responsibility for peace, and the ways in which 
geographies of peace relate to ‘statization’ (see Painter, 2006).  
What, therefore, is the state? The theoretical grounding of this research is in a relational ontology, derived 
from Spinoza (1996 [1677]) and contemporary applications of his philosophy (Armstrong, 2009; Lord, 2017; 
Sharp, 2011, 2017; Steinberg, 2009). Following the above outlined relational ontology, the state cannot be 
conceptualised as an ontologically distinct entity. As with everything else in Nature, a state is constituted 
out of relations between things, or ‘modes’, to use Spinoza’s term. While Spinoza might argue that a ‘civil 
state’ is an advantageous way of organising ourselves (E IV p37s2; TP 3/6), it remains an ‘individual’ made 
up of individuals, affecting and affected (Balibar, 2008; Sharp, 2017). This understanding of the state 
corresponds with others who have sought to avoid reifying ‘The State’ as a unified agent, and yet who 
nevertheless recognise that state effects should not simply be dismissed from political analyses (Dittmer, 
2017; Mitchell, 1991). While critics of a statist approach to political explanation rightly reject any 
metaphysical status of the state, ‘[s]uch criticisms ignore the fact that this is how the state very often appears 
in practice’ (Mitchell, 1991: 91, emphasis added). As Painter (2006: 771) puts it, ‘stateness is not an illusion, but 
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is actualized in countless mundane social and material practices within and outside the institutions 
conventionally referred to as the state apparatus’.  
This notion of the state as an effect of a process, rather than a pre-given unified actor in itself, is shared by 
assemblage theory. In assemblage theory, there are no ‘ontological distinctions between levels of existence’ 
(DeLanda, 2016: 13). Dittmer (2017) utilises assemblage theory to get past a binary between state and non-
state, or between formal political institutions and everyday life, in his studies of diplomacy and foreign 
policy. He expresses a desire ‘to rehabilitate the state within political geography’ (p. 6), arguing that 
assemblage theory allows for this whilst remaining attentive to the everyday. The reason assemblage theory 
allows for this is because of its focus on the relational nature of reality. Things that may well be perceived 
as coherent unified agents, such as a state, an institution, an individual human, are assemblages of relations 
between elements that constitute them and sustain their continued existence. These elements are material 
and discursive, human and non-human, living and non-living. From different arrangements of bodies, 
materials and ideas, emerge different capacities (Dittmer, 2014a). While assemblage theory is applicable to 
all of nature, political geography is most concerned with human society, and so Dittmer uses the term ‘body 
politic’ to designate ‘any assemblage in which human bodies participate[…]and which shape the political 
cognition of those participating in them’ (Dittmer, 2017: 11). This conceptualisation applies to ‘the state’ as 
much as to any other assemblage, small or large – ‘the state is not special; it is simply one body politic among 
many’ (Dittmer, 2017: 11). What we call ‘the state’ is itself a complex and continually becoming assemblage 
of bodies, materials, and ideas, organised in such a way as to produce all of its various capacities. Its 
capacities may be much greater than that of smaller bodies politic, but it is not distinct in nature. Formal 
boundaries cannot be placed around an assemblage, because they are constantly interacting with other 
assemblages, and their own internal constituents are constantly changing too, altering their capacities to 
affect and be affected (Dittmer, 2014a, 2017). 
A relational understanding of agency can therefore help fulfil Heathershaw’s (2013) entreaty that we 
investigate the co-constitution of the liberal peace and the local peace in cases of peace interventions. A UN 
mission does not deploy into a vacuum. It functions within the patterns, practices, institutions, and habits 
that constitute the local context in which it intervenes. An appreciation for both top-down and bottom-up 
factors in shaping the capacities of any assemblage is better placed to pursue understandings of this 
interaction. As Heathershaw puts it: ‘By essentialising the nature of the state or the international 
intervention, or by drawing a binary between internal and external actors, the analyst is blind to how the 
formal is intertwined with the informal, the international with the local and the liberal reform with the 
security imperative’ (p. 282). Adopting an assemblage approach avoids such binaries and essentialisations.  
In turning attention to international organisations involved in peace, therefore, the question of the state 
here is one of the ‘range of practices’ and ‘sites’ (Dittmer, 2017: 5) that are involved in the emergence of a 
‘peaceful’ state. Indeed, peacebuilding as a concept, is closely associated with state-building. ‘State failure’ is 
seen as a cause of civil war and violence (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Helman and Ratner, 1992), for which 
the international response is the restoration of state functions. The previous chapter demonstrated the 
extent to which the UN takes on governance and administration roles in its efforts to establish institutions, 
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build security, and ultimately (in theory) establish the conditions for a sustainable peace (Richmond, 2004; 
Zanotti, 2006). As stated, the UN transitional administrations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste went so far as to 
assume sovereignty over the regions in which they intervened (Bellamy et al., 2010: see chapter 11). The UN 
attempted to establish lasting peace in these regions, in large part through the development of state 
institutions. While the aim in both cases was ultimately to transfer authority over to local administrators, it 
remains an unprecedented geopolitical phenomenon for an external organisation to take sovereignty over 
the domestic administration of a state. Most UN peace operations are not granted this much power over 
the country in which they are deployed. A transitional administration is, however, the most comprehensive 
form of a type of transnational governmental power that has developed along with ‘international society’ 
over the 20th and 21st centuries. Individual state governments increasingly participate in, and are subject to 
the influence of, the governmental power of international organisations. 
3.4.1 Governmental power of organisations 
The agency of international organisations within a globalised political system has been examined by 
Andrijasevic and Walters (2010), addressing the example of ‘border management’ by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM). The IOM is characterised as ‘a major source of intelligence, assessment, 
advice, and technical assistance in connection with national and regional border policies and practices’ 
(Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 979). This description points towards the nature of the relationship 
between the organisation and the nation state. Organisations involved in ‘global governance’, Andrijasevic 
and Walters (2010: 980) suggest, should not be seen as: 
an entirely new regime of power operating on a global level somewhere “above” the world of states 
and much more as a complex of schemes which govern through the elicitation of state agency and 
the regulated enhancement and deployment of state capacity (p. 980). 
It appears, then, that while the means are international in their reach, the intended outcome is ‘a particular 
model of statehood’ (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 983, emphasis added). The authors are therefore 
concerned with the social technologies involved in this interaction between an international organisation 
and the state apparatuses involved in managing a border. Handbooks, training seminars, study visits, lunch 
meetings and so on, are recognised as crucial factors in this governmental process. Organisations, therefore, 
as influential and significant geopolitical agents, are important objects of study for critical geopolitics 
(Bachmann, 2013; Jeffrey, 2013).  
In their analysis, Andrijasevic and Walters remain attentive to the political struggles that accompany border 
management. They note that the technical and seemingly apolitical world of border management masks the 
fact that ‘borders continue to produce hierarchies of access to citizenship and conceals the (political) 
struggles that accompany acts of rebordering’ (p. 996). This attention to the struggle, even violence, 
concealed behind seemingly dull institutional practices is not surprising given the authors adoption of a 
Foucauldian perspective on power, discipline, and governmentality. Foucault’s theoretical framework, and 
his objects of study, are particularly concerned with control, subjugation, and violence, such that his work, 
and work that is inspired by him, is often a project of revealing struggle and violence in society, state 
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apparatuses, and institutions (Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018). This critical approach can be, and is, applied to 
peace, particularly in critiques of the liberal model of peace (Daley, 2014; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Mac Ginty, 
2008; Polat, 2010; Ross, 2011; Shinko, 2008). Zanotti (2006), for example, characterises UN peacekeeping 
as an example of Foucauldian discipline and governmentality (see also Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005). 
She argues that, after the Cold War, the disciplinary and governmental apparatuses that Foucault identifies 
within the modern state were expanded into the international arena. International organisations have 
‘mechanisms to know, monitor and regulate’ (Zanotti, 2006: 152) state governments, and are thus important 
political agents acting across and beyond states. I acknowledge the essential importance of critical accounts, 
and yet, as has been argued elsewhere (Bignall, 2014; Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018), it is necessary to also 
research peace in such a way that the analysis does not exclusively reveal conflict and violence going on 
behind the scenes.  
In adopting a Spinozan conceptual framework, I hope to develop a more positive understanding of how 
international organisations and states might contribute to peace. The intention is not simply to distinguish 
between an idealised version of peace according to Spinoza’s Ethics and the reality that can be observed ‘on 
the ground’. Rather, Spinoza’s relational account of agency can be used to discern that which might 
otherwise not be identified, particularly from the perspective of more dominant political theory, such as the 
realism of international relations, or poststructuralist approaches (e.g. Foucauldian) which 
disproportionately focus analytical attention on violence.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has situated the present thesis within current discussions of peace, geopolitics, and the 
governmental power of international organisations in political geography. In conclusion, I want to re-
emphasise three key areas to which I see this thesis contributing, based on the foregoing discussions.  
The first is an attention to ideals of peace, and how differing ideals have differing political implications. This 
thesis focuses on the peaceful ideals that can be identified in the UN’s peace policies – that is, how the UN 
‘knows the world’ – and investigates how these ideals have played out in the UN Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo. This concern constitutes the main subject matter of chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.  
The second area regards political agency, and where the production of peace is best understood to be 
situated. The peace geographies literature has tended towards a focus on ‘the local’ in its accounts of peaceful 
agencies. These accounts are often framed in opposition to the ‘liberal peace’, which is viewed as an 
hegemonic imposition onto local cultures. Since the UN is considered a key proponent of the liberal peace, 
it was necessary that I address these arguments. I argued that a relational ontology, derived from Spinoza’s 
Ethics, provides an account of agency which can think beyond a binary between the local and the liberal. 
Regarding discussions of agency within political geography, Kuus (2019: 168) states that ‘the question[…] 
is what specifically is revealed and obscured by any specific conception of agency and action’. I hope that 
the relational understanding of agency adhered to in this thesis can reveal new perspectives on how the UN 
influences possibilities for peace. The implications of such a relational ontology on how to assess the UN’s 
contribution to peace are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4 of this thesis. There, I draw from Spinoza’s 
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Political Treatise (2000 [1677]), which considers how best a state can be organised towards the production of 
freedom and peace. Given that this is precisely the endeavour undertaken by the UN mission in Kosovo, 
Spinoza can be utilised in an innovative way to consider the role of both the UN and the state in the 
contemporary geopolitics of peace. 
This leads to the third area to which this thesis contributes, which is the influence of international 
organisations in today’s globalised politics. International organisations represent ‘geopolitical agency in a 
global political space not exclusively determined by territoriality’ (Bachmann, 2013: 410). Examining their 
role in contemporary geopolitics can contribute to efforts to think beyond the nation state, avoiding the 
‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994) of thinking in terms of discreet states, and instead attend to the flows and 
processes of modern politics (Bachmann, 2013). The United Nations Security Council, which provides the 
mandate for all UN peace operations, has been called ‘the apex international organisation’ (Mahapatra, 2016: 
45). For this reason, focusing on UN peacekeeping also entails thinking beyond state-centric accounts of 
geopolitics, a conceptual move that Dittmer (2015) argues is necessary in order to understand the role of 
transnational assemblages in shaping global politics. A relational account of agency does not only provide a 
conceptual language with which to describe such networks. It also has implications for understanding the 
causes of war and peace. Who is responsible for peace if agency is dispersed across networks of causation 
that are not easily influenced and frequently inadequately understood? This is a question that permeates all 
of the chapters of this thesis. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have set out the topics of this thesis and identified the relevant areas to which I see it 
contributing. I have also indicated the themes that are explored in the remainder of the thesis. The next 
chapter takes up the themes that have so far been indicated, and develops a coherent conceptual framework 







4 Peaceful geopolitics: relational ontology and the state 
4.1 Introduction 
In its Principles and Guidelines on peace operations, the UN frequently refers to developing the capacity of the 
state as part of how it defines the aims of a peace mission. To quote one example: 
Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect [sic] the functioning of society and the State, 
and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core 
functions (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). 
In certain peace missions, an association between the ‘core functions’ of the state and the definition of 
peacebuilding is even more apparent. In Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan, the UN facilitated transfer 
to autonomy, or full independence, for a defined territory. The pursuit of peace and the production of 
‘stateness’ are in these cases deeply connected, such that the two cannot be considered separate political 
processes. This chapter is a conceptual investigation into the three principal topics of this thesis - the UN, 
states, and peace. The nature and meaning of these three should not be taken for granted. In order to 
consider questions such as how the state contributes to peace, and whether the transnational agency of the 
UN is changing the role of the state, it is necessary to develop an understanding of what is being referred 
to by the terms ‘the state’, ‘transnational agency’, and ‘peace’. Having so far argued for the inclusion of 
international organisations and states in the geographical study of peace, this chapter develops with more 
detail a conceptual account of how peace itself can be understood in relation to the structures of 
organisations and states. 
The first section considers the position of an idealised category like peace in the complex and messy reality 
of politics. What is the relationship between the political reality of states and organisations, and an ideal that 
in a certain sense can never be realised? I begin by examining the discord between peace and justice – the 
fact that positive understandings of peace are seemingly undermined by critical attention to continuing 
forms of injustice. This tension recalls Jacques Derrida’s sense of justice as aporetic – a radically ethical 
concept, the demand for which is never satisfied in the present. The need to be ever vigilant for operations 
of violence and injustice going on within supposed peace seems to hold a similar sense of peace as an aporia. 
Given the influence of Derrida and deconstruction within critical human geography, it is not surprising to 
find advocates of such vigilant critique (Darling, 2014; Kirsch and Flint, 2011b; Ross, 2011). To articulate 
an understanding of the position of states and organisations relative to an ideal of peace, therefore, I utilise 
Derrida’s analysis of justice and law to try and establish what potential there is for a positive 
conceptualisation of peace from the highly critical perspective of deconstruction. I argue that the need for 
critique remains necessary, but that the very purpose of deconstruction relies on the possibility that there 
can be improvements in the current state of things. Once this is accepted, the next task is to articulate criteria 
by which such improvements might be recognised and assessed. 
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Having argued that there is a relationship between peace and institutional systems – that it is reasonable to 
ask what kinds of institutional patterns could contribute peace – the second section argues for relational 
ontology as a means by which this relationship can be articulated. Drawing again from Spinoza’s philosophy, 
I argue that a relational account of agency collapses the distinction between peace as structural and 
institutional, and peace as localised and embodied. This section argues that Spinoza’s theory is not beholden 
to a logic of either/or, but leads us to consider how the local and the relational are already constitutive of 
institutional and state systems, and that, in turn, institutions and the patterns of social life they engender can 
shape the affects and passions of the population. The tendency towards peace and cooperation or towards 
division and violence is dependent on the kinds of affects and passions that circulate through a population. 
From this perspective, a UN peace mission cannot be understood as a unified actor any more than a state 
is. Rather, through the deployment of people, technology, and a set of ideals and aims, the missions become 
part of the relational process. This theoretical articulation of the relationship between state institutions and 
the extent of social harmony among its citizens provides the criteria and measures with which a state or 
organisation’s contribution to peace might be identified.  
4.2 Utopian ideals in politics: peace and justice 
The peace geographies literature conceptualises war and peace as existing on a spectrum (Koopman, 2011b; 
Williams and McConnell, 2011). It does not treat them as static binary opposites, but instead shows how 
‘violence and peace are intertwined and entangled in complex ways’ (Williams et al., 2014: 6). Yet this 
understanding does not eliminate a sense of peace as a utopian ideal. Indeed, it even seems to confirm it. In 
being vigilant to the ways that peace is always entangled with violence, there is a sense in which every 
expression of peace that can be observed is not quite peace. There are always limits to actual expressions of 
peace, always something that can be pointed to that fails to live up to the name peace. A utopian sense of 
peace remains, therefore, even if it is left unarticulated; it is that which has not yet been realised.  
There is a potential paralysis in this view that I want to avoid. In noting a utopian sense of peace, my aim is 
not to frame war and peace as ‘all-or-nothing opposites’, as Sara Koopman puts it, and so ‘give up on ever 
achieving peace’ (Koopman, 2011b: 193). The reason for raising this point is rather to acknowledge the 
difficulties of trying to develop a position on the relationship between an ideal like peace and the messy 
reality of politics, and then to develop a productive line of inquiry that takes these difficulties into account. 
If the best that can be said about expressions of peace is that they are ‘less-than-violent’ (Darling, 2014), 
what does one look for when studying peace in relation to an organisation like the UN and its state-building 
policies? To begin answering this question, I now turn to a key example of a limiting factor on peace - its 
tension with the concept of justice.  
4.2.1 ‘No justice, no peace’? 
Peace is closely associated with the concept of justice. Martin Luther King Jr. (2003: 181) wrote that positive 
peace is ‘the presence of justice’, an idea similarly advocated by the founder of peace studies, Johan Galtung 
(1969). Williams and McConnell (2011) name justice in their list of ‘peaceful concepts’, and Woon (2014: 
657) states that the intent of nonviolence ‘is to confront injustice in order to increase social justice’. These 
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ideas are echoed in the chants of ‘no justice, no peace!’ at recent protests against police violence in both the 
UK and the USA.22  
Yet critical examinations of peace in geographical literature observe a tension between the concepts of peace 
and justice. Straightforward accounts of what peace means and consists of are destabilized by the 
continuation of injustices such as inequality, poverty, social marginalisation, and so on. This is demonstrated 
by the previously mentioned study of Hindu-Muslim relations in Varanasi, India (Williams, 2007, 2014). 
After two terrorist attacks in the city, a Hindu priest and a Muslim cleric made public appearances together 
and appealed for peace, drawing on a narrative of Hindu-Muslim brotherhood in the city. Williams reports 
that local citizens felt this community-level moral guidance was significant in maintaining calm after the 
violent attacks. Yet, she observes that this particular operation of peace was not manifest as ‘a romantic 
condition in which equality and justice are realized by all’ (Williams, 2014: 205). Muslims in Varanasi remain 
marginalised economically, as well as in education and politics. The maintenance of peaceful relations 
between Hindus and Muslims in this example therefore includes the maintenance of structural inequality. 
To acknowledge this discord, Darling (2014) has used the term ‘less-than-violent’, rather than peaceful, 
when referring to acts of friendship or care across social divides - acts that do not in themselves alter 
underlying structures of injustice. He does so, first, to avoid a simple opposition between violent and non-
violent as discreet opposites, and, second, so as not to conceal the violence that is pervasive throughout 
society. Darling bases this argument on Slavoj Žižek’s (2009) distinction between subjective and objective 
violence. Subjective violence is that which has an identifiable subject responsible for the violent act. 
Objective violence, however, is that which is involved in maintaining the current political and economic 
reality - it is the violence inherent within the ‘“normal” state of things’ (Žižek, 2009: 2). While it is not 
possible to identify a subject responsible for this violence, its effects (inequality, marginalisation, poverty, 
and so on) cannot be denied (see also Galtung, 1969).  
Darling’s empirical case is asylum seekers’ experiences of life in Sheffield, UK. The objective violence in 
this case includes the varying symbolic representations of asylum seekers (as victims; as scroungers; as a 
threat, etc.), and the systemic violence of containment, categorisation, and marginalisation (Darling, 2014). 
Hence ‘less-than-violent’ acts. The positive and welcoming encounters between asylum seekers and citizens 
of Sheffield nevertheless occur within structural forms of violence and injustice, which the caring act in 
itself does not address. Indeed, Darling argues that objective violence is present precisely in the ‘modes of 
dominance that arrange some individuals as capable of acts of compassion and hospitality’ (2014: 238). 
There is, within these accounts and others like them, a warning that we should not lose sight of violence 
and injustice, even as we turn our attention to peace. Indeed, for Ross (2011), the primary critical task is to 
expose the violence within narratives of peace. Outside of geography, Polat (2010) develops an argument 
doing precisely that. Moving ultimately towards a conclusion that ‘peace is war’, Polat critiques a series of 
understandings of peace, arguing that beneath them all is violence and injustice. International, national, 
 
22 A series of police killings of black people in the USA has led to the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement. 
This chant is often used at their protests. Similarly, in the UK, the chant was used in protest after a public inquest ruled 
that the 2011 police killing of Mark Duggan was lawful. 
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governmental, non-governmental, top-down liberal, bottom-up emancipatory - all modes of peace are 
presented as masking violence, as Polat posits conflict and war as an ontological condition. Ignoring this 
constitutive conflict in ideas of peace ‘is in effect only a privileged manifestation of power, hegemonic and 
violent’ (Polat, 2010: 339). 
What do such critiques mean for studying peace, particularly if aiming for a positive understanding of the 
concept? The arguments for uncovering violence and injustice within ‘putative peace’ (Ross, 2011) can be 
placed within a legacy of deconstruction in critical geography and particularly critical geopolitics. Through 
deconstructive critique, scholars have remained attentive to power and violence within what are ordinarily 
considered peaceful norms. Darling’s claim that the very act of hospitality holds within it a mode of 
dominance, for example, has a particularly deconstructive flavour to it (see Derrida, 2000). Derrida himself, 
the originator of deconstruction, treated the concept of justice most notably in his essay ‘Force of Law’ 
(1992). In a later essay, he explored the theme of ‘living together’, and the question of how to live together 
well (Derrida, 2013). Drawing upon his arguments regarding justice, law, and deconstructive critique, 
parallels can here be made with the concept of peace. It supports the argument that we can never be naïve 
or romantic in theorising peace, and that a critical eye is always necessary; yet I argue that this should not 
lead us to giving up on the term peace altogether, as Darling chooses to do. Even within a highly critical 
deconstructive approach, Derrida’s formulation allows that there can be change, progress, and improvement 
within the systems and structures that are the target of critique. As well as revealing systemic violence, 
therefore, there is an additional imperative to conceptualise and research the processes by which such 
progress is made. 
4.2.2 ‘Deconstruction is justice…’ 
In the essay ‘Force of Law’, Derrida makes a distinction between justice and law. Although they are not 
necessarily opposed, justice is never synonymous with the law. The law is always constructed, and thus is 
‘essentially deconstructible’ (Derrida, 1992: 14). This is unlike justice, which Derrida argues is not 
deconstructible. Justice, however, is not here an existing reality – it is the unforeseeable prospect that drives 
the deconstruction of the law (see also Caputo, 1997: chapter 5). The motivation to deconstruct is a desire 
for that which will never come; but the concept of justice remains essential, even if in Derrida’s 
conceptualisation it can never be said that justice has been achieved. This is clarified by Derrida elsewhere: 
You can improve law, you can replace one law by another one. There are constitutions and 
institutions. This is a history, and a history, as such, can be deconstructed. Each time you replace 
one legal system by another one, one law by another one, or you improve the law, that is a kind of 
deconstruction, a critique and deconstruction. So, the law as such can be deconstructed and has to 
be deconstructed. That is the condition of historicity, revolution, morals, ethics, and progress. But 
justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve 
the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for justice we would not have any interest in 
deconstructing the law. That is why I said that the condition of possibility of deconstruction is a 
call for justice (Derrida, 1997: 16). 
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A similar logical structure can also be applied to peace. Peace can be placed in the same position as justice, 
an unforeseeable and un-deconstructible ideal, and the present reality can always be critiqued to show where 
injustice and objective violence continue. But if the law is deconstructed in the name of justice, what is 
deconstructed in the name of peace? What is peace’s limitation in the present?  
Multiple social structures and institutions could be candidates, including, indeed, the law. An example of 
this is offered by critiques of the role of US law as a tactical aid to the ‘war on terror’, (Gregory, 2007; 
Morrissey, 2011). Here, the law is revealed as failing to live up to the standards of peace. Security is another 
broad category that can be critiqued in the name of peace. Security is defined as ‘the state or condition of 
being protected from or not exposed to danger’ (OED). There are various national and international 
processes and institutions that together ensure the basic security of (some) people’s lives. But, to echo 
Derrida, security is not synonymous with peace (see also Dalby, 2014; Ukai, 2009). There will always be 
people excluded from the safety that security measures provide. The security of some will rely on the 
insecurity of others, and violence can be (and is) justified as necessary for continued security (Graham, 2006; 
Ingram and Dodds, 2009). Peace, if it is understood in Derrida’s aporetic sense of justice, is not satisfied by 
the reality of security.  
In ‘Avowing – the Impossible’, Derrida does appear to treat peace in a similar way to his understanding of 
justice. He writes that ‘the peace of “living together”… exceeds the juridical, even the political, at any rate, 
the political as determined by the state’ (Derrida, 2013: 26).23 Rather, living together well ‘supposes an accord 
beyond any statutory condition, not necessarily in contradiction with it, but beyond and across the normality 
of a legal, political, and state-controlled bond’ (ibid., 26). As with justice, then, Derridean critique cannot 
allow that the peace of living together well is guaranteed by legal, political, and state systems.  
To claim that the meaning of peace is not sufficiently captured by a legal or political agreement does not, in 
itself, particularly move the academic discussion of peace in a new or productive direction. At this point it 
is just to assert that Derrida’s logic - that certain concepts, like peace, justice, hospitality, and even democracy 
(see Derrida, 2005) always demand more than the present political reality - seems to capture reliably the 
various calls to remain attentive to how peace is entangled with violence and injustice, as well as the 
criticisms of the liberal model of peace as being inadequate (discussed in the literature review). I said above 
that I wanted to avoid becoming paralysed by such a logic. Koopman (2011b: 193) warns against an 
understanding that would lead us ‘to give up on ever achieving peace’, but that seems to be exactly what a 
deconstructive critique tells us – peace is impossible. Yet, even from this hyper-critical perspective, this is 
not the last word on peace. There are two productive avenues that suggest themselves. 
Firstly, in the above long quotation about justice and law, Derrida twice mentions that the law can be 
improved. The critique of institutions and constitutions does not rule out that they can be better or worse 
when judged against the standards of peace. Derrida’s logic allows that there could be movement towards 
 
23 It is useful to note that the term vivre-ensemble (‘living together’) is used in France to denote what in the UK we call 
‘multiculturalism’ – namely, harmonious cohabitation between different communities (Larousse Dictionnaire de Français). 
This definition gives further credibility to reading Derrida’s essay on ‘living together’ as contributing to an 
understanding of peace. 
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peace, and towards justice. Indeed, deconstruction relies on this possibility. There would be no sense in 
deconstructing the political present if there was no possibility of change. The fact that current systems of 
governance, maintaining the normal state of things, can be deconstructed, means that they can be improved. 
For example, since the end of WWII, European countries have developed political and economic systems 
in the pursuit of greater integration, with the aims of reducing nationalism and improving stability and 
security (Gilbert, 2003; McCormick, 2011). A deconstructive analysis may expose injustice, violence, and 
democratic deficit in the political narratives and structures of what is now the European Union; but it does 
not follow that changes in Europe since WWII have not also been meaningful in terms of people’s well-
being and safety. Derrida (2013: 26) makes it clear that under his logic, justice and the law are distinguished, 
but not necessarily opposed. The same can be said for peace and security. If systems of government, security, 
and law can be flexible, and can change to account for new circumstances and new understandings, it might 
be that they can be more or less enabling of peace-likeness. The criteria by which this might be assessed are 
the subject of the next section of this chapter.  
Secondly, the discussion so far has spoken principally of systems of governance. Without making a strict 
distinction between a ‘formal’ sphere of governance and an ‘informal’ sphere of everyday life (discussed 
further below), it is nevertheless true that political and ethical meaning is also manifest at the level of people’s 
thoughts, feelings, and relationships. There are certain peaceful qualities that are realised here, for example 
trust, friendship, compassion, or forgiveness. Such ‘language of the heart’, as Derrida (2013: 25) calls it, 
cannot be simply produced through the implementation of a rule, a contract, or a policy. It is instead a 
question of ethical relationality – that is, peace and justice as a relation to the other (Bregazzi, 2019; Derrida, 
1997). When Derrida (2013: 27) says that the peace of living together is not contained in a ‘juridico-political 
contract’, and that its meaning exceeds the systems of law and state, it is perhaps only here at the level of 
the affective relationships that make intersubjectivity possible where such criteria could begin to be met. 
For deeply divided societies to move towards peace requires new and transformative relationships between 
people who have a history of violence. Disabling affects like hatred, fear, and resentment must be 
transformed by more powerful enabling affects in order for new understandings between people to emerge 
(Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018; Sharp, 2005). Ethnographic research that focuses on localised everyday peace 
is well placed to uncover and understand the affective and emotional elements involved in peace processes. 
While Darling is therefore right that an act of friendship in Sheffield does not alter the systemic othering of 
the asylum seekers, it is important not to underplay the potential of the everyday, even in the face of 
intractable conflict and/or injustice. In reference to the injustice of systemic racism in the USA, Caputo 
(1997: 130) writes that ‘Before Rosa Parks decided to visit the undeconstructibility of justice upon 
Montgomery, Alabama, […] it was legal, legitimate, and authorized to force African-Americans to the back 
of the bus’. Systems of laws and governance can be disrupted, questioned, and ultimately transformed, by 
acts and relations that exceed the ‘juridico-political contract’. Such everyday acts can put into question the 
conditions that have maintained social division, and so become part of what can improve those systems. 
They are themselves a form of deconstruction, an opening up and questioning of the status quo. 
Chapter 4 
48 
The above discussion suggests a basic analytic framework for peace with three distinguished but related 
elements: 
1. Peace as a utopian ideal – an undeconstructable and unforseeable future that provides the drive and 
the impulse to deconstruct the current state of things. 
2. Peace in state and legal systems and institutions. These may never be free from objective forms of 
violence, but they are amendable and can be improved. Deconstructive critique of these systems is 
therefore necessary. It interrogates the limits of our conceptions of peace and insists on recognising 
where improvements are needed. 
3. Peace in the thoughts, feelings and actions of people and their relationships, where narratives and 
representations might be put into question, and new associations might be created. Such acts and 
relations can contribute to the improvement of the structures of security and law. 
Keeping in mind these distinctions maintains an appreciation for the complexity of peace as discussed in 
the literature review. They maintain the importance of ‘the local’ as a site of peace’s production, while not 
discounting that political structures such as state institutions and the law can contribute to greater or lesser 
‘peace-likeness’ among citizens.  
The question of how a state might contribute to peace is of central importance to an analysis of the United 
Nations peace project. UN peace operations explicitly aim to restore ‘the State’s ability to provide security 
and maintain public order’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 25). Critique and deconstruction of the institutional patterns 
that UN peace operations support is therefore a continual necessity, as one way through which those 
structures might improve. This is a task that academic researchers are well placed to carry out, but it should 
not be forgotten that the UN itself engages in self-critique. Following the Srebrenica massacre and the 
Rwandan genocide in the 1990s, both of which occurred in spite of a UN peacekeeping presence, the 
Secretary-General commissioned investigations into each tragedy, as well as the Brahimi report which 
provided a comprehensive critique of the UN’s approach to peace (UN General Assembly, 2000).24 The 
organisation continues to commission reviews of its peace operations. The most recent ‘Review of the 
Peacebuilding Architecture’ was published in 2015, and there is another review due in 2020 (Lebada, 2019). 
Similarly, in 2018, Secretary-General António Guterres launched the ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ agenda 
(Guterres, 2018). Supported by a Security Council resolution, Action for Peacekeeping is directed at ‘the 
need to enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations peacekeeping’ 
(S/RES/2436[2018]: 2). The content of these reports and resolutions, as well as others besides, is analysed 
in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. For now, the point is simply that, as per the above conceptualisation of 
peace as a radical ideal, there will never come a time when the UN cannot be critiqued in the name of peace. 
United Nations peace operations do not only have to be approached through the second level of the above 
framework, however. They might also be analysed in relation to the third level, the thoughts, feelings, and 
actions of people in the post-conflict environment. Doubtless it is difficult to ascertain how institutional 
 
24The individual report for Srebrenica can be accessed with document code A/54/549. The report for Rwanda is 
document code S/1999/1257. 
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patterns and organisations might shape the possibilities for peaceful criteria at this level. A policy to conduct 
an election or to establish a secure border is one matter, and it is comparatively easy to judge whether the 
outcome of such a policy was successful or otherwise. But how would a policy produce a change in peoples’ 
subjectivity, and in their relationship to the other? In consideration of matters of subjectivity and ethical 
relationships across difference, the philosopher Luce Irigaray has written about the need for ‘an appropriate 
background and milieu’ to aid people’s ‘cultural or spiritual becoming’ (Irigaray, 2019: xvi). For the purposes 
of the present discussion, ‘spiritual becoming’ can be equated to the development among people of peaceful 
qualities such as forgiveness, trust, and compassion. While the policies of a UN transitional administration 
might not be able to direct people’s thoughts and feelings in any straightforward way, they might realistically 
shape a more or less ‘appropriate background’ for the kinds of personal changes that a positive 
understanding of peace requires. 
The question of how a causal relationship between institutions and citizens’ subjectivity might be possible 
is discussed in the following section. It builds upon the framework just outlined, with the aim of 
conceptualising what exactly it means to say that a state, an institution, or an organisation can be understood 
as contributing to peace, and how a researcher might identify such causation. While the above outlined 
framework already suggests interaction between the second and third levels, the next section goes further 
in blurring the distinction between the two, such that, in the final analysis, no formal line can be drawn 
between the state and its constituents. Developing the political implications of such a perspective from 
Spinoza’s political philosophy and contemporary assemblage theory provides a set of concepts, criteria, and 
measures by which to analyse the potential of states, institutions, and international organisations like the 
UN to contribute to positive peace within a population.   
4.3 State institutions and the production of social harmony 
In a United Nations transitional administration, like that which deployed in Kosovo, the UN assumes 
responsibility for administrative and legislative institutions. In Kosovo, UNMIK’s mandated responsibilities 
were broad, including establishing an assembly, conducting elections, providing a police force, controlling 
the region’s borders, re-settling displaced people, and manging provision of utilities. In the pursuit of peace 
and stability, then, the UN’s methods are often directed at the institutions of the state. While the specific 
vision of the state in UN policies is discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7, the remainder of this 
chapter will lay out a conceptual framework by which the UN’s attempts to pursue peace through 
institutions might be both understood and assessed. The first half of this chapter has argued that it is 
reasonable to ask how a state might contribute to peace. Such a claim makes the assumption that there is 
causality between state institutions and peace, that is, that states can be more or less enabling of peace-
likeness. The rest of this chapter conceptualises the process through which such causality might occur. This 
is necessary, as it will form the conceptual basis from which the UN policies can be analysed and assessed 
in the following chapters. Such conceptualisation can also contribute to more general discussions within 
political geography on interactions between states and forms of international agency (Kuus, 2019). 
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Spinoza’s (2000 [1677]) Political Treatise was written at a period in European history that had seen prolonged 
warfare, religious fragmentation, and subsequent attempts to establish a more stable political system (i.e. 
The Peace of Westphalia). As such, Spinoza’s political works are deeply concerned with the possibility of 
‘peaceful diversity’ (Frank and Waller, 2016: 9). Spinoza places particular emphasis on the organisation of 
the state to this end, writing that the purpose of the state is ‘peace and security of life’ (TP 5/2).  
My reason for turning to Spinoza’s politics to elucidate an analysis of UN peace operations is therefore the 
following. In a transitional administration, the UN attempts to establish a stable state in the pursuit of a 
sustainable peace. Spinoza’s Political Treatise provides an account of the process by which states form, as well 
as the logic by which to understand how a state can contribute to peace among its citizens. When Spinoza 
discusses the best way to organise a state to this end, however, he bases his claims on the relational 
understanding of agency that he set out in the Ethics. As discussed in the literature review, a relational 
account of agency leads us to focus on how people’s thoughts, feelings, and actions are determined in the 
most part by things external to them. Through his relational ontology, therefore, Spinoza sought to produce 
a political theory that was founded on an understanding of ‘human nature as it really is’ (TP 1/4) – that is, 
subject to the external determinants - passions - that so often make people contrary to one another, and 
which are the causes of conflict and hatred (E IV p34).  
The significance of this is that Spinoza explicitly acknowledges the weakness of peaceful ideals in the face 
of the messy and passionate reality of society. While religion, for example, ‘teaches that each should love his 
neighbour as himself […] this conviction is of little avail against the passions’ (TP 1/5). Spinoza’s starting 
point, then, is to acknowledge the influence of passions, and to insist that they are taken into account when 
developing a political programme for peace. The central question that Spinoza sets out to answer is: what 
organisation of the state will determine people to act in each other’s mutual interest, given that we know 
they are led by passion more often than reason? If people could reliably be trusted to act from reason, there 
would be no need to pose such a question. But ‘human nature is far otherwise constituted’, and so ‘the state 
must necessarily be so established that all men, both rulers and ruled, whether they will or no, will do what 
is in the interests of their common welfare’ (TP 6/3).  
The Political Treatise therefore provides a framework by which to think carefully and thoroughly about the 
role of state institutions and how they affect their constituent populations, both positively and negatively. 
Spinoza’s ‘political philosophy is about channelling the passions into social benefits by institutional means’ 
(Altwicker, 2017: 188). The concepts and measures that Spinoza provides are therefore applicable to a wide 
range of contemporary political issues. For the present argument, they are applied to United Nations peace 
operation like UNMIK, which developed state institutions in Kosovo with the aim of producing a variety 
of ‘social benefits’, not least an end to violence and ethnic discrimination.  
The concepts to be foregrounded in the remainder of this chapter are derived from Spinoza’s account of 
the foundations of the state. I will therefore first give an overview of the relational foundation of the state 
in Spinoza, before turning to the most significant implications for the present thesis. The implications are: 
First, the state can be conceptualised as an ‘individual’ in so far as the relations between its constituents 
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produce the effect of a certain level of coherence. The capacities of this ‘individual’ act back upon its 
constituents, and therefore it remains possible to refer to the agency of the state. From this position, the 
efforts of a UN peace operation to facilitate autonomy or independence is conceptualised as an attempt to 
develop the coherence and stability of a new ‘individual’. Second, the affects of the state’s institutions upon 
its citizens can be a cause of harmony (concordia) or disagreement (discordia). These terms, and an 
understanding of the processes that lead to greater or lesser harmony, provide the conceptual measure by 
which to assess the UN’s peace building policies.  
4.3.1 The relational foundation of the state: Spinoza’s commonwealth 
In the Political Treatise, Spinoza applies his relational ontology (as laid out in the Ethics) to the foundations of 
the state itself. He writes that ‘one should not look for the causes and natural foundations of the state in the 
teachings of reason, but deduce them from the nature and condition of men in general’ (TP 1/7). The 
‘nature and condition of men in general’ is that they are necessarily in relation to, and determined by, external 
causes – no one can avoid be influenced by passions (E IV p4c). The foundation of the state is, from this 
perspective, a natural relational process (Armstrong, 2009). The process begins with the fact that in a ‘state 
of nature’ – that is, outside of a civil state – an individual’s rights are only equal to their own power (TP 
2/15; TTP 16/2). With no agreement or laws established, people have the right to do anything that they are 
able to do according to their desires. It is important to note that this is not a normative argument. It is not 
‘right’ in the sense of being morally correct, just, or good. It is rather a formal claim based on Spinoza’s 
ontology (see TP 2/4). Thus, ‘when one sees the term “right” in Spinoza, one should generally think 
descriptively, in terms of actual power relations, and not normatively, in terms of obligations one owes to 
others or others to oneself’ (Den Uyl, 2000: xi). 
To live in such a condition is, however, extremely difficult, and a cause of constant fear. A state of nature, 
far from being a radical freedom, is a state of bondage. Mutual assistance is therefore required, such that 
people can more easily ‘support life and cultivate their minds’ (TP 2/15). Everyone strives to persevere in 
their existence, and they are greatly assisted in this striving when they collaborate – i.e. when they organise 
and coordinate their activities such that all benefit. We have far greater potential for survival, growth, and 
cultivation if we are part of a collaborative and organised group, rather than reliant solely on our own 
devices. It is this joining of forces that is the foundation of a ‘civil order’ (TP 1/7).25 The consequence is, 
however, that the right of the individual must submit to that of the group, the communal right, in order to 
sustain the advantages of being in a civil state. This communal right, ‘defined by the power of a people, is 
usually called sovereignty’ (TP 2/17). It is in each person’s interest to follow the command of the sovereign 
– that is, it is in their interest to obey the laws – because it is this subjection to communal right that allows 
for their greater safety, security and power of acting. 
 
25 Spinoza’s definition of ‘civil state’ thus accepts a wide variety of forms of government. As he puts it, ‘all men 
everywhere, whether barbarian or civilised, enter into relationships with one another and set up some kind of civil 
order’ (TP 1/7). As such, humans are almost never in a state of nature – indeed, we are simply born into ‘some kind 
of civil order’.  
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This is why Spinoza refers to the ‘natural foundations of the state’ (TP 1/7). The transfer to living in a civil 
state is not a product of reason, worked out in advance. Rather, it is a product of every beings’ natural 
striving to persevere, something which they are better able to do when they join their powers and submit to 
the collective power of the multitude. Crucially for the purposes of this thesis, Spinoza’s understanding means 
that it no longer makes sense to think of ‘the State’ as a political agent distinct from society. The source of 
the state’s power is the combination of its constituents. As Armstrong points out: 
[F]or Spinoza, the political problem does not reduce, as it does in Hobbes, to two terms – individuals 
and the state – and the relations between them. Rather, Spinoza considers individuals and the state as 
abstractions, which can only be adequately apprehended when related through the multitude which 
includes them both (Armstrong, 2009: 284). 
The result is that Spinoza’s political theory collapses any division between the state and its citizens. The 
state is not a substantial entity, and it cannot be distinguished from the things of which it is constituted. It 
is a product of relations between people, and its coherence over time depends on maintaining certain levels 
of consent from the population – indeed, from this perspective, ‘the state’s existence depends simply on the 
agreement among its citizens’ (Della Rocca, 2008: 213). Again, consent or agreement is not here necessarily 
rational, but affective – people submit to the multitude because they perceive it positively affects their power 
of acting. 
Does it still make sense, then, to refer to the agency of states and institutions in political explanation? It 
does, but in a carefully qualified way. Even while the state is not a substantial ontological entity, a state’s 
power to affect people’s lives cannot be denied. The relational process that produces the effects of the state 
means that ‘institutions and social forces can be sufficiently unified in their existence and action so as to 
constitute individuals’ (Sharp, 2017: 834; see also Field, 2015). This definition of individuality does not, 
however, entail ‘seamlessly unified and perfectly coordinated’ entities (Sharp, 2017: 841). Rather, it is 
sufficient that a number of elements relate to each other in such a way that reach ‘a minimal threshold of 
incorporation to produce effects that depend on the synergy produced by their concatenation’ (ibid., 842). 
The relational process realises capacities that the constituent parts by themselves would not be able to realise. 
These capacities, then, can rightly be seen as state agency, shaping the lives of citizens and events in the 
world more generally – it is just that this agency is not the rational intent of a unified actor, but an effect of 
the continual relational process between constituents. 
The ‘individuality’ of the state is therefore a product of an ongoing process, and, crucially, it is a matter of 
degree. It is not a case of a binary between a perfectly coherent civil state or a state of nature. Rather, all 
forms of political organisation exist somewhere on a spectrum between the two – that is, they have a greater 
or lesser degree of harmony among their constituents. The concept of harmony as it relates to politics and 
states warrants some further discussion, to establish a precise meaning of the term for the present argument.  
4.3.1.1 What is social harmony? 
Both Edwin Curley and Samuel Shirley translate Spinoza’s Latin term concordia as ‘harmony’. In the Political 
Treatise, Spinoza names harmony as the aim of civil order, writing that ‘the best state is one where men live 
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together in harmony’ (TP 5/2). The term is also used in part IV of the Ethics, wherein Spinoza more briefly 
considers the role of the state for moderating inevitable contrary affects amongst a population (see IV 
p37s2). He writes that: ‘Things which […] bring it about that men live harmoniously [concorditer], are useful; 
those, on the other hand, are evil which bring discord [discordiam] to the state’ (E IV p40). It can be seen, 
then, that in both the Political Treatise and the Ethics, the notion of harmony is central to assessing the success 
of a civil order. The concord-discord spectrum is furthermore the key conceptual tool for articulating the 
relationship between the state and peace. Spinoza even defines peace as ‘consist[ing] not in the absence of 
war but in the union or harmony of minds’ (TP 6/4, emphasis added).  
The previous section noted that a civil order is in existence when people agree to give up their individual 
rights to the rights of the group. This is of enormous benefit for enhancing their capacities to continue 
living and thriving. It is this agreement on a common good, and the resultant mutual benefit, that forms the 
basis for ‘harmony’ in Spinoza’s political philosophy. If the foundation of a civil state is the mutual benefit 
derived from an agreement to combine powers, then the best state would be that which is most mutually 
beneficial. A perfectly harmonious society, therefore, would be one in which ‘all, together, should seek for 
themselves the common advantage of all’ (E IV p18s). While the desire for this level of harmony is the 
formal conclusion of Spinoza’s philosophy, he readily acknowledges that it is not possible to achieve it in 
reality. Since everyone is subject to passions, they necessarily have different desires, they have disagreements, 
and they act in ways that are contrary to each other’s well-being (TP 1/5; TTP 5/8; E IV p34). Such 
disagreement and discord are politically destabilising, while agreement and harmony provide stability for the 
civil order. The furthest extent of disagreement and discord would be such that the civil order can no longer 
be maintained. A civil war is in fact a particularly appropriate example of such state-breakdown, whereby a 
section of the population rejects even the minimum level of agreement necessary to define a civil order – 
they no longer agree to submit to the authority of the sovereign on any matter whatsoever. 
If perfectly achieved mutual benefit and total disintegration represent the two extremes of the 
harmony/discord spectrum, then there is enormous scope for variation in-between. There are countless 
issues on which the citizens of a state might agree and disagree, and all civil orders will experience periods 
of greater and lesser harmony. While the complexity and specificity of the issues varies contextually, the 
fundamental criterion for assessing civil order in Spinoza’s political philosophy remains the extent to which 
it promotes harmony. The further along the spectrum towards harmony, the better the state is achieving its 
purpose: 
The best way to organise a state is easily discovered by considering the purpose of civil order, which 
is nothing other than peace and security of life. Therefore the best state is one where men live 
together in harmony and where the laws are preserved unbroken (TP 5/2). 
It is necessary at this point to acknowledge a certain ambiguity of a term like harmony when it is to be used 
as a political aim in this way. No doubt there are authoritarian policies and states that successfully maintain 
‘harmony’ by means of punishment, fearmongering, and surveillance. There are numerous examples, both 
contemporary and historical, whereby citizens have agreed to submit to the laws of the state not because 
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they value the state’s contribution to their well-being, but because they fear the consequences of doing 
otherwise. The Chinese government, for example, has in recent decades used a rhetoric of ‘Harmonious 
Society’ to underly its various suppressions of protest and political dissent (Choukroune, 2012; Choukroune 
and Garapon, 2007; Shin, 2012).  
Spinoza explicitly acknowledges this ambiguity, stating in the Ethics that ‘harmony is also commonly born 
of fear’ (E IV appXVI).  He elaborates further in the Political Treatise: 
[E]xperience seems to teach us that peace and harmony are best served if all power is conferred on 
one man. For no state has stood so long without notable change as that of the Turks, and, 
conversely, none have proved so short-lived as popular or democratic states, nor have any been so 
liable to frequent rebellion. But if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, there 
can be nothing more wretched for mankind than peace (TP 6/4).26 
A further distinction is therefore required, between agreement based on appreciation for the mutual benefits 
of civil order, and agreement based on the fear of expressing dissent. Such a distinction can be made in a 
similar way to the previously discussed definitions of positive and negative peace (Galtung, 1969; King Jr., 
2003). Justin Steinberg, in a paper discussing Spinoza’s state theory, does precisely that when he says that 
'[o]ver and above stability, the state ought to promote a positive harmony (Steinberg, 2009: 48, emphasis 
added). Just as the absence of direct violence is not synonymous with positive peace, so the absence of civil 
strife is not synonymous with positive social harmony. While both fear of punishment and appreciation of 
benefit may achieve obedience to the law, the difference is in the underlying motivation for the fact of 
obedience (Blom, 1995: cited in Steinberg, 2009 [see footnote 59]). Considering the question of motivation 
returns us to the affects, and how a person’s power of acting is enabled or disabled by various external 
influences. As the next section will seek to explore, it is this affective register that provides the conceptual 
basis for assessing social harmony. 
Before moving on to the next section, it is worth adding one note further, to ask if ‘harmony’ and ‘peace’ 
are to be read as synonymous concepts. It is evident how closely related are Spinoza’s understandings of 
the terms. When discussing the role of the state it is indeed the case that they can be used largely 
interchangeably, as Spinoza seems to do in the above quotation from TP 5/2. There are, however, two ways 
in which we can distinguish between harmony and peace. The first is implied by the distinction between 
positive and negative understandings of harmony just mentioned. Harmony achieved through 
authoritarianism may produce stability in the civil order; but to qualify as peaceful, the degree of social 
harmony ought to be motivated more by hope for mutual reward than by threat of punishment. Peace might 
then be defined as: a high degree of social harmony, motivated by the experience of mutual benefit and 
reward derived from participating in the civil order. In this sense, peace is not exactly synonymous with 
harmony, but it is a certain type of social harmony. 
 
26 The state of ‘the Turks’ is a reference to the Ottoman Empire. At the time when Spinoza was writing his political 
works (1660s-70s), the Ottoman Empire was near the height of its territorial control and power. It was ruled by an 
absolute monarch, the Sultan.  
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The second distinction between harmony and peace comes from Spinoza’s understanding that there are 
certain aspects of our subjectivity which the state is not able to determine. While harmony in the civil order 
is a product of reward or threat, Spinoza qualifies this by adding that ‘such things as no one can be induced 
to do by reward or threats do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth’ (TP 3/8; see also TTP 20/3-
4). Spinoza specifically names the ‘faculty of judgement’ as that which the law cannot order. For example, 
the law cannot make us love someone who we hate, or hate someone who we love (TP 3/8). We might 
pretend to do so to avoid punishment, but the actual affect of love/hate will not have been induced in us. 
And if ever one does come to love someone who they previously hated – if enemies are to become friends, 
for example - it can only be due to a change in the affective relationship between those people (see E IIIp43-
44). This suggests a level of subjectivity where peace might be manifest, beyond the stability and security 
that is provided by social harmony. As with Derrida’s reflections on ‘living together’ discussed above, there 
therefore remains a sense of peace that exceeds what is achievable by the production of social harmony in 
the civil order. To repeat what I wrote regarding that excess, however, a state or civil order might still 
provide a more or less suitable background for the development of such positive affects.  
4.3.2 Power of acting as the immanent measure of social harmony 
Social harmony within a state therefore relies on the consent of the constituents to continue to participate 
within it and submit to the collective sovereignty. This consent, however, is not a rational decision, but a 
product of the affects that the citizens feel in relation to the state. To the extent that people are enabled in 
their endeavour to persevere – that is, that they feel their power of acting to be increased by being part of 
the multitude – then they will agree to continue submitting to the sovereign power of the multitude. Part of 
the measure of social harmony, then, is how far the organisation of the state affects the citizens such that 
they are determined to continue to agree to be a constituent part (Lord, 2017). 
If the institutions and laws of the state give people reason enough to fear it and conspire against it, then the 
right of the commonwealth is diminished: ‘the power of the commonwealth and its right is to that extent 
diminished, as it affords reasons for many citizens to join in a conspiracy’ (TP 3/9). As Walther (2003: 661) 
puts it – the ‘right to direct others[… is] weakened in the measure that those directives diminish this 
willingness to obey the laws’. Thus ‘a commonwealth does wrong when it does, or suffers to be done, things 
that can cause its own downfall; […] a commonwealth does wrong when it does something contrary to the 
dictates of reason. For it is when a commonwealth acts from the dictates of reason that it is most fully in control 
of its own right’ (TP 4/4, emphasis added). The normative measure of institutions and laws given here is 
rationality. Institutions and laws must be reasonable, or the commonwealth puts its own existence at risk. 
But how is rationality defined? 
The first thing to say is that the normativity of rationality cannot be based on a transcendent measure. 
Spinoza rejects ‘the claim that there exists an external and transcendent moral standard to which human 
behavior [sic] and human society must conform’ (Frank and Waller, 2016: 14, original emphasis). He rejects 
such a transcendent morality ‘because such a law would apply only to parts of the natural world in violation 
of Spinoza’s principled naturalism’ (Frank and Waller, 2016: 27). It would be to treat humans as an 
Chapter 4 
56 
ontologically distinct part of nature, a ‘dominion within a dominion’, which Spinoza’s ontology of a single 
substance (God or Nature) explicitly does not do (E III pref). A transcendent law could only apply to 
humans – it could not apply to non-human animals, for how can an animal be judged ‘wrong’ for doing 
something that it is determined to do by its nature? A transcendent measure of morality which humans are 
supposed to obey presupposes that humans are in control of their own actions. But Spinoza’s ontology 
challenges us to accept that humans are just as much part of Nature and subject to the laws of determinism. 
We only believe ourselves to be acting from freewill because we remain ignorant of the causes of our 
determination (E III p2s). Therefore, to apply a transcendent morality to humans introduces a division into 
reality, which violates Spinoza’s naturalism (Della Rocca, 2008). 
How, then, can Spinoza assert a normative measure by which to judge institutions – rationality – and at the 
same time have it that this is an immanent measure and not transcendent? Rationality can be an immanent 
measure if it is based on power of acting. Recall that power of acting refers to an individual’s capacities – to 
think, to feel, and to be the cause of effects. It is the desire to increase power of acting that is the foundation 
of the commonwealth. Any increase in power of acting is a joy, any decrease is a sadness. A state’s 
institutions and laws are therefore rational when they increase the power of acting of the multitude, and are 
irrational if they decrease it. The state participates directly in the wellbeing of citizens, because, even while 
all citizens are subject to passions and therefore liable to be contrary to one another, the institutions and 
laws can determine them to act as if they were rational, that is, to act for the good of the common welfare - 
‘laws are correctives that check or harness the passionate, myopic, grasping nature of most people and 
replace would-be destructive behaviour with power-promoting behaviour’ (Steinberg, 2009: 46). On the 
contrary, if a state’s laws are such that they oppress the civilians and produce division, the state is reducing 
its own power of acting – and so such laws are irrational. As Armstrong (2009: 294) states: 
For Spinoza, a state which relies on mere force acts contrarily to reason, but only in the sense that 
reason dictates the avoidance of actions that lead to the weakening or destruction of a body’s power. 
Now, an immediate counter to this comes to mind, and it is present in Arendt’s (2017) Origins of 
Totalitarianism. Arendt critiques the idea ‘that right is the equivalent to being good or useful for the whole in 
distinction of its parts’ (p. 391). She associates such a view with a justification for violations of human rights; 
indeed, she sees such a view as being consistent with Adolf Hitler’s motto: ‘Right is what is good for the 
German people’. Thus Arendt quotes Plato – ‘Not man, but a god, must be the measure of all things’ 
(Arendt, 2017: 391). 
Spinoza’s doctrine of immanence is the precise opposite of this – there is no transcendent morality, thus 
the measure for what is good is based on what ‘yields best results for the agent’ (Frank and Waller, 2016: 
27). Spinoza’s immanent measure of what is good for a population, however, is not an equivalent to Hitler’s 
declaration that what is right is what is good for the German people. What is good for the German people, 
for Spinoza, is objectively measurable based on the citizen’s collective power of acting. Hitler’s opinion on 
what is good for the German people did not measure up to this objective rule – his laws and institutions 
were irrational, because they brought about the destruction of the state. So, ‘what is good for’, in Spinoza’s 
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political philosophy, is not a matter of opinion - it is not even a matter of democratic decision making – it 
is based on the objectivity of increases and decreases in power of acting.  
Spinoza’s politics therefore still provides a position from which to critique laws and institutions which 
perpetuate injustice and division. The difference is that they are not critiqued via an appeal to transcendent 
ideals, but via the immanent measure of power of acting. The laws of apartheid in South Africa, for example, 
were irrational, aiding and continuing division and hatred among the population. It can therefore be asserted 
that while it is often better to obey a law that we know to be irrational (TP 3/5), that does not mean that 
the commonwealth is right to force us to do it. If the state continues to demand adherence to irrational 
laws, it gives more people cause for indignation – pushed far enough indignation turns ‘the civil order into 
a condition of war’ (TP 4/4). Certain conditions maintain the fear of, or respect for, the commonwealth by 
its citizens, and so maintain adherence to its laws (see also TP 3/3) – a commonwealth ceases to be if these 
conditions are not maintained. If even the minimum amount of harmony cannot be maintained, then 
Spinoza claims that the state ‘has not attained the full right of a commonwealth’ (TP 5/2). Such a failure to 
promote harmony describes what might today be called a ‘failed state’. Spinoza writes that: 
a civil order that has not removed the causes of rebellion and where the threat of war is never 
absent and the laws are frequently broken is little different from a state of Nature, where every man 
lives as he pleases with his life at risk (TP 2/5). 
The ‘individuality’ of a state is brought about by the concurrence among its citizens (Della Rocca, 2008), 
but the coherence achieved is not fixed, but changeable – ‘its coherence […] admits of a wide range of 
degrees’ (Sharp, 2017: 841). When the bare minimum cannot be maintained, however, it can no longer be 
said to be functioning as a civil state. 
4.3.3 Assessing the UN’s intervention in ‘failed states’ 
The above understanding of the state and how it affects the harmony or division among its constituents 
completes the analytic framework for assessing the United Nation’s pursuit of peace through state 
institution. The relative coherence of the state as an ‘individual’ is, from a Spinozan perspective, the product 
of an ongoing process whereby citizen’s power of acting is sufficiently positively affected such that they are 
determined to continue submitting to the collective sovereignty of the multitude. The dissolution of a state 
like Yugoslavia is indicative of how this coherence cannot be taken for granted. If the institutions of the 
state, its government and its laws, are disabling for the citizens power of acting, then they are more likely to 
be productive of division rather than harmony. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević’s oppressive measures 
against Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s can therefore be characterised as irrational according to Spinoza’s 
political philosophy. They were productive of disabling affects, and so increased division, eventually leading 
to the outbreak of war. 
When the UN intervened, therefore, it began to engage in the relational process in Kosovo. The measure 
for assessing UNMIK’s contribution to peace is based on how far their ideals and practices were productive 
of harmony – positive affects by which the ‘citizens view the interests of the state, or the aim of the laws, 
as consonant with their own private interests’ (Steinberg, 2009: 51). Spinoza’s term for this sense that the 
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state is serving one’s interests is securitas. While a perfect harmony among all citizens is an impossibility, ‘a 
state that is able to promote securitas or hope will approximate “peace” to a considerable degree’ (ibid., 53). 
The remainder of this thesis turn to the UN policy documents themselves, and considers them in light of 
the above outlined understanding of how institutions can contribute to social harmony. Chapter 5 presents 
the methodological approach to the document analysis. Chapter 6, examines the ways that the UN 
conceptualises the role of the state, and how it has implemented its ideals in Kosovo. I consider its success 
in contributing to a coherent ‘individual’ in Kosovo, but also examine how the ideas and coherence of this 
individual were resisted, particularly in northern Kosovo. The final chapter, chapter 7, takes up the question 
of social harmony in relation to the social difference that characterises the conflict in Kosovo; namely, the 
division between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians. I examine how UNMIK’s ideals and policies have 
sought to manage this difference, and consider whether there are indicators of movement towards more 
harmony. In this regard, I particularly pay attention to elections, as an indication of the extent to which 
citizens are prepared to participate in the Kosovo institutions, and so agree to be a part of the Kosovo 
‘individual’. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Security and the law can be critiqued in the name of peace – they can be deconstructed. But if the motivation 
for critique and deconstruction is the hope that there can be improvement in structures of security and law, 
which Derrida seemingly confirms to be the case, then it is reasonable to ask of what such improvement 
would consist. I have argued that considering the political implications of a relational ontology can provide 
some productive avenues for articulating the criteria for such improvements.  
In this chapter, I have sought to provide a productive conceptual framework for the inclusion of states, 
institutions, and international organizations in the geographical study of peace, but to do so without losing 
the critical sensibility of the existing literature, nor a recognition of the importance of local forms of agency 
in the production of peace. I based this framework on Spinoza’s relational account of reality, which offers 
a relational understanding of the foundations of the state and its capacities. This understanding makes no 
ontological distinction between different levels or scales, because every ‘individual’ thing is a product of 
relations between constituent parts. Viewing the state’s coherence as a product of ongoing relational 
processes has implications for how we can understand the way a state, through its government, institutions, 
and laws, can contribute to greater or lesser social harmony among its constituents. If constituents have the 
perception that their interests are served by the state, then they are affected positively towards it and agree 
to submit to the collective right of the multitude. The greater and more widespread the sense of securitas, 
among the population, the more social harmony is produced. This account therefore provides terms and 
measures by which to analyse the UN’s state-building endeavours in the pursuit of peace. 
Even while the peace geographies literature acknowledges peace’s complexity, and refrains from positing 
any single definition of the concept, there remains a sense in which peace is utopian. Attending to the ways 
in which peace and violence are always interconnected means that there is always a sense in which reality 
falls short of a peaceful ideal. Even while we seek to articulate more positive accounts of peace, we are 
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warned to maintain critical attention to ongoing forms of injustice and structural violence going on within 
the supposed peace (Brickell, 2015; Ross, 2011). From a Spinozan perspective, there remains a sense of a 
perfect peace that can never be achieved. Harmony and division are matter of degree – perfect harmony 
however, whereby every citizen would act in the interests of all, is an impossibility. But states can certainly 
be better or worse in this regard. Some institutions, governments, and laws are more productive of harmony, 
or peace-likeness, than others. Chapters 6 and 7 apply the conceptual framework developed here to the 
UN’s vision of the state, and their implementation of that vision in Kosovo. Before that, however, it is 
necessary to present my approach to the documents under analysis. The next chapter, therefore, lays out 
my methodology and gives an account of how I carried out the document analysis on which chapters 6 and 








5 Methodology and method: Applying discourse analysis to United 
Nations policy documents 
UN secretaries-general have, with varying degrees of success, attempted to advance the debate on 
doctrine for UN peacekeeping. Their proposals, even though not constituting a comprehensive 
doctrine for peacekeeping, in toto, have decidedly influenced the mandate and means most recently 
assigned to the latest generation of peacekeeping operations.  
- Ahmed et al. (2007: 21) 
5.1 Introduction 
To develop an understanding of how peace is conceptualised in the policy and practice of UN peace 
operations requires a careful examination of relevant documents, resolutions, and reports. The UN, and 
indeed any organisation, is guided by numerous ideas by which it rationalises its policies and practices. In 
any peace operation, it is not only personnel and materials that are deployed, but ideas too. These ideas 
guide the activities that are supposed to be productive of a more peaceful and stable society. In order to 
analyse the UN’s role within the contemporary geopolitics of peace, it is necessary to identify the political 
rationality of its peace activities. Such rationality includes how it articulates problems and solutions, and so 
justifies its actions (Dittmer, 2010; Lees, 2004; Merlingen, 2003).  
Within human geography, and especially in critical geopolitics, discourse analysis has been a key method by 
which scholars have examined texts and their relationship to political or social practices (Dittmer, 2010; 
Hoggart et al., 2002; Waitt, 2010).27  Critical geopolitics has investigated texts in order to identify the 
particular geopolitical vision that is being advocated, and then to demonstrate the political implications of 
such a vision. Underlying this approach to analysing texts is an understanding that actions within politics 
and society are shaped according to different understandings of how the world is and what is possible within 
it. As Megoran (2010b: 385) points out, however, such investigations have ‘largely sought to expose 
geopolitical visions as constitutive of violence or of the economic, social, imaginative or political structures 
that support violence’. A ‘pacific geopolitics’, by contrast, would adopt similar methods, but would explore 
‘the ways in which spatialising and ordering the world in imaginative geographies can contribute towards 
more harmonious relations between states and other human groupings’ (Megoran, 2010b: 385). This chapter 
therefore presents how I utilise and build upon the legacy of discourse analysis for the purposes of 
identifying the ideas of peace supported by UN documentation, and for considering their implications in 
peace interventions. 
As this research is concerned with the UN as a key actor in the development of transnational agency after 
the Cold War, the first section introduces organisations as objects of study within political geography, 
particularly organisations that are international in scope. Identifying the policies and practices of 
 
27 ‘Text’ here assumes a broad meaning: policies, speeches, science, journalism, television broadcasts, literature, films, 
etc. have all been subject to discourse analyses within geography and beyond. 
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international governmental organisations (IGOs), using both text-based approaches and also increasingly 
‘institutional ethnography’ (Billo and Mountz, 2016; Kuus, 2019), is a way in which political geographers 
can better understand the cross-border nature of governance in a globalised world, and the relationships 
between such governance and the traditional role of states. If politics and civil society is more and more 
subject to international influences in a globalised world, then attempting to understand this process requires 
thinking beyond ‘nation-based categories’ (Kuus, 2018: 6). Studying the UN can contribute to such attempts. 
Not only does the UN represent a form of political agency operating ‘above’ the level of states, but its 
purpose is to deal with the kinds of problems which are neither caused, nor resolved, by any individual state. 
Poverty, climate change, illegal trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs, terrorism, the regionalisation of 
conflict, the displacement of people and subsequent refugee crises – all of these examples require multilateral 
responses, and the UN is one of, if not the, primary organisation through which such a response is provided. 
To research such themes necessarily puts the primacy of states into question and requires the development 
of alternative explanatory concepts. 
The second section turns to the main types of discourse analysis within critical geopolitics. Reflecting on 
the difference between broadly structuralist and poststructuralist approaches, this section demonstrates that 
discourse can be, and is, understood differently, and that the method and purpose of analysis differs 
according to its theoretical underpinnings. While this thesis is certainly working within the legacy of 
discourse analysis in critical geopolitics, it does not fully subscribe to either structuralist or poststructuralist 
theoretical foundations. It is therefore necessary to identify where the present thesis differs, and how this 
difference changes the understanding of the texts and how they are to be analysed – this is communicated 
in the third section. 
Remaining committed to the relational ontology underpinning the thesis, the third section considers the 
nature of ideas themselves, and how a relational, ‘renaturalized’ (Sharp, 2011), understanding of ideas alters 
the method of discourse analysis. Drawing especially on Sharp’s (2011) contemporary reading of Spinoza, I 
consider the ways in which text-based research can serve the study of peace. Like the structuralist and 
poststructuralist approaches, a Spinozan understanding of discourse recognises that ideas have power and 
force within the world. Applying Sharp’s renaturalized conception, however, means that critical analysis is 
not only a matter of identifying damaging ideas or exposing them as contingent products of history. A 
renaturalized account views the world of ideas as an ‘ecology’ wherein the ideas that thrive are those that 
have the most support from multiple ‘thinking powers’ (Sharp, 2011). When considering peace, therefore, 
the question becomes that of how far ideas promoting more peaceful relationships spread within the ecology 
of ideas in any given context. How far have peaceful ideas received the support of more thinking powers, 
and so provided alternatives to the kinds of ideas that have shaped damaging patterns of conflict and 
division? Analysing the UN peace operation documents is therefore about identifying the ideas of peace 
they support and assessing how successful the organisation has been in mobilising the power of its ideas. 
Importantly, ideas also come up against resistance from counter-ideas. When examining a UN peace 
operation, it also therefore necessary to look at how far the UN’s ideas are resisted in the local context in 
which they are deployed, and the effects of such resistance.  
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Having established the methodological framework for the research, the final section describes the actual 
process and rationale by which UN documents were selected and analysed. I describe the filters I used to 
choose the documents, how I organised them, and the process of analysing each set of texts to identify key 
themes. 
5.2 Organisations as objects of study 
Organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, are recognised as important objects of study for 
critical geopolitics (Bachmann, 2013; Jeffrey, 2013). Emerging from ‘a broad dissatisfaction with an 
assumption that the state constitutes the primary locus of political power’ (Jeffrey, 2013: 388), studying 
organisations contributes towards developing more nuanced understandings of geopolitics today. Doing so 
has certain scalar and spatial implications. International governmental organisations are transnational; 
money and ideas flow between them, and thus ‘the established scalar hierarchies or organisational 
boundaries are challenged by a new institutional politics’ (Jeffrey, 2013: 391; see also Andrijasevic and 
Walters, 2010; Dittmer, 2015). The study of organisational discourse is necessary to understand ‘the mutually 
constitutive relationship of language and practice, the complex interweaving of representation and 
intervention. Examining organisations that act across state boundaries allows researchers to explore 
international governance as a discursive project and a set of material practices’ (Merlingen, 2003: 371).  
This thesis aims to analyse the political rationalities of contemporary UN peace operations through an 
examination of policy documents, mission reports, and Security Council resolutions. Engaging with UN 
documents, and adopting discourse analysis as a method, broadly follows Merlingen’s approach to studying 
organisations. He writes that political rationalities: 
can be studied by investigating IGO [intergovernmental organisation] documents (e.g. decisions, 
policy papers, programmes), pronouncements by national delegations to IGOs and IGO staff, 
proposals of IGO-affiliated international non-governmental organizations and so forth. The focus 
in this analysis is, among other things, on the problems to be acted upon by IGOs, the arguments 
that are put forward to justify interventions, the strategies for tackling the problems, and the 
agencies that are assigned operational functions (Merlingen, 2003: 367). 
Merlingen draws upon Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and governmentality (Foucault, 1991a, 
1998, 2002). This is reflected in his recognition of the power of discourse to ‘make up reality’ (Merlingen, 
2003: 368). Thus, Merlingen talks about the ‘imagined’ status of the eastern states in Europe after the Cold 
War – ‘the imagined similarity between East and West gave way to imagined structural dissimilarity that needed 
to be tackled by a major international project of improvement’ (p. 372, emphasis added).  
While my own thesis is likewise focussed on the productive power of imagination and ideas, the underlying 
conceptual framework utilised here differs somewhat from a Foucauldian understanding of discourse. 
Foucault’s approach, and the literature that follows his approach, seeks to de-naturalize epistemology; that 
is, it seeks to demonstrate that knowledge is not a reflection of natural ‘truths’ about society. The Spinozan 
framework that I here adopt from Sharp (2011) however, re-naturalizes epistemology. This distinction is 
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discussed in greater detail below. For now, I will emphasise that a renaturalized account of ideas alters how 
the rationality of an organisation is understood. The analysis is not just to show that the ideas promoted by 
an organisation are productive of certain imaginaries and subjectivities, as a Foucauldian approach does. It 
is also to understand how the very possibility of such imaginaries is a product of an underlying relational 
ontology of ideas as a natural attribute of existence. Before elaborating a renaturalized understanding, the 
next section first considers in more detail the theoretical underpinnings that have shaped the use of 
discourse analysis as a method in critical geopolitics.  
5.3 Discourse analysis and critical geopolitics 
Discourse analysis is not a neatly isolated method for analysing texts. Committed to the importance of 
language for ‘enabling virtually all social activities’ (Dittmer, 2010: 274), discourse analysis shares similar 
concerns and objects of analysis with hermeneutics, deconstruction, and semiotic analysis (Hoggart et al., 
2002). Although firmly established in human geography, there is no single agreed-upon definition of 
discourse analysis, and methods of application vary accordingly. The kinds of questions to be asked of a 
text, and the analysis of what is found, differ according to the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology. 
The following therefore sets out the theoretical perspective of the methodology for this thesis and 
demonstrates how the theory justifies the questions asked of the documents.  
In human geography there are two broad strands to discourse analysis, which differ along the lines of 
structuralist and poststructuralist social theory (Dittmer, 2010; Lees, 2004). The structuralist understanding, 
drawing from Gramsci and Marx, ‘presupposes a subject that is ontologically prior to the effect of the 
discourse of the subject’ (Dittmer, 2010: 276). Characteristic for this kind of work is the designation of 
different classes. Citizens belong to an identifiable class, and discourse is the ideology by which capitalist 
values are instilled in society and revolution is prevented. The analysis of texts from this perspective 
therefore focuses on demonstrating the ways that prevalent discourses (or ideologies) are complicit in the 
oppression of the working class (or women, people of colour etc.). This approach aims at liberation from 
such ideologies.  
The poststructuralist understanding of discourse, associated principally with Michel Foucault, does not 
adhere to a Marxist understanding of pre-given subject positions, but rather argues that subjectivity itself is 
a product of discourse (Dittmer, 2010; Wylie, 2006). Subject positions, individual as well as groups, are not 
presupposed to have a fixed reality, but are considered the result of historical and ongoing operations of 
power and knowledge. A key difference with the structuralist view is that power is not understood as held 
and exercised by a ruling class, but rather is viewed as something that functions through numerous relations 
between individuals. As Foucault (2004: 29) himself states: 
Do not regard power as a phenomenon of mass and homogenous domination – the domination of 
one individual over others, of one group over others, or of one class over others […] Power must, 
I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when 
it is part of a chain.  
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Analysing texts from this perspective involves tracing the conflation of power and knowledge in the 
historical formation of the ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1977: 13) that is under scrutiny. It concerns the ways 
in which the ideas and concepts in a text ‘become embodied and enacted’ (Dittmer, 2010: 275) in the reality 
of everyday life. Foucault, following Nietzsche, called his approach ‘genealogy’ (Foucault, 1991b), and 
notably applied it in his analyses of the human sciences (Foucault, 1991a, 1998).  
The two approaches are not necessarily discrete, and there is a ‘blurring of theoretical boundaries during 
many discourse analyses’ (Dittmer, 2010: 279). Within critical geopolitics, however, poststructuralist theory 
has been particularly influential, and discourse analysis in the Foucauldian tradition is a principle tool 
(Agnew, 2013; Müller, 2008; Ó Tuathail, 1996). It is used to show that geographical knowledge about the 
world is imbued with political power, that taken-for-granted ‘truths’ about space, place, and identity are 
discursively produced, and that these constructions are frequently implicated in instances of violence and 
war (Agnew, 2013). If geographers are to develop a greater understanding of peace and nonviolence, as 
Megoran (2010b, 2011) argues they should, then the question remains of how discourse analysis can serve 
the study of peace.  
5.4 Ideology critique and the nature of ideas 
In the structuralist view, ideology oppresses certain social groups and prevents material change in society. 
The poststructuralist perspective is concerned with how knowledge constructs subjectivities and shapes the 
possibilities of social life. Both understandings imply that discourses - the texts, ideas and concepts they 
consist of - have significance and force within the reality of people’s lives. The continual attention paid to 
representations (textual and otherwise) within human geography is part of ‘a concerted effort to understand 
the force of representations as they make, remake and unmake the world’ (Anderson, 2019: 1120). What 
does it mean to say that ideas have force, and how does such a claim relate to questions of war and peace? 
The force of ideas is considered in some depth by the philosopher Hasana Sharp (2011), whose arguments 
regarding the nature of ideas, and their significance for political analysis, derive from the ontology set out 
in Spinoza’s Ethics (1996 [1677]). Spinoza’s account of reality focuses on its relational nature. The being of 
any single ‘thing’ – to the extent that it is possible to talk about discrete ‘things’ - cannot be isolated from 
its relationship to everything around it, how it affects and is affected by the things it encounters. This is as 
much true of humans as it is of plants and animals, and indeed of non-living objects, although their capacity 
to affect and be affected is less than that of living beings. This is why Sharp names her project one of re-
naturalization. Following Spinoza, she argues that humans, and their social and political realities, cannot be 
considered as being outside of the system of relations that constitute Nature.  
The key point for the purposes of this methodology is that the relationality between beings is true not only 
of bodies but also of minds. Spinoza challenges us to consider that the content of our minds, our thoughts 
and ideas, cannot be said to originate in ourselves. As Sharp (2011: 67) puts it:  
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Individuals imagine themselves to be the origin of their ideas, when, in actuality, they do not think 
independently of myriad other beings, especially those of their immediate surroundings, social 
milieu and political environment.  
This acknowledges the fact that our minds consist in large part of the numerous ideas inherited from the 
social world into which we are born - the commonly accepted knowledge which is perpetuated down 
generations. In Sharp’s account, the strength of an idea is dependent on it occupying many minds and being 
supported by other ideas within those minds. Through encounters and interactions with other beings we 
are exposed to new ideas, which may strengthen or weaken ideas already present in our minds. For new 
ideas to develop and begin to gain strength requires that more people are exposed to them, and that they 
‘take root’ in many minds, something which can be difficult when new ideas come up against the resistance 
of numerous thinking powers, who might reject the new idea if it is not compatible with their current ideas 
(Sharp, 2011). 
Some ideas that we inherit from our social environment are useful for us and contribute to our well-being. 
Examples could include knowing how to read and write, how to cook, or moral instruction to treat others 
well. Others can be damaging to our well-being, for example dominant standards of physical beauty which 
can cause low self-esteem.28 These examples demonstrate the point that ideas can be enabling or disabling, 
but it is necessary not to be simplistic. People can be affected differently by the same idea – i.e. what one 
perceives as good, another perceives as bad. This disparity is the result of each person having a unique 
history of the ideas and affects they have been exposed to, which has formed their desires, disposition, and 
the content of their mind (Sharp, 2017). Such disparity may in many cases be of no great consequence, 
differing tastes in music, for example. In other cases, disparity can drive social divisions and hatred, whereby 
people find themselves in irreconcilable groups regarding a particular issue. This division and enmity can to 
a large extent shape social and political life because it involves strong ideas which occupy a great many minds 
on both sides of a debate.  
Individuals themselves are also affected by contrary ideas. An addiction, for example, could be 
conceptualised under Spinoza’s ontology as a particularly strong affect that drives a person to repeat a 
specific behaviour. Knowing that the behaviour is damaging them is often not sufficient to make them 
cease, because such knowledge is overwhelmed by the strength of the opposite idea, which in the case of 
an addiction is the desire for alcohol, drugs, or whatever it may be. Hence Spinoza’s declaration that ‘often 
we see the better and follow the worse (viz. when we are torn by contrary affects)’ (E III p2s). 
Ideas, then, just like everything else in Nature, require support to thrive and persevere. In turning to Spinoza 
and developing a renaturalized understanding of ideology, the study of discourse becomes a study of ‘the 
life of ideas’ (Sharp, 2011: 61). Hence Sharp’s call to ‘ascertain the affective power of ideas’ (p. 78). A 
politically engaged analysis should not just be about identifying damaging or disabling ideas. It also: 
 
28 see Sharp, 2011: 79-80, for a discussion of affects in relation to beauty standards, plastic surgery, and self-esteem. 
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requires an ongoing practice of sustenance and attention to new insights, promising ideas, and 
counterhypotheses, seeking amenable ambient forces that might allow them to take root and 
become adequate for increasingly many thinking powers. Spinoza’s portrait of ideal existence 
encourages us to consider which practices, associations, and relationships might strengthen and 
care for emerging, fragile, and challenging ideas that will not immediately find fertile soil (Sharp, 
2011: 74). 
Taking Spinoza’s ontology into account suggests a revised understanding of discourse or ideology. It 
includes elements of both the structuralist and poststructuralist approaches outlined above, but a 
renaturalized conception of ideas adds an additional dimension to critical analysis. Like the structuralist 
approach, Sharp’s model for ideology critique involves the identification of damaging ideas, ideas that can 
reasonably be shown to be reducing people’s well-being. But, like the Foucauldian critique, Sharp does not 
accept that the power of an idea is held by a ruling class. She writes that:  
Ideology is not best understood as something that is produced by the powers that be and imposed 
upon the malleable crowd. Rather, regardless of where they come from, ideas are powerful insofar 
as they occupy and flow from many minds (Sharp, 2011: 78-79). 
Sharp’s conceptualisation of ideas also shares the poststructural understanding that subjectivities are shaped 
by the constellation of ideas in which we unavoidably exist. But, for Sharp, pointing out that certain taken-
for-granted ideals or categories are in fact contingent products of history is not in itself sufficient to fulfil a 
critical analytical investigation of ideas. Her call to ‘ascertain the affective power of ideas’ (Sharp, 2011: 78) 
focuses a stage earlier in the existence of a discourse. If, for Foucault, the ‘way things are’ is the outcome of 
historical struggles out of which ‘truth’ is produced (Foucault, 1991b; Oksala, 2012), then Sharp’s 
understanding of ideas attempts to grasp the ontological nature of that struggle  – the relationality of thought 
and the ‘ecosystem of ideas’ (Sharp, 2011: 56) in which all thought participates. In arguing for a renaturalized 
understanding of ideology/discourse, Sharp is not saying that traditionally accepted categories are natural 
after all; rather she argues that ideas themselves are natural, whether they are true or not. Hence why ‘[t]he 
renaturalization of ideology is not exclusively a question of truth but is most importantly a question of 
power’ (Sharp, 2011: 77).  
How does this understanding of ideas relate to matters of war and peace? Regarding peace, for Sharp it 
would not be enough to point out the ideas that cause and perpetuate division and violence, e.g. the 
perception of an a priori enemy in an ideology of difference (see Said, 1985), inflexible orthodoxies that 
justify violence, dehumanising a specific community, and so on. Neither is it sufficient to demonstrate that 
these ideas are contingent products of history, rather than essential truths. It is necessary to also try to 
understand and promote how ideas that counter such damage spread and become adequate – what are the 
‘practices, associations, and relationships [that] might strengthen’ the idea that we can live together, and so on? 
Such ideas, if they became strong enough, change the nature of the relationships between people, from 
damaging and destructive to enabling and productive, and thus allow for the possibility of peace, and give 
peace content. It is this more productive element that is often missing from analyses in critical geopolitics 
Methodology 
67 
that have focused predominantly on violence and war (Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018). Thinking about peace 
this way responds also to Megoran’s (2010b) argument that critical geopolitics should not only examine how 
discourse contributes to violence and warfare, but how it can contribute to peace. 
Studying the policies of an organisation from this perspective is therefore a study of the ideas that are 
advocated and supported by that institution and what they do. Certain ideas flourish and become established 
ideals, while others seem to have momentary consideration before being largely forgotten. Some ideas are 
hotly contested and debated. Others are so widely accepted that they may not even be explicitly 
acknowledged – they rather form a foundation of presuppositions that are not brought into question or 
critical scrutiny. Sharp’s conceptualisation of an ‘ecosystem of ideas’ draws our attention to these ongoing 
relational processes. It is no doubt an incredibly complex process. An organisation like the UN involves a 
plethora of meetings, panels of experts, different governments with different priorities, and debates over 
every conceivable issue of international governance. An informal conversation between staff members and 
a Security Council resolution are both contributions to the life of ideas in this assemblage, albeit with 
disparate force and influence. In focusing on policy documents and reports on peace operations, this thesis 
is addressing only one aspect of the complex assemblage of UN ideas. It is therefore necessary now to 
examine more specifically the role of documents and reports within the ecosystem of ideas in an organisation 
like the UN. 
5.5 Coding the ecosystem of ideas in UN public discourse 
Alongside the networks of relations between politicians, diplomats, civil servants, and military personnel, 
‘international intervention also fuels, and is fuelled by, a knowledge and report writing industry’ (Doucet, 
2016: 126). This thesis analyses publicly available UN reports on matters of peace policy in general, and the 
intervention in Kosovo in particular. The documents selected for analysis include regular reports on the 
mission in Kosovo, as well as those stand-alone documents that are considered doctrinal within UN peace 
policy (see below section 5.6 for specific detail on documents analysed). To a large extent, the documents 
under examination here represent a specific ‘genre’ of UN policy writing. That is, they share a highly formal 
written style, consisting of a series of numbered paragraphs and/or articles, each paragraph presenting one 
key point (Figure 3). The documents also frequently refer to the existing organisational code or decision in 
accordance with which they are produced. For example, every Report of the Secretary-General on the UN 
Mission in Kosovo begins by stating: ‘The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999)’. To a large degree, then, the documents correspond to the style and formatting 
practices of international law. The UN Charter and Security Council resolutions in fact are international legal 
treaties, so such stylistic correspondence is unsurprising in their case; but their formal genre is emulated also 
in the Secretary-General’s reports, and in other documents which do not hold the same legal authority as 
Security Council resolutions.  
What are the methodological consequences of conceptualising these formal texts, and the ideas they contain, 
as component parts of an assemblage? Given the foregoing account of the nature of ideas, and the 
complexity of the assemblage of ideas in the UN, a first point to acknowledge is that these documents are 
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only a partial window into the ecosystem of ideas on UN peace operations. Similarly, it is important to 
remain aware of the fact that the presentation of an idea or policy in a publicly available document might 
belie disagreement and arguments going on ‘behind-the-scenes’ in the organisation. Inter-agency 
competition and resistance to coordination efforts, for example, are not uncommon in the UN (Ahmed et 
al., 2007; Weiss, 2011). Likewise, the appearance of a policy recommendation in a document does not 
guarantee that it will be implemented in full. To take one example, the Report of the High-level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) was published in 2015, but the Security Council ‘did 
not initiate an implementation process triggered by a formal resolution’ (Novosseloff, 2019: 4), and the 
report’s recommended reforms have only ‘been implemented in a piecemeal manner’ (Sharland, 2018: 9). 
While texts, and the ideas they contain, do not provide access to the whole assemblage, then, they are 
nevertheless important component parts. There are several reasons why a focus on the UN’s public 
discourse remains relevant to researching the geopolitics of peace, even while accepting the previous 
paragraph’s caveats. ‘UN ideas have set past and present international agendas’, writes Thomas Weiss (2011: 
45). They have attempted to provide a ‘guiding vision’ for contemporary peace processes (Ahmed et al., 
2007: 16). Using the language of assemblage theory, the agenda-setting and vision-guiding function of formal 
documents can be identified as a capacity to code the components of the assemblage. ‘Coding’ is defined as 
‘the role played by special expressive components in an assemblage in fixing the identity of a whole’ 
(DeLanda, 2016: 22). In an assemblage like the UN, or a state, the coding function is provided by ‘written 
rules, standard procedures, and most importantly, a constitution defining the organisation’s rights and 
obligation’ (ibid., 22). The UN Charter is an excellent example of a text that demonstrates a capacity to code 
the UN’s ideas and policies. As a foundational and legally binding treaty, all the procedures and policies of 
the organisation are expected to conform to the Charter. A Security Council resolution, such as that 
mandating the mission in Kosovo, likewise demonstrates a coding function, providing the legal framework 
Figure 3 – Extract from Security Council Resolution 1244, demonstrating the formal legal style of most UN documents 
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within which UNMIK is expected to carry out its mandated responsibilities. Thus, while UNMIK’s policies 
are expected to conform to the code of Security Council Resolution 1244, Resolution 1244 is expected to 
conform to the code of the UN Charter. Texts with a substantial coding capacity are therefore important to 
examine, because they establish the parameter within which the organisation’s policies are bounded. 
Paying attention to the coding function of the documents is therefore one of the methodological 
consequences of conceptualising texts as component parts of an assemblage. Nevertheless, the majority of 
the documents analysed in this thesis are reports of the Secretary-General, which do not have the legal 
authority of Security Council resolutions or the UN Charter. What is their role within the assemblage? While 
texts that code the assemblage provide its parameter, the majority of texts are variables within the limits of 
that code.29 The distinction between parameter and variable as different ‘levels’ of linguistic entity within an 
assemblage is analytically useful, but in reality the ideas they contain constantly interact and influence each 
other (DeLanda, 2016: 52). This means that, although the Secretary-General’s reports do not have the same 
coding capacity as resolutions or Security Council approved doctrine, they are still active components of the 
assemblage of ideas. Additionally, ideas that originate within the plethora of variables, if they receive 
sufficient nurturing and support, may end up as part of future codes. Hence the relevance of the Secretary-
General’s reports, in which the researcher can identify which ideas are being promoted and nurtured over 
time. If they are expressed in a way that seems to emulate international law, then that is perhaps a way to 
strengthen support for ideas, seeking legitimacy by echoing the authoritative framework of legal documents. 
Ahmed et al. (2007: 21) observe that the Secretary-General’s reports, ‘though not constituting a 
comprehensive doctrine for peacekeeping, in toto, have decidedly influenced the mandate and means most 
recently assigned to the latest generation of peacekeeping operations’. The ideas present in these variable 
texts can therefore gain in prominence and influence, even though they do not always receive unanimous 
Security Council or General Assembly endorsement. As texts ‘accumulate in an archive that [can] be accessed 
by policy makers’ (Dittmer, 2017: 32, original emphasis), they come to form an institutional memory – an 
enduring record of the ecosystem of ideas out of which policy is constructed. Even if certain policies or 
ideas are disputed, the point is that the dispute is over this particular policy and not over some other 
unarticulated one. By focusing on the UN’s public discourse,  then, the researcher is able to identify the 
content of its institutional memory - which ideas change, which remain constant, which end up being 
reflected as later parameters/codes, and so on.  
Although an examination of discourse lacks the immediate experience of social processes as they unfold in 
context, then, the importance of policy and doctrine in its capacity to guide practices should not be 
dismissed. The large body of knowledge contained in UN reports promotes a ‘particular way of making 
visible and problemetizing violent conflict[…] and it summons particular forms of knowledge and remedial 
actions in response’ (Doucet, 2016: 126). Examining the UN’s policies and reports provides a way of 
understanding, at least in part, the transnational governmentality of a contemporary peace process. It allows 
 
29 The terms ‘parameter’ and ‘variable’ are both from DeLanda (2016: 51). 
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for an analysis of how peace becomes imagined as possible in different contexts and at different times – 
how it is conceptualised, and how it is operationalised. 
5.6 Account of the document analysis 
In a review of the UN peacekeeping policy making process, Sharland (2018: 4) notes that ‘[t]he formulation 
of policy on UN peacekeeping over the last seventy years has largely been evolutionary and ad hoc’. Indeed, 
before the development of the Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008), there was no single document 
defining and elaborating the UN’s peacekeeping doctrine (see Ahmed et al., 2007). Rather, various policies 
and guides were introduced at different points, often in response to perceived failures, particularly in the 
1990s, as well as when interventions were prematurely declared successes before reverting to violence 
(Ahmed et al., 2007).  
For the purposes of this research, UN documents were selected for analysis according to the conceptual 
framework and filter of my study, as presented in previous chapters. This thesis is concerned with the UNs 
conceptualisation of peace, its policies in the Mission in Kosovo, and what they reveal about the state in the 
geopolitics of peace. It was necessary, therefore, to examine both the overarching principles and doctrine 
of UN peace operations, and documents specific to Kosovo. Documents were thus chosen with the aim of 
establishing how peace is both conceptualised in an abstract statement of ideals, and operationalised in the 
policy decisions in Kosovo. 
The documents were chosen with the support of an understanding of how peacekeeping policy gets made, 
which came principally from Sharland (2018). While the Secretariat formulates much of the peace policy 
and training materials, the Security Council retains overall authority over peace operation mandates and so 
‘continues to set the terms and limits of how UN peacekeeping is defined’ (Sharland, 2018: 19). While the 
majority of the documents selected would therefore be sourced from the Secretariat (the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretary-General’s reports, etc.), it was also important to establish the legal 
mandates of the case mission as presented in Security Council resolutions.  
The selection process was further informed by Koops et al.’s (2015a) introduction to peacekeeping in the 
21st century. They note the importance of the Brahimi report (UN General Assembly, 2000), the Capstone 
doctrine (UN DPKO, 2008), and the New Horizon process (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009), as being three 
key conceptual developments in peacekeeping in the new millennium. Selection was aided also by the UNs 
own research guide on peacekeeping.30 This guide directs the researcher towards the relevant documents 
from the General Assembly, the Security Council, as well as the relevant specific departments and 
committees involved in the management of peace operations. 
Based on the above, I established three broad categories by which to filter the available documents, from 
the conceptual to the operational, and selected relevant documents applicable to each category. The 
categories are: principles and doctrine (6 documents); annual reports on peace (21 documents); mission 
specific reports and resolutions on Kosovo (78 documents). In total, 105 documents were selected for 
 
30 Guide available at: http://research.un.org/en/docs/peacekeeping/intro 
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analysis. All of the documents were accessed through the UN’s online archive, which stores electronic copies 
of every publicly available UN document from throughout the history of the organisation. The majority of 
the documents have a unique document symbol. The full texts can be found by entering the document 
symbol in the Official Document System at https://documents.un.org. The next three sub-sections detail 
the specifics of the chosen documents. This is followed by a note on the authorship of the documents, then 
an account of how the analysis was conducted.  
5.6.1 Principles and doctrine 
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) 
The ‘Brahimi Report’ was commissioned in light of the UN’s failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide and 
the Srebrenica massacre. It provides a ‘thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities’ 
and makes recommendations for improvements in UN peace operations. The Capstone Doctrine (see 
below) explicitly states that it draws on the analysis provided in the Brahimi Report (UN DPKO, 2008: 10). 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008) 
The so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’, this text is the UN’s guide to the normative framework of their 
peacekeeping operations. It is aimed at ‘planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 8).  
A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009) 
Unlike the Brahimi report and the Principles and Guidelines, the New Partnership Agenda is not a declaration 
of official UN policy. It was produced by the DPKO and the DFS, but as a ‘consultation document’ to 
promote discussion about the future of UN peacekeeping. It explicitly cites both the Brahimi report and the 
Capstone doctrine. 
An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
The Agenda for Peace ushered in the transformative post-Cold War approach to peace operations in the UN. 
It introduced the term ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, a concept that would extend the role of peace missions 
beyond security measures to include aspects of social, economic, and political development. 
Charter of the United Nations (1945) 
The founding document of the UN, the Charter provides the legal and organisational framework to which 
Member States, in principle, agree to adhere. While peace operations have transformed significantly in the 
decades since the Charter was signed, all Security Council mandates make reference to the section of the 
Charter under which they are acting when they authorise an intervention. The chapters most directly relevant 
to peace operations are chapters VI and VII, regarding, respectively, ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ and 
‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’. 
Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the 
Peacebuilding Architecture (2015) 
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Jointly commissioned by the General Assembly and the Security Council (see A/69/674–S/2014/911), the 
Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture initiated the ‘sustaining peace’ agenda in the UN. ‘Sustaining 
peace’ is the most recent program for improvement and development of the organisation’s approach to 
peace operations (see section 2.3.1 of this thesis).  
5.6.2 Annual reports on peace 
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 
These reports are an annual review of the full breadth of UN activities. They always contain a section on 
peace and security. Their UN document symbol is A/[session]/1. I reviewed every annual report, from 1999 
to 2019, attending particularly to the sections on peace and security, as well as to the introductory sections 
which outlined the main themes of that year’s activities, and often summarised the Secretary-General’s 
thoughts on where work and improvement was required.   
5.6.3 Mission specific resolutions and reports 
Security Council mandates and resolutions 
The Security Council holds the overall authority to deploy a peace mission, to set and renew its mandate, 
and also to pass any resolutions regarding the mission as it develops. Thus, while other bodies within the 
UN are involved in policy discussions and consultations, the Security Council ‘continues to set the terms 
and limits of how UN peacekeeping is defined’ (Sharland, 2018: 19). The most important Security Council 
resolution for the purposes of this thesis was that which provided the mandate for the Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/RES/1244[1999]).  
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Interim Administration in Kosovo 
The Secretary-General compiles a report for each peacekeeping mission roughly every 90 days, addressed 
to the Security-Council. I was therefore able to compile the UN mission reports for Kosovo from its 
establishment in 1999 through to the present day, a total of 72 reports. They give an account of the mission’s 
activities for the given period, and recommendations for further action. 
A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (2001) 
The Constitutional Framework (UNMIK, 2001) was the legal regulation by which UNMIK established and 
managed the ‘provisional institutions’ in Kosovo, including the Provisional Assembly, the judicial system, 
the protection of human rights, and other factors besides.  This document was therefore a particularly useful 
source for investigating how UNMIK sought to pursue peace through the institutions of government. 
The Standards for Kosovo (2004) 
The Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004) lay out a series of benchmarks that the UN Security Council 
deemed necessary to have been achieved before the independent status of Kosovo would be considered – 
the so-called ‘standards before status’ policy (see S/PRST/2004/13). The Standards cover a broad range of 
aspects, including criteria for the functioning of democratic institutions, freedom of movement of all 
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citizens, management of the economy, and dialogue between the Kosovo and Serbian governments. This 
document therefore provided a particularly good insight into the overall vision of peace that UNMIK was 
aspiring to in Kosovo – ‘A Kosovo where all – regardless of ethnic background, race or religion – are free 
to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for 
everyone’ (p. 1). The document was therefore a rich source of the ideas that UNMIK sought to promote, 
although there was less detail here on precisely how these standards would be achieved.  
Reports on the future status of Kosovo 
Two reports were selected for their significance in relation to the status of Kosovo, and the efforts to 
establish an official UN position on the question of whether Kosovo should be independent or not. These 
are: ‘A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo’ (S/2005/635); and the ‘Report of the Special 
Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’ (S/2007/168). The first of these was an 
assessment of the progress that had been made in Kosovo up to that point, with a view to deciding if it was 
possible to begin the process of determining Kosovo’s future status. The report concluded that ‘the time 
has come to commence this process’ (§ 62). The second report therefore detailed the outcome of the future 
status process initiated by the first report. It recommended that Kosovo should indeed begin its transfer to 
full legal independence from Serbia. This recommendation was not passed by the Security Council, however, 
due to the Russian government rejecting it. Six months later, the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared 
independence, violating the conditions of the UNMIK mandate.  
First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations (2013) 
More commonly called the ‘Brussels Agreement’, this treaty was the outcome of European Union facilitated 
negotiations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo. It is considered to have brought to an end 
the ‘North Kosovo Crisis’, a period of increased tension and violence related to the Kosovo government’s 
exercise of authority over Serbian communities in the region (see chapter 6). The agreement proposed the 
creation of an Association/Community of Kosovo Serb Municipalities, a policy that would give the Serb-
majority municipalities in Kosovo a certain amount of governmental autonomy. At the time of writing, 
however, the Association/Community has yet to be formally established. 
5.6.4 A note on authorship and institutional context 
A characteristic of many of the documents just listed is that they are not attributed to an author. Security 
Council resolutions, and doctrinal texts like the Principles and Guidelines are presented as the disembodied 
voice of the organisation – or at least of the specific department that has produced the text. This is one of 
the ways in which the public-facing discourse of the UN might be said to belie fragmentation and 
disagreement. The reader is presented with, for example, the supposedly coherent view of the Security 
Council – we are not given details of arguments between Member States, or what compromises had to made 
to placate the P-5.  
The Reports of the Secretary-General are a little different in this regard, however, in so far as they do not 
claim to speak for the UN as a whole, but are presented as the Secretary-General’s own analysis of the 
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activities of the Secretariat. They are even written in the first-person, albeit while maintaining a highly formal 
style. Different Secretaries-General have different ideas and agendas. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (served 1992-
96), who wrote the Agenda for Peace, evidently championed an interventionist agenda, successfully advocating 
for the expansion of the UN’s peace activities. More recently, it has been suggested that the current 
Secretary-General, António Guterres, ‘is not a fan of multidimensional peace operation’ (Novosseloff, 2019: 
1). The Mission in Kosovo has been conducted under the service of three Secretaries-General,31 and it is 
therefore relevant to pay attention to what is consistent and what changes in the priorities of the Secretariat 
as they are presented by the Secretary-General.  
This distinction – between the disembodied codes of doctrine/resolution and the slightly more subjective 
Secretary-General’s reports – roughly follows the above-discussed distinction between texts as parameter 
and texts as variable. Indeed, as the term ‘variable’ already implies, there can be latitude for different ideas 
within the parameters of the larger code. It might be expected, then, that the researcher is likely to find more 
variability of ideas within the Secretary-General’s reports than in the more highly coded documents. Such 
distinction might in part be an outcome of the different institutional contexts in which the texts are 
produced. The Security Council consists of 15 representatives of national governments – the five permanent 
members, plus the remaining ten members who rotate after two years of participation. While the changing 
of the non-permanent members may bring new perspectives into consideration, or increase/diminish the 
potential for effective collaboration, the history of the Council demonstrates that veto, stalling, and inaction 
are common. Commenting on the ‘unhelpfulness’ of the Security Council in addressing contemporary 
conflicts, Novosseloff (2019: 5) observes: 
Fewer member states are willing to deviate from agreed-upon language and concepts, even if 
proposed changes are minimal. There is great reluctance to advance new ideas; there is also a lack 
of flexibility, a lack of inventiveness, and a lack of audacity. 
By contrast, the Secretary-General, and the Secretariat he administers, is not so beholden to the demands 
and red lines of national governments. Indeed, the UN Charter describes the Secretary-General’s 
responsibilities as ‘exclusively international’, and orders that Member States shall not ‘seek to influence [the 
Secretary-General] in the discharge of their responsibilities’ (United Nations, 1945: Article 100). Perhaps 
this is why a reader is more likely to find new ideas and agendas being promoted and discussed in Secretariat 
documents rather than being advanced by Security Council resolutions. National governments are unlikely 
to question the inviolability of state sovereignty for example – but that is exactly what Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali was able to do in his Agenda for Peace.  
Nevertheless, the Secretary-General’s reports still try ‘to demonstrate a consistent organizational stance’ 
(Sharland, 2018: 21) which is not necessarily representative of inter-departmental rivalry, disagreement, and 
inconsistent practice or procedure. To acknowledge that there is disagreement over ideas within the 
organisation, however, does not render the public documents irrelevant, a somehow passive façade that 
masks the ‘real’ UN. On the contrary, they are important and influential components of the UN assemblage. 
 
31 Kofi Annan (1997-2006), Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016), António Guterres (2017-present). 
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Without a certain degree of coherence around key ideas – provided by the circulation of reports and doctrine 
– the organisation would not be able to function. Such coherence can never be achieved absolutely. That is, 
the assemblage can never become so highly coded that there is no latitude whatsoever for divergent views, 
disagreement, or inconsistency. But it can be achieved to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the issue 
being addressed. From this perspective, the role of the public discourse of the UN is to pursue this 
coherence – to try and establish consistent understandings of, for example, the ideals of democracy and 
human rights, the organisation of state institutions in the pursuit of peace, or a definition of sovereignty. 
The institutional or departmental authorship of these documents – as opposed to naming the actual 
person/people who write them – can therefore be seen as part of this strategy to pursue coherence.  
5.6.5 Conducting the document analysis 
The analysis was conducted using NVivo, a computer programme designed to aid qualitative textual 
research. It allows the researcher to highlight and organise material that relates to chosen themes and sub-
themes in the documents. The text can be annotated to keep track of the analytical process. Not only do 
these features make the process systematic and efficient, they also support the transparency of the research, 
as it makes it straightforward to identify the supporting evidence for claims. 
I sifted through the documents, or relevant sub-sections, coding the text according to the themes discussed 
below, as well as new themes that became apparent as I read. I was then able to review the coded content, 
examine its context within the document as a whole, and then write up the findings for each theme with 
reference to the content. 
5.6.5.1 Principles and doctrine 
The analysis began with the principles and doctrine, in order to first establish an understanding of the 
organisation’s own conceptualisation of peace which would then productively inform the analysis of the 
annual reports and the mission-specific reports, to identify any discrepancies, for example, or to search in 
the mission specific reports for any key terms identified in the doctrinal texts. Based on the conceptual 
framework of the research, I began with six themes to draw out from the documents. They were: 
• Ideals of peace 
- Anything that indicates the conceptual understanding of what peace is. This would include any 
'theology' of peace, any references to universal themes such as justice and equality.  
• Geographical/spatial 
- Any references to space and place in the understanding of peace and how to achieve it. It could 
be specific sites of action, policies that involve spatial separation of peoples (safe zones etc.), or 
any comments that refer to the geography of a place as part of their diagnosis of the problems 
and suggested solutions. 
• State governance 
- References to the state and the functions of state, as part of the development of peace. This 
might include mandates to carry out civil administration and/or institution building. It could 
include practices that aim to extend the spatial reach of government authority. It might be part 
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of the conceptual understanding of peace, placing responsibility on the government or the law 
for example. 
• Local level 
- A counterpoint to the 'state governance' node, local level means any references to reconciliation 
in communities and local relationships. This might include community meetings, local 
reconciliation measures, the role of trade/religion/sport/music and so on. Namely, policies and 
practices that are aimed not at state institutions and authority, but on people and their 
relationships in a context of post-conflict society.  
• Criteria for measuring outcome 
- By what criteria is a policy, practice, or mission, deemed a success or failure? Any mention of 
what worked or what didn't work will come under this. 
• Responses to perceived problems 
- How has the organisation responded to perceived problems? I.e., if they recognise an issue that 
is compromising peace, what do they do to remedy it? 
While these six formed a starting framework for my examination of the texts, I remained open to identifying 
other relevant themes might become apparent as I read the documents.  
5.6.5.2 Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 
Reading the annual Reports of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization was a little different 
to reading the declarations of principles and fundamental doctrine. I read the introduction of each report, 
wherein the Secretary-General summarises the main issues of the year and the actions that the UN has taken 
in relation to them. I also read the section in each report that is dedicated specifically to peace and security. 
The overarching themes that I was looking for stayed the same, and I was interested to see if there were 
continuities and differences between the detached ‘Ideals of Peace’ in the doctrine, and the more engaged 
process of making decisions and responding to problems that the reports summarise for a given year. I 
looked for geopolitical and spatial themes. I also looked for details of Kosovo, and how these cases were 
connected to the policy decisions made in that particular year. This way I was able to track changes across 
the 20-year period, changes in concepts, in organisational elements, and of events in Kosovo (elections, 
renewal of violence, etc.).  
Once I had been through all the reports, I reviewed the coded material and the annotations, in order to 
summarise the findings relating to the key themes of the project. I noted all the points that were annotated, 
and then tried to draw out themes that were repeated across the different points. I came up with nine themes 
– each point I’d annotated seemed to be related to at least one of the following themes. One of the themes 
was simply ‘geopolitical’, but this was too broad – and at least 5 of the other themes could be considered 
geopolitical. Thus, those things I’d called simply ‘geopolitical’, I considered again and tried to recognise their 
more specific theme, and how they related to the other eight themes, which were as follows: 
• Globalization and the limits of the nation state 
• Cross-border flows 
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• International sphere of operating 
• National/domestic sphere of operating 
• State sovereignty vs the need to protect human rights 
• Struggles and operational hindrances 
• Institutions 
• Ideals 
In addition, reviewing these reports I established a timeline of the mission in Kosovo by bringing together 
the content of each report regarding UNMIK (as a general rule, each report had one or two paragraphs 
dealing with every ongoing peace operation). Doing this not only provided a summary of the UN’s 
engagement in Kosovo over the 20-year period, but I was able to pay attention to what the Secretary-General 
saw fit to report in each case. I was able to identify changes in events and policy, for example the extension 
of mandates, elections, Security Council resolutions, and so on.  
Having written up the summaries of these findings, I reviewed them and identified what related to the 
overarching theme of geopolitics and the role of the state, as well as to the chapter themes of 
institutionalising peace and managing difference. This gave me a sense of how to direct my reading after 
this stage – i.e., if I picked up on a key finding to do with managing difference, I could work out what I 
would have to look for to further develop an understanding of that point. For example, one of the findings 
regarding Kosovo was that the peace mission tried to encourage the participation of ethnic Serbs in 
elections. This prompted further inquiry into election turnout, how the mission sought to promote Serbian 
participation, and so on. This kind of further information was generally found in the mission specific reports. 
5.6.5.3 Reports on the Interim Administration in Kosovo 
For the documentation specific to Kosovo, the starting point was the Security Council mandate. Resolution 
1244 specifies the mission’s aim and indicate the main components of the strategy for 
peacekeeping/building in the distinct context of the mission. All actions and decisions taken by the mission 
leadership is supposed to adhere to the scope and aims of the mandate, which is what gives authority to the 
intervention.  
I then moved onto the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Interim Administration in Kosovo, which 
are requested by the Security Council in its initial mandate. The reports present a summary of the conditions 
on the ground (organised along key themes such as security situation, humanitarian situation, etc.), as well 
as documenting the mission’s activities. The reports are produced frequently (usually four a year), and thus 
make up a substantial body of material. To help guide my examination of this large body of material, I 
referred to the summary that I derived from the broader Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of 
the Organization. These summaries indicated key events from the history of the mission which I could then 
look at in further detail in the mission specific reports. For example, in Kosovo, a key event mentioned in 
the broader reports was the election of the Provisional Assembly in 2001, and the subsequent transfer of 
some administrative powers to the Assembly. I could therefore go to the mission specific reports from 2001 
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to find greater detail of UNMIK’s involvement in this process, to find out which powers were transferred, 
which were retained by the UN, and so on.  
Of particular use for a systematic approach to the document analysis was the concluding section of each 
report, sub-titled ‘Observations’. These sections, generally 1-2 pages, communicated the Secretary-General’s 
main points regarding the work of the mission for that reporting period. Thus, a good overview of the work 
of the mission in any given period could be derived from reading the relevant ‘Observations’ sections for 
the reports in that period. The more specific detail of relevant information could then be found in the 
relevant sections elsewhere in the report.  
In addition, my enquiries were guided by my research questions and the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
I was interested in anything that related to the key themes of managing difference and institutionalising 
peace. Regarding managing difference, I was interested in how UNMIK responded to further outbreaks of 
violence; how elections were organised, particularly whether broad participation of the electorate was 
achieved; measures directed at improving civic participation and representation. For institutionalising peace, 
I was interested in the development of new constitutions; the role of law in the peace process; the networks 
of infrastructure that allow administration of the region, how the mission negotiated opposition in the local 
context, and so on. Geopolitically, and thinking about the assemblage of a new state, I was interested in 
elements such as border management, infrastructure, extension of state authority, and internal and external 
agencies and inputs (e.g. Kosovo relying on Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, for the production of 
electricity following the war [see S/1999/779]).  
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the methodological framework which underlies the research carried out for this 
thesis, and also gave an account of how I carried out my document analysis. The following two chapters 
present the findings and analysis of this process, identifying the ideas found in the documents, and how 





6 Institutionalised peace: Assembling the ‘post-conflict’ state 
The different powers that contribute to the existence and action of a commonwealth can be sufficiently 
coherent and unified to account for its endurance over time, its ability to preserve itself in the face of 
hostile forces (internal and external), its ability to organize constituents to act according to certain 
norms and laws, etc.  
- Hasana Sharp (2017: 840) 
The best way to organise a state is easily discovered by considering the purpose of civil order, which is 
nothing other than peace and security of life.  
- Spinoza (2000 [1677]) Political Treatise, 5/2  
[P]eacebuilding is first and foremost a national process.  
- Ban Ki-moon (UN Secretary-General, 2009: § 58) 
6.1 Introduction 
In an overview of research on institutions in political geography, Merje Kuus defines institutions as ‘more 
or less stable patterns in, and mechanisms for, organizing social and political life’ (Kuus, 2018: 2). This 
definition includes a formal understanding of the term (national government, the law, financial institutions 
etc.), as well as the less formalised arrangements and customs of what is sometimes called ‘civil society’. If 
there is to be change in politics and society, even if the driver of change is a grassroots movement, it must 
eventually be institutionalised (Kuus, 2018); it must become part of the ‘more or less stable patterns’ that 
shape people’s lives.  
United Nations peace operations can be characterised as attempting to institute such changes in the societies 
where they intervene. Where conflict and violence dominate, the UN tries to institutionalise patterns of 
practice and custom that are conducive to long-term peace rather than war. How has the UN sought to do 
this, and how have such attempts played out in context? The UN mission in Kosovo is a particularly 
appropriate case in which to investigate this question. In 1999, peacebuilding had only recently developed 
as a concept to guide UN policy and practice, and the new types of tasks being put into practice were 
considerably broader than those of ‘traditional’ peacekeeping (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). The 
Security Council’s mandates for the UN missions in Kosovo (S/RES/1244) and East Timor (S/RES/1272) 
were unprecedented in the extent to which they took responsibility for the administration of the regions in 
which they were deployed (Bellamy et al., 2010: chapter 11). In addition, these missions, and the more 
recently mandated mission in South Sudan, assisted in establishing autonomy and independence in the 
regions in which they deployed. This has involved the production of constitutions, laws, infrastructure, and 
so on, for the development of the new countries. These productions can be understood as ‘place-making’ – 
the process whereby abstract notions (in this case, the idea of the new nation state) become manifest 
materially and socially (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 25-26). 
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This chapter examines the UN’s vision of the role of the state in relation to peace, and how the UN has 
attempted to build peace through the development and management of state institutions in Kosovo.  
The chapter begins with a review of the UN’s statements of principle and doctrine on peace, to establish 
how the organisation pursues peace through the role of the state. Surveying these documents, it is clear that 
the UN places great emphasis on the development of a stable, democratic, legitimate state, for establishing 
more peaceful societies. In addition, however, the documents also display an awareness of the limits of the 
state to deal with problems that are cross-border in nature, for example the regionalization of conflict. 
Furthermore, when it comes to promoting human rights, the UN has sought a more multilateral and 
interventionist approach, whereby the sovereignty of a state government is considered secondary to the 
protection of citizens. In the case of Kosovo, it is perhaps the case that Serbia’s sovereign and legal right 
over the region was subordinated to the need stop the violence – and yet, the UNMIK mandate was also 
committed to the ‘territorial integrity’ of Serbia. The tension between the UN’s commitment to state 
sovereignty and its method of multilateral intervention in the pursuit of universal norms has therefore played 
out in Kosovo, with various political implications. 
The latter half of the chapter therefore examines the UN mission in Kosovo, and the effect of the UN 
developing Kosovo’s state institutions without formally supporting its independence. I focus, first, on the 
Kosovo Assembly’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. I argue that, although the UN was 
neutral on the matter of Kosovo’s independence, by developing its state institutions and territorializing its 
division from Serbia, UNMIK in effect had produced an independent state ‘individual’ even if, on paper, it 
was not committed to such an end. The coherence of the new state was not evenly distributed, however. 
The second key event I focus on is the resistance to the Kosovo assemblage in the so-called ‘North Kosovo 
crisis’ (2011-13), wherein four Serb-majority municipalities in the north of the region resisted the central 
authority of the Kosovo government. While the crisis was supposedly resolved in EU-facilitated 
negotiations between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, northern Kosovo remains highly segregated 
from the rest of the region. The North Kosovo crisis is an example of how events in one location are 
determined by interactions between international, state, and local agencies.  
6.2 The UN’s geopolitical vision for peace 
Given that peace is often ill-defined (Megoran, 2011), what can be learned from the UN’s doctrine about 
the meaning of peace supported by the organisation? Chapter 2 highlighted the different definitions by 
which the UN describes its various peace activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Although in practice there is not strict separation of these activities, it is 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding that most concern this thesis. These are the activities that the UN defines 
as occurring in the post-conflict environment, where, in theory at least, a peace agreement or ceasefire has 
been agreed between the parties to the conflict (see chapter 2, figure 2). It is these activities, and especially 
peacebuilding, that aim at creating ‘sustainable peace’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). The findings presented in this 
section are derived from the three key documents identified by Koops et al. (2015a) as most significantly 
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shaping 21st century peace policy,32 as well as from the annual Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work 
of the Organization. Probably the most important document, at least for establishing the overarching ideals 
of peace, is the Principles and Guidelines, the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’ (UN DPKO, 2008). The Principles 
are intended to guide the conduct of all peacekeeping activities. Here is how it describes its doctrinal status:   
[This document] sits at the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United Nations 
peacekeeping. Any subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and 
training materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform to the principles and concepts referred 
to in this guidance document (UN DPKO, 2008: 9). 
Recalling the discussion of texts as constituent parts of an assemblage, laid out in chapter 5, the preceding 
quotation makes apparent the Capstone Doctrine’s status as a coding document. It is described as the ‘highest-
level’ creed on peacekeeping; it sets the limits and parameters to which all further ‘directives, guidelines[…] 
procedures, manuals and training materials’ are expected to conform. It therefore readily achieves 
DeLanda’s (2016: 22) definition of coding: ‘the role played by an expressive component of an assemblage 
in fixing the identity of a whole’. In this case, the ‘whole’ being coded is the entire UN peacekeeping 
assemblage. Wherever in the world a peace mission is deployed, the content of this document is intended 
to guide its principles, policy, and conduct. When trying to discern the ideals to which the Department of 
Peacekeeping seeks conformity – its attempt to produce a coherent and widely adopted understanding of 
peace, the role of the state, and the role of the UN – the Principles and Guidelines are the most suitable first 
port-of-call.  
The definitions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding quoted in chapter 2 already indicate certain factors in 
how peace is understood within the UN. There is acknowledgment that the aim is to sustain a positive 
version of peace, ‘something that is more than just the absence of war’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13); 
but what are the qualities of this positive peace in the documents’ conceptualisation? The Principles and 
Guidelines list key attributes of the ‘sustainable peace’ envisioned in a contemporary multi-dimensional peace 
operation. There is continuity across the definitions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding emphasising ‘the 
State’s ability to provide security’, the rule of law, and the need for ‘legitimate’ political/governmental 
institutions (Table 1). These criteria provide a summary of what can be found consistently throughout the 
UN’s documentation. Surveying the principles and doctrine on peace operations, the same group of ideals 
are continually referenced as being crucial to peace. They are: Security; rule of law; human rights; protection 





32 The three are: the ‘Brahimi Report’ (UN General Assembly, 2000), the Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008), 
and the New Partnership Agenda (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009). 
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Table 1- UN criteria for a sustainable peace 
Defining peacekeeping Defining peacebuilding 
[T]he core functions of a multi-dimensional United 
Nations peacekeeping operation are to:  
 
a) Create a secure and stable environment while 
strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, 
with full respect for the rule of law and human 
rights;  
b) Facilitate the political process by promoting 
dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the 
establishment of legitimate and effective 
institutions of governance;  
c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United 
Nations and other international actors pursue their 
activities at the country-level in a coherent and 
coordinated manner. 
 
Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008: 23) 
[E]xperience has shown that the achievement of a 
sustainable peace requires progress in at least four 
critical areas: 
 
a) Restoring the State’s ability to provide security 
and maintain public order;  
b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for 
human rights;  
c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political 
institutions and participatory processes;  
d) Promoting social and economic recovery and 
development, including the safe return or 
resettlement of internally displaced persons and 
refugees uprooted by conflict. 
 
 
Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008: 25) 
 
6.2.1 What role for the state is presented in the documents? 
As the above criteria for peace demonstrate, the role of ‘the State’ is emphasised in the UN’s 
conceptualisation of peace. A sustainable peace requires ‘restoring the State’s ability to provide security and 
maintain public order’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 25). Examining the documents for further mention of the state 
reveals more detail as to what is regarded as necessary at the state and institutional level in order to maintain 
a sustainable peace. The criteria referred to are, in part, similar to those peaceful criteria mentioned above 
– security and public order; rule of law; democracy and political representation; social and economic 
recovery; and reconciliation. While the UN is frequently involved in these functions, particularly when 
providing an interim administration, ultimately the objective is that the state should become responsible for 
their provision. Both the Partnership Agenda and the Principles and Guidelines state that an ‘exit strategy’ for a 
UN peace operation depends upon the host country ‘providing for their own security’ (Le Roy and Malcorra, 
2009: 5). 
Three further terms that are used in the UN documents to define the role of the state are capacity, authority, 
and legitimacy.  
State capacity: At no point do the documents offer an explicit definition of what is meant by state or national 
capacity, but it is implicit in reading the documents that it refers to the ability of the state to provide those 
criteria mentioned above – also referred to as ‘core functions’. 
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A lack of, or weak, state capacity is recognised as a problem in need of redress. For example, regarding 
intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War era, the Principles say, ‘Many of these conflicts take place in the 
world’s poorest countries where state capacity may be weak’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 21). In response, ‘[t]he 
activities of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation must be informed by the need to 
support and, where necessary, build national capacity’ (ibid., 40). This view is confirmed in the Reports of 
the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, which further notes that ‘weak states’ are ‘fertile 
breeding grounds for terrorism’ (UN Secretary-General, 2002: § 2), and are furthermore unable to prevent 
the spread of violence. 
State authority: Related is the term ‘state authority’. The Principles list ‘Restoration and extension of State 
authority’ as a core peacebuilding activity (UN DPKO, 2008: 27-28): 
The aim must always be to restore, as soon as possible, the ability of national actors and institutions 
to assume their responsibilities and to exercise their full authority, with due respect for 
internationally accepted norms and standards (UN DPKO, 2008: 40). 
Similarly, the annual Secretary-General’s Reports on the Work of the Organization refer to need to consolidate 
(2004 § 46; 2005: § 45), restore (2006 § 72), extend (2009 § 46; 2013 § 34), and re-establish (2012 § 50) state 
authority.  
State legitimacy: Finally, the term legitimate is used in the Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008) to describe 
the ‘transition to legitimate government’ (p. 22), the ‘establishment of legitimate and effective institutions 
of governance’ (p. 23), and the ‘formation of legitimate political institutions’ (p.89). There is little detail given 
on what precisely defines legitimate institutions from non-legitimate ones, but it is explicitly connected with 
‘free and fair elections’ (pp. 28; 89). This suggests that the UN understands the legitimacy of a government 
and its institutions to be derived from it being democratically elected. 
Overall, it appears that state capacity and authority refer to the extent to which the state can provide the 
further peaceful criteria, including security and public order, rule of law, political representation of all groups, 
and so on. Progress on these criteria seems to go hand in hand with achieving legitimacy according to the 
measures in the documents, particularly the holding of democratic elections. 
6.2.2 What is the vision of peace outside of the institutions of the state? 
In addition to emphasising the role of the state, some of the peaceful criteria are qualities manifest in 
communities rather than governmental institutions. These criteria emphasise social recovery. They include 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, the resettlement of citizens 
displaced by the conflict, and the safety of civilians from any further violence. These social criteria cannot 
be divorced from the institutional criteria because they are related. For example, a criterion for sustainable 
peace at the institutional level is economic recovery, something which necessarily requires the development 
of organisations and infrastructure. The social or community level counterpart to this institutional 
development would be the provision of sustainable employment for demobilized former combatants. 
Discussion of social measures in the documents also includes factors which are about the relationship 
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between the UN peace mission and citizens. The factors are communication, understanding local culture, 
and perceptions of the mission among local people.  
Communication 
Communication regards the UN’s ‘public information strategies’ (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 15), and the 
need to ‘ensure that the mandate and objectives of the mission are fully understood by the host population 
and other key actors’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 83). An effective public information strategy is required ‘to counter 
disinformation and to secure the cooperation of local populations’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 146), as 
well as to ‘manage expectations[…] among the local population’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 82). 
Understanding local culture 
Understanding the local culture is intended to minimise the potential for tensions and misunderstandings 
between UN personnel and the communities with which they interact. It includes factors such as 
understanding the diversity of views regarding the peace process among local people, to ensure that 
‘ownership and participation [is] not limited to small elite groups’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 39). The Principles also 
state the need to manage cultural differences between the UN and the host population, in order to minimise 
the potential for ‘friction and discontent’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 82). The examples given include, ‘employment 
of women in non-traditional gender roles, mixing and socialization amongst genders, drinking, gambling, 
inappropriate behaviour, etc.’ (p. 82).  
Local perception of the UN 
Both communication and respect for local culture are intended to contribute to a positive perception of the 
mission among the host population. The effectiveness of a peace operation is deemed to require local 
support: ‘The experiences of the past 15 years have shown that in order to succeed, United Nations 
peacekeeping operations must also be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the 
local population’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 36). 
The local level criteria for peace can therefore be divided into those that are directly about building peace 
(safety, employment, reconciliation, DDR), and those which are about management of the UN mission’s 
relation to the local population. These latter factors indirectly contribute to peace in so far as they contribute 
to the mission’s chances of success.   
6.2.3 Positive peace as a stable nation state 
Considering the definitions of peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, of most 
significance for the present research project are peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Whereas peacemaking and 
enforcement are directed towards stopping an ongoing violent conflict, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
encompass the range of activities intended to maintain peace and develop sustainably peaceful societies. In 
principal, these activities require ‘a peace to keep’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 49), that is, the hostile parties must 
have at the least agreed to a cease-fire and consented to a peace process. In practice, however, there is often 
not a clean temporal distinction between peacemaking and peacekeeping/building, between measures to 
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stop violence and measures to sustain peace. Indeed, the Principles document notes that the different 
activities undertaken in the pursuit of peace do not occur sequentially, and that it is through a combination 
of them all that a comprehensive peace process functions (UN DPKO, 2008: 20). It is worth maintaining a 
conceptual distinction, however, not only because the documents themselves do so, but to aid the overall 
analysis.  
In terms of the difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the distinction broadly fits the 
conceptual distinction between negative and positive peace (Galtung, 1969). Peacekeeping aims to maintain 
‘security’, which can be understood as the absence of violence. To this end, it requires that the hostile parties 
agree to a political process, so the disagreement and conflict can be addressed through negotiation and 
diplomacy rather than through direct violence. From this foundation of non-violence, in theory at least, the 
more fundamental structural issues can be addressed and a more positive version of peace, underpinned by 
the rule of law and human rights, can be built. The Brahimi report states, ‘peacekeepers work to maintain a 
secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining’ (UN General 
Assembly, 2000: viii, see also § 28). The positive vision for long-term peace is acknowledged to be the more 
difficult to achieve. As the authors of the New Partnership Agenda write, ‘Several [missions] have made good 
progress in providing security and stability but face obstacles in designing and implementing peacebuilding 
strategies that can facilitate responsible transition and exit’ (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: ii). 
The latter quotation raises the point of transition and exit, which is when a peace mission is judged to have 
completed its mandate and can withdraw, handing responsibility for further engagement with the country 
to other UN and non-UN organisations (see UN DPKO, 2008: 86-90). This is an important problem, 
because a decision to withdraw a peace mission indicates that a certain understanding of peace has been 
achieved, and the Security Council has decided that the host country no longer requires a peacekeeping 
presence. The mission is Kosovo was established in 1999, and is still ongoing today, albeit with a relatively 
small number of personnel. The Principles note that ‘There is no standard “check-list” of benchmarks 
applicable to all situations. The specific benchmarks used will differ from situation to situation, depending 
on the underlying causes of the conflict and the dynamics at play’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 88).  
Despite this acknowledgement that there is no ‘check-list’ applicable in all contexts, the consistency of the 
concepts across the documents indicates that there are a set of broader standards which the organisation 
presents as normative. Indeed, the intention behind the Principles and Doctrine is precisely to provide a unified 
doctrine to which ‘subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training 
materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 9). This is further evidenced by 
statements about universal, or ‘international’ standards. The Principles says that one of the aims of a multi-
dimensional operation is for national institutions to ‘exercise their full authority, with due respect for 
internationally accepted norms and standards’ (ibid., 40). The Brahimi report says that the UN should only 
commit to implementing a peace agreement if it is ‘consistent with prevailing international human rights 
standards and humanitarian law’ (§ 58), and also mentions the need to train local police forces ‘according to 
international standards for democratic policing and human rights’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 39). 
Elsewhere, Secretary-General Kofi Annan laments the ‘growing contempt for international norms (UN 
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Secretary-General, 1999: § 93), and in the case of the ‘Standards for Kosovo’, a series of governmental 
norms were supposed to be achieved before any consideration of settling Kosovo’s independent status 
(UNMIK, 2004). Phrases like these make explicit what is implicit in the whole concept of international 
intervention, namely that a UN peace operation is intended to help a country meet certain standards which 
it has failed to achieve or maintain – standards of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and so on. It is for 
this reason that Zanotti (2006) has characterised peacekeeping as a project of ‘normalization’. The doctrinal 
texts evidently play a role in this normalization, displaying a consistent set of ideals by which all peace 
missions are intended to operate, no matter the differing contexts in which they are deployed. Examining 
the UN Mission in Kosovo therefore offers an opportunity to examine how this process of normalization 
– this attempt to institutionalise consistent standards - has been manifest in practice, and to reflect on its 
implications for how the geopolitics of contemporary peace processes can be understood. 
The findings just outlined, then, can be understood as setting the parameters within which further policies 
of the UN peace operation assemblage must conform. They demonstrate the UN’s emphasis on state 
building, accompanied by an understanding that social measures such as DDR are also necessary. As Ban 
Ki-moon states, ‘peacebuilding is first and foremost a national process’ (UN Secretary-General, 2009: § 58). 
So far, this highly-coded geopolitical vision would seem to correspond with the liberal model of peace – the 
end goal is a stable state which operates in accordance with ‘international norms’ (Richmond, 2004). Reading 
further through the Secretary-General’s Reports on the Work of the Organization, however, reveals that 
these doctrinal standards are by no means the beginning and end of the UN’s ecosystem of ideas in relation 
to peace and the state. Indeed, the Secretary-General’s reports at times display an awareness of the limits of 
the state, question the inviolability of state sovereignty, and consider how to better respond to the cross-
border and regional nature of conflict.  
6.2.4 Beyond the state: Cross-border flows and ‘regionalization’ 
As the previous section’s findings demonstrate, the ideals of peace presented in the doctrinal texts are 
echoed also in some of the Reports of the Secretary-General. The declared importance of restoring ‘state 
authority’, for example, was present in the Principles and Guidelines and in several of the Secretary-General’s 
reports. Likewise, the necessity of ‘international norms’. As was discussed in the methodology, however, the 
Secretary-General’s reports do not have the same coding function as do the doctrinal texts which have just 
been discussed. They do not set the mandate of peace missions, and neither do they ‘define the nature, 
scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations’, as do the Principles and 
Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008: 8). Rather than a parameter of the peacekeeping assemblage, then, the ideas in 
the Secretary-General’s reports are better characterised as variables within that parameter. The presentation 
of an annual report on the Work of the Organization is ordered by the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945: 
Article 98). While they are therefore produced in accordance with the larger code, and derive their legitimacy 
from that code, the reports also display a greater latitude and variance in the ideas they present, as will 
become apparent in the presentation of the following findings. They do not only echo the doctrinal texts, 
but also advance and promote some of the more contentious ideas that have not achieved doctrinal status. 
The methodology of this thesis characterised the ‘life of ideas’ as a natural ‘ecosystem’ within which some 
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ideas flourish and are supported, while others either fade away, or perhaps are never even articulated (Sharp, 
2011: 61). The doctrinal texts discussed above can be said to contain ideas that have flourished and received 
wide support within the UN assemblage. The Reports of the Secretary-General, by contrast, offer an insight 
into some of the less ‘successful’ ideas – those which are more rigorously contested or questioned, and 
regarding which consensus has yet to be achieved. 
A repeated theme across the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization is the 
transboundary nature of contemporary problems, and the need for international cooperation to be able to 
deal with them. These statements were generally made in the introductions of the reports, and thus were 
being made in relation not just to peace, but to the broader range of issue that come under the so-called 
‘three pillars’ of the UN – peace and security, development, and human rights (UN Secretary-General, 2012: 
§ 1; 2016: § 3). The statements made regarding this highlight the limits of the nation state as being capable 
of solving problems of violence, poverty, and human rights abuses. This is implicit in stating that global 
problems require international cooperation, but the reports also state it explicitly. ‘[N]o single country has 
the capacity to cope with the political, economic, environmental and technological challenges of an 
interconnected world’, writes Kofi Annan in the 2002 report (UN Secretary-General, 2002: § 4). Ban Ki-
moon echoes this in 2008 – ‘Challenges like climate change and global health know no borders and cannot 
be addressed by a single State or groups of States’ (UN Secretary-General, 2008: § 5). António Guterres 
likewise writes in 2017 – ‘The interconnected nature of today’s global trends unequivocally demonstrates 
that countries cannot manage these risks alone’ (UN Secretary-General, 2017: § 12).  
In the report for 2006, Kofi Annan offers a relatively extended reflection on the place of the nation state 
(UN Secretary-General, 2006: §§ 4-13). Here he writes that the current globalized world represents ‘an era 
in which international relations are no longer almost exclusively about relations between nation-States’, and 
notes the various ‘self-constituted groups across national boundaries’ that make up ‘new global 
constituencies’ (ibid., § 4). He also notes that wars and violence ‘most often begin within States, yet swiftly 
develop into threats to the peace of a whole region, if not the whole world’ (UN Secretary-General, 2006: 
§ 9). This point is similarly emphasised by António Guterres, who writes that ‘[t]he regionalization of 
conflict is one of the most challenging trends we face today’ (UN Secretary-General, 2018: § 67). The 
specific example given in the 2018 report is the Middle East and its series of related conflicts, but the same 
phenomenon is addressed in a broader sense elsewhere (2003: § 12; 2004: § 11). In the report for 2003, for 
example, Kofi Annan notes the threat posed by civil wars to ‘international peace and security’ (§ 12). He 
refers to ‘zones of impunity’, and the ‘transboundary networks of finance and trade’ which facilitate 
trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people, and destabilize ‘entire regions’ (§ 12). A notable other example 
occurred in Africa in the 1990s. The violence of the Rwandan civil war and genocide spread across Rwanda’s 
border into Zaire,33 leading to further strife, the collapse of Zaire’s government, and two Congolese wars 
involving seven further countries (Williams, 2011).  
 
33 Zaire was then the name of what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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6.2.5 Multilateralism before state sovereignty? 
The tension between the primacy of nation states and the need for multilateral responses based on 
international norms is reflected in Kofi Annan’s assertion that state sovereignty should not protect 
governments that violate human rights. Referring to a disagreement in the Security Council over 
intervention in Kosovo, he observes that ‘Defenders of the traditional interpretations of international law 
stressed the inviolability of State sovereignty; others stressed the moral imperative to act forcefully in the 
face of gross violations of human rights’ (UN Secretary-General, 1999: § 66). He raises the point again in 
2000, where he asks the following: 
if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
offend every precept of our common humanity? (UN Secretary-General, 2000: § 37). 
This question was responded to in a report produced by an International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS). The report was called The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a principle that is defined 
as follows:  
the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable 
catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or 
unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (ICISS, 2001: 
viii). 
The UN General Assembly adopted this principal in 2005, and a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to 
Protect was appointed in 2008. While the UN charter notes that state sovereignty is inviolable, therefore, 
the ICISS sought to sidestep this by presenting a new understanding of sovereignty – namely that it is not 
the government that is sovereign, but the citizens of the state (Oman, 2010). This idea is in fact present in 
one of Kofi Annan’s reports, where he refers to ‘the sovereignty of the people’ as a ‘universal ideal’ (UN 
Secretary-General, 2001: § 5, emphasis added). These developments around the definition of sovereignty 
indicate that the discord between multilateral action in the interests of universal ideals and state sovereignty 
remains relevant to the organisation’s contemporary actions. As with Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) more 
interventionist vision in An Agenda for Peace, the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001) initiative shows that the 
UN is still trying to develop ways through this discord. 
This debate and disagreement over state sovereignty furthermore demonstrates the often fragmented and 
incoherent character of the UN. While the doctrinal texts seek to produce a coherent and unified set of 
ideals, it is apparent that such unity and coherence is not always possible. What is worth emphasising, 
however, is that the appeals from Kofi Annan to place qualifiers on the inviolable status of sovereignty 
clearly had some success. This is particularly evident in the development of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) agenda. Thomas Weiss (2011: 225) observes that, ‘no idea has moved faster or further in the  
international normative arena than the “responsibility to protect”’. While the Secretary-General’s reports do 
not function as doctrinal parameters, then, the example of R2P demonstrates their potential to nurture and 
promote certain ideas such that they gain in prominence and influence in the broader ecosystem of ideas. 
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The fact that the principle of R2P was adopted by the General Assembly shows the interaction and influence 
between the different ‘levels’ of linguistic entity (DeLanda, 2016) in the UN assemblage. Ideas that originate 
among the variable non-doctrinal texts can end up forming part of future doctrine if they receive sufficient 
support. 
The above concerns of the Secretaries-General illustrate some of the main geopolitical tensions within which 
the UN tries to operate. While both an international sphere and a domestic sphere of operating are noted 
as important, the tension between the two is evident when regarding issues such as globalisation and the 
limits of the state, cross-border flows and regionalization, and state sovereignty vs. the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ citizens from human rights violations. This tension is further demonstrated by Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon’s ‘Human Rights Up Front’ initiative, which foregrounded the responsibility of the 
organization to protect civilians. (UN Secretary-General, 2014: § 57). The initiative was intentionally 
implemented at a level that did not require Member State approval – ‘UN officials were concerned that too 
much public attention surrounding the action plan could provoke a serious backlash from states wary of an 
intrusive and activist organization, and the possible erosion of sovereignty’ (Rhoads, 2019: 289). While this 
implies an opposition between national sovereignty and the protection of human rights, António Guterres 
says that ‘human rights and national sovereignty should not be seen as competing ideas’ (UN Secretary-
General, 2018: § 18). Such a statement is somewhat undermined by the need to introduce Rights Up Front 
without Member State approval, demonstrating again the contested nature if UN ideas. The UN has a 
multilateral vision for responding to problems that are transboundary in nature, but it has to pursue this 
vision through the nation-state system. Kofi Annan affirms that ‘while nation-States are no longer the sole 
players in international relations, they are still the most important’ (§ 6), and he ultimately finishes his 
reflections by emphasising states’ responsibility and capacity to maintain security and protect human rights. 
The first half of this chapter has identified the geopolitical vision of the UN in relation to its peace 
operations. A peace mission can be said to operate between the need for multilateralism and universal 
norms, on the one hand, and the sovereignty of nation states on the other. The doctrinal texts clearly affirm 
a vision of the institutions of state as vital for securing peace – they direct the efforts of peace missions 
towards establishing state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy. The tension, however, is in the fact 
that these state-based aims are articulated according to universal norms, such as democracy, human rights, 
and rule of law. The UN therefore wants to re-establish a stable state through its interventions, but demands 
that this state must conform to the UN’s universal norms.  
The second half of this chapter turns to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to 
examine how the geopolitical vision for peace laid-out in the principles and doctrine of the UN has played 
out in practice. Kosovo demonstrates the complexity of operating between state-based goals and universal 
norms. As chapter 2 described, Kosovo was placed under international authority, which developed its 
governmental institutions, and yet it was not granted formal statehood by the international authorities. The 
comprehensive extent of UNMIK, and its 20 year history, means that it is not possible to analyse the full 
extent of the mission. I have therefore chosen two key events that represent the geopolitical complexities, 
paradoxes, and tensions in Kosovo. They are, first, the question of Kosovo’s status and the unilateral 
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declaration of independence in 2008; and second, the resistance to Kosovo’s government in the north of 
the region and the so-called North Kosovo Crisis during 2011-13. 
6.3 Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
Chapter 2 overviewed the extent of UNMIK’s authority in Kosovo when it was deployed in 1999. The 
mission assumed near total sovereignty over the region. It secured the borders, provided a police force, 
managed the judicial system, and organised the election of the first Provisional Assembly. It provided the 
constitution for the new government, and transferred some authority over to the Assembly, but UNMIK 
also maintained a series of ‘reserved powers’ which were not transferred (UNMIK, 2001). The mission 
therefore had the authority to implement a broad strategy in pursuit of its peaceful ideals in Kosovo, and 
began the process of institutionalising the universal norms adhered to by the UN. In the terms of the 
relational account of agency discussed in chapter 4, it could be said that through the deployment of people, 
technologies, and ideals, UNMIK was organising the constituents of Kosovo such that it was becoming 
more coherent, and new capacities were being realised. The mission’s activities therefore contributed to 
Kosovo’s territorialization, not least by securing and monitoring the borders.  
‘Territorialization’ is the assemblage theory term for ‘the determination of the spatial boundaries of a whole 
– as in the territory of a community, city, or nation-state’ (DeLanda, 2016: 22). As with the cohesion of a 
Spinozan state ‘individual’ (see chapter 4), the territorialization of a state assemblage is a matter of degree, 
rather than binary. When considering the matter of Kosovo’s independence, it is apparent how the concept 
of territorialization becomes relevant. Securing the borders of the region, for example, is a textbook instance 
of increasing the degree of territorialization. The physical apparatus on the border, defended by police 
and/or military personnel, delineates between the space of the ‘new’ country and that of the country from 
which it has become independent. A highly territorialized state might have very strict rules on movement 
of people and goods across the border. A less highly territorialized state might allow for greater freedom of 
movement (as, for example, exists between member states of the European Union). As shall be seen, 
however, while UNMIK contributed to Kosovo’s territorialization, it was formally neutral on the question 
of independence. While some policies are territorializing, such as border monitoring, other policies are 
deterritorializing, such as remaining neutral on Kosovo’s status. De/territorialization is therefore a 
particularly useful concept for understanding the implications of the UN’s geopolitical vision for peace and 
the state as it was made manifest in Kosovo. 
Whilst under UNMIK administration, the question of Kosovo’s final status remained unaddressed. The 
Security Council resolution which mandated UNMIK – the key coding text of the mission - was committed 
to both autonomy for Kosovo and the territorial integrity of Serbia (S/RES/1244 [1999]). The question of 
the status of Kosovo was, furthermore, supposedly to be postponed until the Standards for Kosovo 
(UNMIK, 2004) had been achieved – the ‘standards before status’ policy (S/PRST/2004/13). For the first 
years of the mission, then, UNMIK operated within the tension of its mandate, developing autonomy and 
territorialization within Kosovo but without committing to a process for independence.  
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The status problem would eventually have to be addressed, however. In 2005, therefore, the Secretary-
General commissioned ‘A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo’ (S/2005/635), the purpose of 
which was to assess ‘whether the conditions are now in place for initiating and conducting the future status 
process’ (S/2005/635: 2). The review identified progress in several key areas, including the development of 
central and local government, a functioning civil service, and some economic progress. Despite noting the 
need for continued implementation of the Standards for Kosovo, the review recommended that the process 
to determine Kosovo’s final status should begin. The process took the form of a negotiation between the 
Serbian and Kosovan leadership, mediated by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s 
future status, Martti Ahtisaari. By 2007, Ahtisaari had prepared his report (S/2007/168). He recommended 
‘independence with international supervision’ as the only possible future status for Kosovo, given the totally 
irreconcilable positions of the Serbian and Kosovan governments. The recommendation was presented to 
the Security Council, who, had they agreed to it, would have provided the legal mandate for Kosovo’s 
transfer to independence. Russia, however, a member of the Security Council P-5, refused to accept the 
recommendation, meaning a resolution could not be passed; the question of the UN’s formal position on 
Kosovo’s future status was left unresolved.  
Shortly after Russia had blocked the independence process, the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared 
independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Having failed to achieve independence through the formal 
UN process, they went against the authority of the UN and declared independence via an ‘unofficial’ 
method. The declaration was passed by 109 of 120 Assembly members – the 10 Serb representatives did 
not attend the vote (S/2008/354: § 3). As part of this move, the Assembly also acted to remove UNMIK’s 
authority over the region – they did so by introducing a new constitution, which came into force 15 June 
2008. The new constitution claimed responsibility for what had been the UNMIK Special Representative’s 
reserved powers (S/2008/458: § 2). The Assembly furthermore began a concerted effort to assert its 
statehood, including the following measures: 
• established a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and set up diplomatic mission 
• applied for membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
• conducted a census  
• established the Ministry for Security Forces 
• appointed a Central Election Commission 
• passed legislation ‘without reference to the powers of [the] Special Representative’ 
- see S/2008/692: § 2 
The declaration of independence, and the new constitution, represented a fundamental challenge to 
UNMIK and its role in Kosovo. The Secretary-General’s report at the time talks of the need to adjust the 
‘operational role’ of UNMIK in light of these new circumstances (S/2008/354: §§ 10-11). Furthermore, the 
Security Council was divided on the issue – the USA, the UK, and France, all immediately recognised 
Kosovo’s independent status (on 18 February 2008). Russia and China did not. This deadlock among the 
P-5 meant the Security Council was ‘unable to provide guidance’ as the Secretary-General’s report put it 
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(S/2008/458: § 3). UNMIK was therefore restructured according to the Secretary-General’s plans, without 
Security Council backing. This involved a downscaling of UNMIK, loss of the Special Representative’s 
authority, and the transferral of many of its responsibilities to EULEX, notably in the area of ‘policing, 
justice and customs’ (S/2008/692: §§ 21-25). At the time, the Special Representative to the Secretary-
General still held ‘reserved powers’, including the right to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly should it act in 
contradiction to the Security Council mandate (UNMIK, 2001). While the unilateral declaration of 
independence is in violation of the Security Council’s resolution, the Special Representative did not exercise 
his rights to assert UNMIK authority against the Kosovo Assembly.  
In unilaterally declaring independence, the Kosovo assemblage to which the UN mission had been 
contributing sought to enhance its autonomy yet further by breaking away from the UN’s authority. This 
demonstrates that agency does not equal intention. UNMIK was indeed an important agent in Kosovo. But 
as Kosovo territorialized, there would come a point at which the territorialization came into conflict with 
the de-territorializing elements of the UN mission. This seems to indicate a paradox that Kofi Annan himself 
recognises regarding transitional administrations. Regarding the then newly deployed operations in Kosovo 
and Timor-Leste, he refers to the ‘sometimes contradictory tasks of governing those territories, supporting 
the emergence of local institutions and maintaining law and order’ (UN Secretary-General, 2000: § 68). The 
tasks are contradictory in the sense that an international authority is trying to establish regional autonomy, 
autonomy that is undermined by the fact the UN mission retains executive authority, including the authority 
to dissolve the government (UNMIK, 2001: § 8.1). Indeed, some political activist groups, opposed to 
international intervention in Kosovo, utilise this kind of contradiction to frame their opposition (Björkdahl 
and Gusic, 2015). While UNMIK and the other international organisations in Kosovo are committed to 
norms of democracy and rule of law, the activist opposition point out that the international presence is itself 
undemocratic, and places itself ‘above the law which they are here to implement’ (Vetëvendosje!, quoted in 
Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015: 279). The territorializing factors in the Kosovo assemblage (self-government, 
border control, ‘independence’, ethno-nationalism) are in discord with the deterritorializing factors 
(coalition of international organisations, neutrality on independent status, principle of multiethnicity).  
To further demonstrate the role of territorialization and coherence of the state ‘individual’ with regards to 
independence, it is worth noting that 2008 was not the first time that the Kosovo government had declared 
independence. In 1990, the Kosovo Assembly had similarly declared Kosovo to be an independent state, 
and re-asserted this claim again in 1991, following an unofficial referendum on the question (Daskalovski, 
2005). Some alternative public institutions were developed, but these first declarations of independence had 
little meaning beyond the symbolic. Albania was the only country to recognise Kosovo as independent, and 
Serbia continued to exercise authority in the region – indeed, Serbian President Milošević was actively 
reducing the autonomy that Kosovo had been granted under Tito’s Yugoslavia.  
In 2008, however, the ideal and material circumstances were considerably different. Serbian authorities - 
governmental, military and police - had withdrawn from Kosovo under NATO’s watch (NATO, 1999). The 
border between Kosovo and Serbia was monitored by KFOR personnel, and customs gates were in 
operation. The Kosovo Assembly had been established and several official elections had been conducted to 
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select its members. In short, the Kosovo state assemblage had developed a level of territorialization that it 
had not had in the 1990s. UNMIK’s official neutrality on the status of Kosovo was therefore secondary to 
the fact that Kosovo had already become a more consistent and territorialized assemblage through UN 
intervention. When considering the state as an assemblage, or a Spinozan ‘individual’, it can be said that 
UNMIK had already facilitated Kosovo’s becoming a state, even while the UN discursively resisted such a 
status by being formally neutral on the matter. UNMIK’s intention, on the question of independence, was 
undermined by its action. Again, agency and influence was not the same as rational intention. Although 
UNMIK substantially influenced the development of institutions in Kosovo and was granted extensive 
authority, it can never be said that an agent is totally in control of the processes in which they participate.  
When independence was declared in 2008, therefore, it had a good deal more meaning than in the 1990s. 
The capacities of the assemblage had been developed such that the Kosovo Assembly was able to implement 
further territorializing measures, such as conducting a census and establishing new ministries, thus asserting 
their ‘stateness’. Furthermore, the USA, the UK, and France immediately recognised Kosovo’s 
independence, giving further weight to the coding of Kosovo as a state. The discursive designation of 
Kosovo as a state does, therefore, contribute to the coding of the assemblage. But it is not the only, or even 
the most important, aspect.  
6.4 Resisting the state assemblage: the ‘North Kosovo Crisis’ 
The question of Kosovo’s status cannot be separated from the ethnic division that characterised the war in 
the 1990s. While the majority of ethnic-Albanians are in favour of independence, the minority ethnic-Serbs 
want Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia. The region remains highly segregated along ethnic lines, with many 
Kosovo Serbs living in mono-ethnic ‘enclaves’, which swelled after the NATO military intervention had 
forced out Serbian authority (Higate and Henry, 2009). In particular, the segregation of Kosovo Serbs in 
four northern municipalities of the region has been an enduring factor contributing to the geopolitical 
tensions at play in Kosovo (Figure 4). The institutional processes developed by UNMIK continually 
struggled to integrate northern Kosovo into the governance of the region (Gusic, 2019). Indeed, the Serbian 
government maintained influence in the northern municipalities, managing ‘parallel structures’ that operated 
separately from the Kosovo institutions (OSCE, 2007). The parallel structures included courts, education, 
and healthcare (OSCE, 2007). The ‘problem’ of the ethnic enclaves made headlines again in 2018, when the 
leaders of Serbia and Kosovo discussed a potential ‘land swap’ that would transfer northern Kosovo into 
Serbia in return for a majority-Albanian area of Serbia being ceded to Kosovo (Capussela, 2018). 
While UNMIK may have had a comprehensive set of ideals, and a broad mandate with which to implement 
them, the process by which they are put into practice was neither straightforward nor evenly applied across 
the region. Institutional and governmental processes come up against obstacles and resistance whereby they 
are weakened, or disabled altogether (DeLanda, 2016). While this is the case in any system of government, 
in divided societies, where state legitimacy is in question, resistance to the central government is often more 
trenchant and exacerbated (van der Haar and Heijke, 2013). 
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Following the unilateral declaration of independence, then, there was immediate protest and reaction from 
Kosovo Serbs in the northern municipalities, including some violent clashes, the seizure of a courthouse, 
and the destruction of customs service points (S/2008/354: §§ 5-6). The Serbian parallel structures in 
northern Kosovo ‘widened and deepened’ (S/2008/458:§ 2), with the support of the Serbian government 
in Belgrade (S/2008/458: § 5). Serbia held its own elections in northern Kosovo on 11 May 2008, which 
UNMIK declared to be invalid (ibid., § 6). Furthermore, on the basis of these elections, Serbia established 
the Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, 
as an alternative to the Kosovo Assembly. While UNMIK’s institution building can therefore be 
characterised as territorializing the Kosovo assemblage, it is apparent that this process was resisted in 
northern Kosovo. If the unilateral declaration of independence was an assertion of Kosovo’s stateness, the 
response in northern Kosovo was to emphasise rejection of the Kosovo government’s authority, further 
entrenching the parallel structures. 
A period that particularly captures the geopolitics of Kosovo’s stateness and Serbian resistance is the so-
called ‘North Kosovo Crisis’, from 2011-2013. Beginning in July 2011 with an attempt by Kosovo police to 
exercise authority in the northern municipalities, the crisis supposedly ended with the ‘Brussels Agreement’, 
Figure 4 - Map highlighting the four Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo.  
(Original map by WhiteWriter, distributed under CC BY-SA 3.0 license. Additional text 
added by author.) 
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an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo facilitated by the EU. The crisis was triggered by a dispute over 
customs, and the policing of customs gates. An incidence of international dispute and diplomacy between 
Kosovo and Serbia was manifest locally at customs gates 1 and 31, on the northern Kosovo border with 
Serbia. 
6.4.1 Customs gates 1 and 31 
In the UN documents, rising tension in northern Kosovo is attributed to the Kosovo government’s attempt 
to exercise its authority in the region. For example, Regional Operational Support Units (part of the Kosovo 
Police) began to patrol in northern municipalities (S/2011/514: § 21). The ‘triggering’ event was when the 
Kosovo government placed an embargo on Serbian goods, and deployed police officers to the customs 
check points in northern Kosovo in order to enforce it (S/2011/675: § 3). The embargo itself was a response 
to Serbia’s refusal to recognise goods with a Kosovo Customs stamp (ibid., § 3).  
This assertion of Kosovo’s central authority was met with roadblocks from Kosovo Serbs, on the roads 
leading to the customs gates, blocking the approach of the Kosovo police. KFOR intervened to remove 
Kosovo police, but violence broke out and a Kosovo Police officer was killed. KFOR took control of the 
customs gates, and through mediation between Belgrade and Pristina is was agreed that KFOR should 
remain in control of them ‘until the resumption of the European Union-facilitated dialogue and with a 
deadline of 15 September’ (S/2011/ 675: § 4). Most (but not all) protestors’ roadblocks were removed 
following this mediation.  
Tensions would soon rise again, however. Following further discussions between Belgrade and Pristina in 
Brussels, an agreement was reached such that Serbia would recognise Kosovo’s customs stamps (the initial 
issue over which the trade embargo was imposed), and so trade could begin again. It was agreed that EULEX 
would take over authority at the customs gates from KFOR, but that one Kosovo Customs officer and two 
Kosovo border police would also be present at each gate (S/2011/ 675: § 5). Kosovo Serb protestors were 
not satisfied with this arrangement, and so ‘reinforced their roadblocks at Gates 1 and 31 and erected 
additional roadblocks along other routes in order to protest the deployment of Kosovo Customs officers at 
the gates’ (ibid., § 6).  
The supposed end of the ‘crisis’ was the signing of the ‘First agreement on principles governing the 
normalization of relations’ – also called the Brussels Agreement - by the Serbian and Kosovo governments 
(S/2013/254: § 4). The headline policy of the agreement was the creation of an Association/Community of 
Kosovo Serb Municipalities, a policy that would give the northern Kosovo municipalities a certain amount 
of governmental autonomy. Furthermore, during the negotiations, Serbia was granted EU candidacy 
(S/2012/275). Establishing the Brussels Agreement was a prerequisite for Serbian accession negotiations to 
begin. Despite the supposed settlement of the disagreement over authority in northern Kosovo at the formal 
governmental level, protestors in the northern municipalities were not necessarily satisfied. The Secretary-
General notes that ‘many Kosovo Serbs continued to voice their opposition to the agreement’ (S/2013/444: 
§ 16). At the time of writing, the Association of Kosovo Serb Municipalities has still yet to be established 
(see S/2018/407: §§ 23-4). 
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6.4.2 International, national, and local agencies in northern Kosovo 
The situation in northern Kosovo, both during the crisis and still to this day, is shaped by the interaction 
between the local actors, the authorities of Kosovo and Serbia, and the international agencies of both the 
UN and the EU. It serves as an example of the multiple forms of agency, across and within borders, that 
shape the politics of a particular location. Northern Kosovo is not unique in this regard. In today’s globalised 
politics, almost all human societies are more subject to influence and determining factors from further and 
further afield, as people organise and collaborate internationally, and communication technologies allow for 
wider spread of affects (Sharp, 2005). The North Kosovo crisis is an example of how these agencies and 
affects interact and influence matters of war and peace. The dispute over customs and the subsequent unrest 
and violence demonstrates the everyday consequences of international diplomacy. Talks between the 
Serbian and Kosovar governments were being facilitated by the EU, but a breakdown in negotiations led to 
the trade embargo. The ‘reality’ of this embargo was played out in northern Kosovo, with the deployment 
of police to the border in order to enforce it. Thus the local and the everyday reality of life in northern 
Kosovo is implicated in both national policy and international diplomacy. Customs gates 1 and 31 became 
flashpoints for the manifestation of geopolitical issues, including relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the 
authority of NATO, and Serbia’s potential membership of the EU. Megoran and Dalby (2018: 263) note 
that the EU wasted an opportunity to shape peace in Cyprus when it allowed the island to become an EU 
member ‘without making accession conditional on negotiated reunification, thus removing a major incentive 
to real progress’. It remains to be seen whether Serbia’s EU candidacy will more positively affect the 
geopolitical dispute in north Kosovo.34 
Despite the supposed settlement of the north Kosovo crisis following the Brussels Agreement, northern 
Kosovo remains highly segregated along ethnic lines. Indeed, the Brussels Agreement even confirmed the 
distinctness of northern Kosovo by granting the region some governmental autonomy. In terms of whether 
the intervention of a regional block (the EU) or an international organisation (the UN) contributed towards 
a greater sense of securitas among Kosovo Serbs regarding Kosovo, it is difficult to be optimistic. The more 
recent discussions of a potential land swap, whereby northern Kosovo would be ceded to Serbia (Capussela, 
2018), demonstrate that the matter of the Serb-majority municipalities is far from resolved. Is it still worth 
considering the contribution of international and regional agencies to peace, therefore? They seem to have 
only secured a fragile negative peace in northern Kosovo, dependent on continued segregation of the 
population. The failure of these political organisations to produce a more positive peace is one of the 
strongest arguments justifying focus on alternative, radical, localised manifestations of peace instead of 
‘liberal peace’. And yet, precisely because these agencies are implicated in shaping events in a case like the 
North Kosovo crisis, we should still seek to understand them, even if it is only to more pointedly direct 
critique against them. The point is not that the influence of these forms of political agency are more likely 
than local agencies to guarantee peace. Indeed, if we accept an account of political agency as relational and 
 
34 At the time of writing, neither Serbia nor Kosovo are members of the European Union. Serbia is a ‘candidate 




dispersed, the responsibility for peace can never be placed solely on a government, an institution, or an 
organisation (Sharp, 2005). But if there is to be movement towards more peace-likeness in northern Kosovo, 
it will not happen in isolation of the influence of the UN, the EU, the Kosovo government, and the Serbian 
government. It is therefore worth maintaining an understanding of how they have shaped events in the past, 
and how they might shape them in the future.  
6.5 How the UN knows the world: A changing vision? 
This chapter has explored the role of the state in UN peace operations, examining both the vision of the 
state in principle, and how this vision has been manifest in the mission in Kosovo. I want to finish this 
chapter by returning once again to the way that the UN sees the state in relation to peace.  
Dalby (2014: 43) observes that ‘dominant mappings of politics continue to specify the world in terms of 
territorial domains of rule in rivalry with one another, and with military force as the ultimate arbiter’. Such 
a view would correspond with the so-called ‘realist’ understanding of international relations (Wohlforth, 
2009). But Dalby goes on to suggest that the United Nations might represent a ‘pacification’ of international 
relations, and links such a process to the possibility of what Megoran (2010b) calls pacific geopolitics, defined 
as ‘the study of how ways of thinking geographically about world politics can promote peaceful and mutually 
enriching human coexistence’ (Megoran, 2010b: 383).  
The origins of the UN can be read as more aligned with a realist view, emphasising the primacy of sovereign 
states and the need to regulate competition between them. This is understandable given the ineffectuality 
of the League of Nations to de-escalate the conflicts that eventually led to WWII. Hence the need for the 
P-5 members of the Security Council. It was essential that any new ‘global organisation’ would include the 
USA and the USSR, and that both governments could be re-assured that this organisation could not force 
their hand or undermine their sovereignty. The early ‘traditional’ peace operations similarly reveal a more 
realist view of the world, designed to diminish inter-state war, by monitoring ceasefire and the separation 
of forces with the consent of the parties to the conflict (Bellamy et al., 2010).  
In the 75 years since the UN has existed, however, both geopolitical patterns and the UN’s approach to 
conflict resolution have changed. The geopolitical vision presented in the policy documents has by no means 
neglected the primacy of states, but it has become more nuanced, as indicated by Kofi Annan’s reflections 
on the role of the state (see above, section 6.2.4). The annual reports of the Secretary-General on the Work 
of the Organization continually assert the transboundary nature of contemporary problems and the necessity 
of multilateral responses to them. They note the regionalization of conflict, as local violence spills into 
neighbouring countries, as well as the cross-border flows of weapons in ‘zones of impunity’ (UN Secretary-
General, 2003: § 12). As discussed above, the Secretary-General’s advocacy for more progressive ideas does 
not guarantee they will become doctrine. Division and disagreement among member states is inevitable 
when it comes to multilateral coordination, a process which necessarily brings absolute sovereignty into 
question. As the example of the rise of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ agenda demonstrates, though, ideas 
in the UN are never totally static. New geopolitical visions develop, often in the reports and documents of 
the Secretariat, which can go on to have a real influence on doctrine. 
Chapter 6 
98 
It is with this in mind that I want to highlight a line from the 2015 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture 
(A/69/968-S/2015/490). Much of the review confirms what has been identified above. For example, it 
notes that failures and flaws in governance and state institutions contribute towards conflicts (§ 12), that 
religious and ethnic identities are exploited in civil conflicts (§ 13), and that local disputes can quickly become 
regional (§§ 19-20). The point of interest, however, is in paragraph 21, which questions the prioritisation of 
central state authority in peacebuilding. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest that in contexts of fragmentation 
(often along sectarian and/or ethnic lines), then strengthening of central state authority might even 
exacerbate violence. The Review states: 
Independent, sovereign nation States are the building blocks of the international order and of the 
United Nations in particular. Member States are therefore naturally inclined towards a predominant 
international paradigm of recreating a strong central authority. In a context of fragmentation, 
however, it is possible that an attempt to rebuild or extend a central authority could lead not to 
peace, but to deepening conflict. In such cases, there is a need to find new approaches that 
understand peacebuilding, at least in its early phases, as having more to do with strengthening local 
domains of governance than with endeavouring to re-establish a strong central authority 
(A/69/968-S/2015/490: § 21). 
As an alternative view of governance and sovereignty in relation to peace, if this view was to take hold 
within UN peacebuilding doctrine, if would represent a move away from the earlier emphasis on ‘enhancing 
state capacity’ as the primary task for a peace mission.  
Being published in 2015 means that this review is of course too late to influence the UN’s mission in 
Kosovo. UNMIK no longer has the authority in Kosovo that it did when it was deployed. Furthermore, the 
central governance of the Kosovo Assembly is now firmly established, as is its resistance in northern 
Kosovo. Given the foregoing discussion of the north Kosovo crisis, however, it might be said, just as the 
Review states, that the strengthening of central authority in Kosovo exacerbated the division and conflict 
with the northern municipalities, rather than easing them. Perhaps an approach that began by developing 
more localised governance would have met with less resistance than did the institutionalisation of a central 
state government.  
This is necessarily a speculative point, and I certainly do not want to claim in hindsight that UNMIK would 
have successfully managed the integration of Serbs and Albanians if only it had eschewed developing the 
centralised Kosovo Assembly. What can be said, however, is that the resistance to the state assemblage in 
northern Kosovo would appear to exemplify the problems for peace that can arise when asserting a 
centralised state authority onto a minority group that rejects it. While it is too early to say if the Review’s 
alternative vision will gain prominence in UN peace policy – if it will eventually come to form part of the 
guiding parameters/code - it could be the beginning of a significant development. An approach to 
peacebuilding that began by focussing on the reconciliation of local relations might in turn ‘add up’ to a 
more effective state, with these relations contributing to a state assemblage that is not so intractably divided. 
That is to say, if we accept that causality within an assemblage is both bottom-up and top-down at once 
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(DeLanda, 2016), then the quality of the affects and interactions at a local level will in part determine the 
characteristics and capacities of the assemblage as a whole. Whether the recommendation of the Review of 
the Peacebuilding Architecture is to become more prominent and influential will depend on its continuing 
to be nurtured within the larger ecosystem of UN ideas. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the geopolitical vision of the United Nations, and the implications of this vision 
as they have played out in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. Drawing on doctrinal texts, 
as well as the reports of the Secretary-General, I identified the most prominent ideals of peace present in 
the UN public discourse. These include ideals of security, rule of law, democracy, the extension of state 
authority, and the commitment to ‘international norms’ on human rights. While there is continuity between 
the doctrine and the Secretary-General’s reports on these themes, the chapter also identified where the 
Secretary-General has questioned doctrinal assumptions, and advocated ideas that are more contested than 
those which have made it into doctrine. The chapter therefore also demonstrates the ongoing interaction 
between ideas at the different ‘levels’ of the organisation, and showed how the variable texts of the Secretary-
General can influence the parameter texts of the doctrinal codes.  
Regarding Kosovo, I have argued that, although UNMIK was neutral on the question of Kosovo’s 
independence, the mission in fact facilitated Kosovo’s territorialization as a state assemblage, even before it 
declared its independence unilaterally. While mainstream discourse still tends to reify nation states as self-
evident coherent units of geopolitics, the case of Kosovo exemplifies the continual process by which 
‘stateness’ is produced (Mitchell, 1991; Painter, 2006). Demonstrating that agency and intention are not 
synonymous, UNMIK contributed to the stateness of Kosovo while its mandate was formally committed 
to the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Serbia (S/RES/1244: 2).    
The process by which the coherence of the Kosovo state ‘individual’ developed was not, however, evenly 
distributed across the region. It came up against resistance, most notably in the Serb-majority municipalities 
of northern Kosovo. I therefore explored the North Kosovo crisis as an example of the interaction of 
international, national, and local forms of agency as they shaped the possibilities for peace in the northern 
municipalities. Although a formal agreement was established between Serbia and Kosovo, the issue of ethnic 
segregation in Kosovo is far from resolved. Progress in terms of functioning institutions has therefore not 
been sufficient to resolve the issue of status and ethnic divide. The Kosovo assemblage itself may be 
achieving greater coherence and realising greater capacities of governance, but the ethnic divide remains. 
The next chapter therefore considers the issue of segregation and integration in more detail, by examining 






7 Difference and relationality in peacebuilding 
One can, however, declare oneself for difference (as opposed to sameness or homogenization) without 
at the same time being for the rigidly enforced and policed separation of populations into different 
groups.  
- Edward Said (1985: 40) 
If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his 
own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the universal 
name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class 
or nation.  
- Spinoza (1996 [1677]) Ethics, III p46 
7.1 Introduction 
Hostility and conflict are often manifest in a supposed incompatibility between groups. Whether it involves 
nationality, ethnicity, religion, political allegiance - at various scales and locations there is ongoing violence 
along lines of communal difference. When considering the meaning of peace, therefore, the question of 
difference must be accounted for. How should a geography of peace, or a ‘pacific geopolitics’ (Megoran, 
2010b), address this apparent tendency towards division into identity-based factions who cannot live 
together? With its society segregated along ethno-nationalist lines, Kosovo is a prime example of the 
‘problem’ of difference for peacebuilding (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018). This chapter therefore 
explores the issue of difference as it contributes to both conflict and peace, and investigates how UNMIK 
has attempted to manage communal difference in Kosovo. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the question of ‘managing difference’ as I am applying it to UN 
peace operations. Continuing the theme of the state in relation to peace, I note the relevance of 
ethnic/nationalist/religious conflicts that are accompanied by secessionist movements. While in Kosovo 
the UN has facilitated self-government and autonomy, the question of reconciliation across seemingly 
intractable differences certainly does not end with the partition of the population or assisting independence.  
Having set the scene on the problem of difference in Kosovo, the chapter develops an understanding of 
what difference is, and its place in the politics of both war and peace. I examine how difference has been 
conceptualised as a social construct, and more particularly how this is regarded as a spatial process in critical 
geopolitics. Such work has focused on how the difference between groups is produced in discourse, and 
how it is expressed spatially through representations of ‘our’ place, and ‘their’ place. Spatial expressions of 
difference are present in Kosovo, and the UN facilitated this separation. Understanding difference as being 
fundamentally a problem for peace, however, and advocating spatial separation as its remedy, does little to 
satisfy a more positive understanding of what peace can be. The second section considers the potential for 
a positive understanding of difference and peace. As is firmly established at this point, this thesis is 
approaching peace processes from the perspective of a relational ontology. One of the fundamental tenets 
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of such an ontology is the inability to make absolute distinctions between bodies. Bodies are both 
constituted and determined by other bodies, ultimately making up a single substance, ‘God or Nature’ 
(Spinoza, E IV pref; also IV p4d). This section therefore elaborates upon differentiation and relationality. I 
argue that such an understanding does not deny the existence of differences, nor that these differences are 
implicated in violence. But these differences are not seen as pre-given. Rather difference is viewed as 
produced by processes of differentiation, and this is a relational and affective process. Not only that, but the 
process is always ongoing, and so is potentially open to change. The passions and relations that are 
productive of group identity, and of conflict between groups, are not fixed. They can be subject to new 
affects, which can alter the patterns by which groups have organised themselves. Investigating difference 
and peace processes from this position is therefore about examining a ‘network of passionate relationships’ 
(Sharp, 2005: 607). Difference need not necessarily be a cause of conflict – whether it is or not is dependent 
on the types of affects circulating among people. And as previous chapters have sought to demonstrate, 
institutions and organisations contribute to the network of relations, both positively and negatively. 
Managing the ‘problem’ of difference (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018) must therefore necessarily 
involve the passions of a society, even if an organisation like the UN does not frame its activities in those 
terms. 
Having established a theoretical understanding of difference in relation to peace and conflict, and some 
criteria by which to assess the movement towards peace, the chapter turns again to the UN and to the 
Interim Administration in Kosovo. While the UN is in principal against ‘all forms of racial discrimination’ 
(see A/RES/1904[XVIII]), in facilitating the transfers to independence following conflicts that have 
involved division along ethnic lines, it could also be said to be facilitating a formal ‘separation of populations 
into different groups’ as Edward Said (1985: 40) puts it in the opening quotation above. As an indicator of 
potential improvement in relations between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo government, I examine a series 
of elections that were conducted in Kosovo, managed and organised by UNMIK. Ultimately, however, I 
conclude that elections in Kosovo reflect the divisions of the society rather than reduce them.  
7.2 UN peace operations and managing difference: Setting the scene 
This section sets the scene for the analysis of difference by establishing the basic parameters of the ‘problem’ 
of difference (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018) and how it relates to understanding United Nations 
peace operations. 
While all conflicts involve some form of difference, a difference of opinion on a political matter for example, 
in cases of ethnic/religious/nationalist violence, the problem of difference becomes seemingly intractable. 
More than a difference in opinion, these conflicts involve a difference in identity, and a history of violence 
between the different identities. When intervening in such a conflict, a UN peace mission comes up against 
the problem of difference and tries to manage it. In the UN documents examined for this thesis, there was 
explicit acknowledgement of the issue of violent conflict manifesting along lines of ethnic, religious, and 
nationalist identities. Secretary-General Kofi Annan writes that ‘The upsurge of “ethnic cleansing” in the 
1990s provides stark evidence of the appalling human costs that this vicious exploitation of identity politics 
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can generate’ (UN Secretary-General, 1999: § 19). In a later report he notes the continued problem of 
‘violent internal conflicts’ that ‘exploit ethnic and religious differences’ (UN Secretary-General, 2004: § 11). 
While the reports do not themselves use the term ‘managing difference’, this is the term I have chosen to 
designate the attempts by UN peace operations to resolve the kinds of conflicts to which Kofi Annan’s 
quotations refer.35 
As this thesis is concerned with the role of the state in relation to peace, of particular relevance are civil 
conflicts along identity lines that are accompanied by a political independence movement – a desire on the 
part of one faction to secede from the country and assert their right to a new independent state. In the 21st 
century, the UN has facilitated self-determination as part of a resolution to three nationalist civil wars: in 
Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. The UN mandates for these peace missions, in one sense, already 
accepted the difference between the two demographics (broadly defined) and accepted the right of the 
seceding group to self-government. This is one way of managing difference in the pursuit of peace, if not a 
particularly inspiring one. While the UN formally condemns racial or ethnic discrimination as ‘a violation 
of human rights’ (A/RES/1904[XVIII]: Article 1), facilitating transfer to independence seemingly confirms 
that the groups in question cannot live together in peace, and formalises their spatial and governmental 
separation. 
As a way of managing difference in the pursuit of peace, the limitations of assisting group self-determination 
are apparent. Separating ethnic, national, or religious groups in the name of security does not meet positive 
understandings of peace that would include criteria such as justice and reconciliation, even if it does achieve 
a cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and South Sudan have all experienced further 
violence within their own borders since achieving self-government. For example, in South Sudan, within 
three years of having achieved independence, the country descended into a further civil war in 2013, this 
time among factions within its own population (de Waal, 2014). Similarly, in the newly independent Timor-
Leste, a schism within the East Timorese military sparked an outbreak of more widespread violence in 2006-
7 (Scambary, 2009). The populations of these countries both overwhelmingly voted for their independence 
(99% in South Sudan, 79% in East Timor). Yet, in both cases, the resolution of civil conflict through 
democratic transfer to independence did not mark the beginning of long-term peace. 
As with South Sudan and Timor-Leste, Kosovo is a political conflict that is manifest in an ethnic/national 
divide. There is also a religious aspect to the division, as Serbs are associated with Orthodox Christianity 
and Albanians are associated with Islam. While the Kosovo War is not considered a religious war, religion 
functions as an ‘identity marker’, and ‘religious myths’ are mobilised in Serbian nationalist rhetoric 
(Johnston, 2005: 184). The war in 1998-9 was a result of competing nationalist claims over the region, and 
segregation between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs has continued to characterise Kosovo since the UN 
intervention (Baldwin, 2006; Dahlman and Williams, 2010). The segregation is expressed spatially, in 
Kosovo Serb ‘enclaves’, but it is also expressed institutionally, notably in the Serbian-run ‘parallel structures’ 
 
35 The notion of difference as ‘an obstacle that ha[s] to be manged’ in peacebuilding is discussed by Bargués-Pedreney 
and Mathieu (2018). It is from their article that I have drawn the term ‘managing difference’ as the theme for this 
chapter.  
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in northern Kosovo (OSCE, 2007). Education and healthcare ‘remain almost completely segregated’ 
(Krasniqi, 2015: 212), with the Serbian government providing these services for the Kosovo Serbs within 
Kosovo, while the Kosovo government manages the services for the majority Kosovo Albanians 
(Kostovicova, 2005; Krasniqi, 2015).  
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the UN’s peacebuilding policies in Kosovo frequently emphasise 
the objective of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. From the beginning of the intervention, the institution-building 
component of UNMIK aimed to ‘establish the foundations of a free, pluralist and multi-ethnic society’ 
(S/1999/779: § 79). Similarly, the Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004: 3) aspired to ‘a multi-ethnic society 
where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement and equal access to justice for all people in 
Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background’. The difficulty lies in assessing just what kind of policies and 
actions might be productive of movement towards such ideals. The previous quotation gives some 
indication as to the kind of measures through which UNMIK hoped to resolve the division and segregation, 
including representation of all communities in the democratic institutions, secure freedom of movement for 
all ethnicities throughout the region, and equality within the justice system. And yet, as assemblage theory 
reminds us, agency does not equal intention, and there are also reasons to show that UNMIK’s intervention 
inadvertently consolidated segregation in Kosovo (Gusic, 2019; Jenne, 2009). At the same time, the fact that 
the conflict involves an ethnic division, and that there was ethnically motivated violence carried out by both 
sides during the war, means that there are some who argue that the resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts must 
involve partition as part of a realistic solution (Downes, 2006; Kaufmann, 1996). While such an argument 
certainly would not satisfy radical understandings of positive peace, it must still be acknowledged as part of 
the discussion of difference in peace processes, not least because the UN’s facilitation of self-determination 
would seem to facilitate such partition.  
In the Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali (1992: § 17) wrote that ‘if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group 
claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being 
for all would become ever more difficult to achieve’. This quotation seems to show an awareness of the 
potential problem for peace of logics of self-determinism as a resolution to conflict between different 
groups. Two principles of UN doctrine are therefore in tension – the principle of democracy, and the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of ethnicity or religion. In short, the democratic will of Kosovo’s 
population is for independence from Serbia. But because it is an ethno-nationalist conflict, then supporting 
the right to statehood is in effect facilitating the partition of ethnic groups, thus violating the principal of 
non-discrimination and multi-ethnic societies. The mandate for the UN mission in Kosovo tried to operate 
between the two – it supported autonomy and self-government for Kosovo, while supposedly maintaining 
the ‘territorial integrity’ of Serbia (S/RES/1244[1999]: p. 2). The remainder of this chapter explores how 
the attempts to manage the problem of difference in Kosovo have played out, and considers what this can 
tell us about peace. 
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7.3 Difference as social and spatial 
Social theory has dealt with the constructed nature of difference. Of significance in this regard is the work 
of Michel Foucault, who analysed the construction of categories in the human sciences. To cite just one 
example, Foucault asserts that ‘the Homosexual’, as a category of person (rather than just the 
practices/relationships with which it is associated), came into being in the 19th century (Foucault, 1998). 
The categories ‘heterosexual’ and ‘homosexual’ are not, in Foucault’s analysis, a taken-for-granted truth, but 
a product of scientific and psychological discourses on sexuality in the 19th century. This raises two of 
Foucault’s famous ideas about power: its relation to knowledge, and its productive capacity. By conjoining 
power/knowledge, Foucault aimed to show that the knowledge produced about people cannot be separated 
from operations of power. Knowledge is not a detached description of its object. Rather, it acts on its object, 
it passes judgement by measuring deviations from norms that knowledge itself produces, and then power is 
operationalised to correct these deviations (Foucault, 1991a). Hence why power is not understood by 
Foucault as only repressive. It is also productive, of categories, identities, behaviours, and modes of conduct. 
Within critical geopolitics, the Foucauldian account of knowledge/power has been adopted and applied to 
matters of political geography. In Ó Tuathail’s foundational text, Critical Geopolitics, he states that ‘geography 
is not a natural given but a power-knowledge relationship’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 10). He introduced the term 
geo-power to designate ‘the functioning of geographical knowledge not as an innocent body of knowledge and 
learning but as an ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the governmental production and 
management of territorial space’(Ó Tuathail, 1996: 7). The question of difference in critical geopolitics is 
investigated by analysing the construction of difference in place and space, and how such constructions are 
inseparable from the politics of states, territory, and war. ‘[T]he essential moment of geopolitical discourse’, 
says Dalby, ‘is the division of space into “our” place and “their” place’ (Dalby, 1991: 274).  
An understanding of the territorial construction of difference can be applied to analysing the identity politics 
of Kosovo. Chapter 2 of this thesis mentioned the significance of the Battle of Kosovo (fought in 1389) in 
contemporary Serbian cultural identity. The supposed connection between ethnic Serbs and the 
geographical region of Kosovo therefore draws upon centuries of history and mythology. When Serbian 
President Slobodan Milošević was promoting Serbian nationalism and introducing discriminatory measures 
against Kosovo Albanians, he referred to Kosovo as ‘the heart of Serbia’ (quoted in Daskalovski, 2005: 12). 
Kosovo Albanians equally justify their claim to the region by drawing upon a long history and mythology. 
The Albanian account asserts continuity from the ancient Illyrians to present day Albanians, and thus the 
Serb settlements in Kosovo from the seventh century are viewed as an occupation of Albanian land 
(Daskalovski, 2005). These competing ‘truths’ over the history and geography of Kosovo exemplify Ó 
Tuathail’s notion of geo-power. The knowledge produced about Kosovo is not a neutral communication of 
facts, but is productive of contemporary identities in relation to Kosovo, and is implicated in the continuing 
political divide in the region. These discourses were mobilised during Milošević’s suppression of Kosovo’s 
autonomy, and are likewise used in support of Kosovo’s right to sovereign independence.  
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A demonstration of the connection between historical knowledge and state identity in Kosovo is identified 
by Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) in the example of Mother Teresa Boulevard in Kosovo’s capital city, 
Pristina. In the 1990s, when Serbia was asserting authority over Kosovo, this street was called Vidovdanska 
Street. Vidovdan is Saint Vitus’ Day in Serbia, a commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo. Mother Teresa, 
on the other hand, is symbolic of ‘Albanianness’ in Kosovo. In addition to renaming the street Mother 
Theresa Boulevard, a statue of Mother Teresa replaced a statue of the Serbian symbol the ‘Kosovo Maiden’ 
(Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 58). The Serbian symbolism of Vidovdan has therefore been replaced, with 
the street’s new name and statute instead contributing to the ‘discursive construction of a predominantly 
Albanian identity of Kosovo’ (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 58). Interestingly, the authors also note that 
the street was once called Marshall Tito Street, after Yugoslavia’s President Tito. The same street has 
therefore had three different names, each one symbolically asserting a specific form of identity and 
statehood – first Yugoslavian, then Serbian, then Kosovan. This is one demonstration of how geopolitical 
changes of the last 70 years of Kosovo’s history become manifest in specific places. Björkdahl and Kappler 
call this process ‘place-making’ – the way that an abstract idea, such as the idea that Kosovo is Albanian, 
becomes ‘visible in material terms’ (p. 66). In the language of assemblage theory discussed in chapter 4, we 
could say that symbolic place names and statues contribute to the coding of the Kosovo assemblage. Coding 
refers to ‘the role played by special expressive components in an assemblage in fixing the identity of the 
whole’ (DeLanda, 2016: 22). As with territorialization, coding is a matter of degree rather than a binary of 
coded vs. decoded. Re-naming the street and changing the political symbolism of the statues increases the 
coding of the Kosovo assemblage as having Albanian identity.  
If the construction of difference between people and places is often implicated in conflict, violence, and 
war, it seems that an understanding of peace ought to grapple with the question of what difference is, how 
it contributes to violence, and how a politics of peace could respond for it. Must peace appeal to sameness 
as a response to the problem of difference, for example? Hannah Arendt (2017) argues that ‘developed 
political communities, such as the ancient city-states or modern nation-states’ (p. 394), have sought to 
‘eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and differentiations which by 
themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust, and discrimination’ (p. 395). She claims that the fact of naturally 
given differences – ‘the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds’ (p. 394) – represents a threat to 
the ‘law of equality’ on which the ‘public sphere’ of a polity is founded.36 Difference, on this understanding, 
is a problem that has been suppressed, but which cannot be denied.  
An appeal to sameness, perhaps to the universal humanity and value of each and every person, may have 
merit, but is it sufficient to inform the politics of peace in the face of histories of conflict along ethno-
nationalist lines? Regarding his critique of how the difference between East and West was constructed, 
Edward Said (2003: 352) has said that he aimed ‘not so much to dissipate difference itself – for who can 
 
36 Arendt is not suggesting that equality is necessarily achieved in such polities. She is making this point in the context 
of a discussion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), a French Revolution document that 
still forms part of the French constitution, and which asserts the principle of equal rights for all humans. Similar 
political principles are included the US Declaration of Independence. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) is a descendant of such ideas (Kennedy, 2007: see chapter 6).  
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deny the constitutive role of national as well as cultural differences in the relations between human beings 
– but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences, and 
a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things’. If peace does not necessarily require the eradication 
of differences that Arendt identifies in modern state politics, then what are the qualities of the relations 
across difference that could be called peaceful? The next section considers how a Spinozan relational 
account of politics would respond to this question. 
7.4 Difference and relationality 
The theoretical framework set out in chapter 4 explored an understanding of political agency and peace 
based on a relational ontology. The foundational claim of Spinoza’s relational philosophy is, as stated, that 
there is only one substance – God, or Nature – which incorporates the whole of reality. All the constituent 
parts of this reality are therefore products of relationality. Bodies are both constituted and determined by 
other bodies (Spinoza, E IV pref; also IV p4d). Given this unavoidable relationality, how does such a 
perspective account for the kind of entrenched differences and segregation that characterise ethnic, 
nationalist, and religious conflicts? 
The first point to make is that the assertion of a single substance does not deny the existence of these kinds 
of difference, or their implication in violent conflict. It does, however, deny that they are essential. They are 
rather a product of relational processes that make up reality. In this regard, then, a relational ontology would 
concur with the above outlined Foucauldian view that differences in identity are a product of social 
construction. But from the perspective of a Spinozan relational ontology, the process that produces the 
entrenched difference is not only a matter of discursive construction. It is also affective – it is a product of 
how people have been determined to feel towards others that they perceive as different, based on how they 
are affected by them.  
The process of differentiation does not just operate along ethnic, national, or religious lines. We are all 
differentiated and individualized through our interactions, as we develop a unique history of affects which 
shape our disposition and the content of our minds (Sharp, 2017). The fact of people’s differentiation, then, 
is not, in itself, the source of the problem of difference – it is rather the perception of negative affects 
between differentiated people. As Spinoza writes:  
‘If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from 
his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the 
universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the 
same class or nation’ (E III p46). 
Importantly, the idea of the cause of sadness does not have to be true; it is enough that we imagine ourselves 
to have been affected by them (E III p15). It can be seen, therefore, how this affective process accounts for 
the seemingly intractable conflicts among different ‘communities’, each side perceiving the other as a cause 
of their reduced power of acting. It is this affective process that can be said to be the ‘problem’ of difference 
for peace.  
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7.4.1 The Kosovo peace process as a double-rejection of parthood 
Chapter 4 noted that a state could be understood as contributing towards social harmony in so far as it 
affects the population with a sense of securitas – the reasonable expectation that their interests will be served 
by the commonwealth (Steinberg, 2009). If people are not affected positively in this way, but are instead 
fearful of the state, they are determined to reject their place within the broader community. As the Spinozist 
scholar Beth Lord puts it: ‘[i]n so far as we agree, we consider ourselves parts of a community whole; in so 
far as we disagree, we reject our political parthood and consider ourselves wholes in our own right’ (Lord, 
2017: 74). According to this explanation, the problem of ethnic difference in Kosovo can be considered a 
double ‘rejection of parthood’. First, the population of Kosovo Albanians rejected their parthood as 
constituents of Serbia, and instead asserted their own ‘wholeness’ – or stateness. Second, the Kosovo Serbs 
remaining in northern Kosovo rejected their parthood as constituents of Kosovo.  
It is difficult to assess the level of hope felt within a population in a text-based study. For the purposes of 
this chapter, I investigate this through the conduct and participation in elections in Kosovo. Steinberg (2009: 
56) defines securitas as being demonstrated by ‘broad civic participation’ (p. 56), and claims that such 
participation would result in a reduction of factionalism. For this reason, I have chosen to focus on elections, 
as an indication of civic participation in Kosovo. 
7.5 The management of difference through democratic elections 
In his 1999 Report on the Work of the Organization, Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted a development 
in the role attributed to democratic elections in the UN’s peacebuilding strategy. He writes: 
Elections that have in the past served predominantly as an exit strategy out of conflict situations 
are now seen as providing an opportunity for institution-building and the introduction of 
programmes for good governance (UN Secretary-General, 1999: 109).  
This view of elections is consistent with the definition of peacebuilding presented in the Brahimi report a 
year later, which lists ‘assistance for democratic development’ and ‘electoral assistance’ among the 
peacebuilding activities (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). Similarly, the Principles and Guidelines associates 
‘free and fair elections’ with the development of legitimate institutions of government (UN DPKO, 2008: 
28; 89). Elections remain a major part of UN peacebuilding, with 2019 seeing the organisation provide direct 
assistance in 18 elections around the world (UN Secretary-General, 2019: § 76). Kofi Annan’s above 
quotation was published in the same year that the UN Interim Administration was deployed in Kosovo. 
Two years later, UNMIK conducted the first national election in Kosovo, to select the members of the 
Provisional Assembly.  
How might elections relate to the management of difference in societies that are highly segregated, and with 
a history of violence between factions? In principle at least, elections are meant to initiate ‘the 
institutionalization of a multi-party democratic system that provides for inclusive, transparent and accountable 
governance’ (UN Secretary-General, 2007: § 59, emphasis added). The first point to make with regards to 
how elections can contribute to the management of difference within a state, therefore, is that an election 
Chapter 7 
108 
should provide for the inclusion of the different communities – inclusion in the sense that they participate 
in the election by casting their votes, and inclusion in the sense that representatives from different 
communities get the chance to be elected. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon furthermore asserted that 
elections are a way to help states ‘demonstrate that the legitimacy of an elected government is derived not 
solely from the ballot box but rather from its ability to provide impartial security and deliver basic social 
services to all’ (UN Secretary-General, 2007: § 59). The idea that legitimacy comes from impartial security 
and the delivery of services to all would correspond with Spinoza’s term securitas (E III def aff XIV; 
Steinberg, 2009: 52). Securitas must apply as widely as possible within the population; for if portions of the 
population do not feel that it is in their interests to participate in civic life – or if they have reason to fear 
the state, then they have greater reason to reject their parthood and to assert their own sovereign wholeness 
(Lord, 2017). Thus, one way in which the institutions of a state can contribute to peace among the 
population, is if they instil securitas widely among citizens.  
If it is the case that elections can contribute towards the peaceful management of difference within a divided 
population, it must be noted that this is not necessarily the case. While there can be no doubt that the UN 
peace policies foreground the importance of elections, they also display an awareness that ‘elections can 
have a polarizing effect and heighten political tensions’ (UN Secretary-General, 2004: § 64). As opposed to 
lessening the sense of division in a state, an ‘ill-timed or poorly designed’ election can exacerbate tensions 
and ‘result in support for extremists or encourage patterns of voting that reflect wartime allegiances’ (UN 
Secretary-General, 2005: § 74). The following section explores the relationship between elections and the 
management of difference in Kosovo. 
7.5.1 UNMIK’s administration of elections in Kosovo 
In Kosovo, the Constitutional Framework by which UNMIK established the provisional institutions made 
it a requirement for the Assembly to reserve 20 of the 120 seats for ‘non-Albanian Kosovo Communities’ 
(UNMIK, 2001: § 9.1.3). Of that 20, half are designated for representatives of Kosovo Serbs, and the other 
half is made up of representatives for ‘other communities’ (ibid.).37 It might be observed that this reservation 
of Assembly seats is not in fact democratic – it allows for the election of political representatives that would 
not otherwise receive a high enough proportion of votes to secure a seat. In the unique circumstances of 
Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of civil war, however, it is apparent why UNMIK justified such a choice 
in the Constitution. Recall that UNMIK aimed to ‘establish the foundations of a free, pluralist and multi-
ethnic society’ in Kosovo (S/1999/779: § 79). In pursuit of this objective, ‘The Mission’s aim is to show 
Kosovo’s minority communities that they can derive tangible benefits from engaging in public life’ 
(S/2001/926: § 35). In designating 20 seats to ethnic minorities the Constitutional Framework can be seen 
as coding the idea of multi-ethnic representation into the foundational text of the polity. Interestingly, even 
after the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared independence in 2008, they maintained the 20-seat 
reservation for minorities when they introduced their new constitution. This continuity shows that, even 
 
37 ‘Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to other Communities as follows: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities 
four (4), the Bosniak Community three (3), the Turkish Community two (2) and the Gorani Community one (1)’ 
(UNMIK, 2001: § 9.1.3). 
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while the government was asserting its autonomy and rejection of UNMIK’s authority, the ideas that 
UNMIK promoted have still shaped the code of the Kosovo assemblage. 
It would be difficult to achieve securitas, a hopeful citizenry, and an acceptance of parthood, if there was no 
realistic chance of being represented in the government. It might be said, however, that reserving the seats 
for representatives maintains a logic of two distinct groups without shared interests. It seems to make the 
assumption that Albanian and Serbian citizens would never be voting for the same parties. It is therefore 
continuing the stasis of the divide, even while it is supposed to institutionalise peace. There is thus a fine 
line between adopting measures for the inclusion of minority groups and avoiding entrenching a logic of 
fundamental difference between communities. As shall be seen in the following sections, UNMIK was not 
always successful in staying on the right side of this line. 
7.5.2 Electing the first Provisional Assembly 
A principal step in the development of ‘provisional institutions’ in Kosovo was the election of the first 
Assembly, held on 17 November 2001. It was organised by the ‘institution-building’ pillar of UNMIK, led 
by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). While the election was reported a 
success (S/2002/62: § 3), the issues that UNMIK had to attempt to resolve during and after the election 
are representative of the tensions and paradoxes of Kosovo’s geopolitics. 
As the Secretary-General’s reports state, a primary focus during preparation for the vote was the 
participation of non-Albanian communities, most importantly that of ethnic Serbs. In an earlier election, 
the municipal elections held in October 2000, Kosovo Serbs had not participated in the vote. In fact, the 
UNMIK Special Representative had to personally appoint members of the municipal assemblies in Serb 
majority municipalities because the turnout was so low that the results were not certified (S/2000/1196). 
Thus, for the election of the Provisional Assembly, UNMIK was determined to achieve Serb participation. 
The report from the period immediately before the election says that participation of the minority groups 
in Kosovo is ‘critical to the legitimacy of the elections and the Mission’s goal of an all-inclusive provisional 
self-government’ (S/2001/926: § 2). Recall that ‘legitimacy’ is one of the ideals emphasised by the doctrinal 
texts on peace operations (see section 6.2.1.). So here, legitimacy is being defined in part by extent to which 
ethnic minorities participate in elections and are represented in the institutions of government. In pursuit 
of this doctrinal ideal, UNMIK conducted a ‘civil registration operation’. The emphasis was to register those 
who had not participated in the municipal elections of the previous year, as well as newly returned citizens, 
and those eligible to vote who were outside of Kosovo (e.g. people displaced by the conflict who had not 
yet returned to Kosovo) (see S/2001/926: §§ 28-31). To this end, UNMIK set up voter service centres and 
mobile registration units, and conducted a public information campaign (ibid.).  
One reason for the difficulty in achieving Kosovo Serb participation is because Serbs looked to the 
government of Serbia (then still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for direction (S/2001/926: § 5). 
It was therefore a significant boost to the registration campaign when both the President of F.R. Yugoslavia 
and the Prime Minister of Serbia called upon Kosovo Serbs to register. The report notes that, following this 
endorsement, numbers of Kosovo Serb registrations increased to between 3 - 4,000 a day. In response, 
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UNMIK decided to extend the registration period by two weeks, in order to accommodate this increase 
(S/2001/926: § 31). Again, the actions of the mission were being guided by the principle of multi-ethnicity.     
Thus, though the effort to achieve Kosovo Serb participation was successful, it was aided in great part by 
the endorsement of the leaders of Yugoslavia and Serbia, demonstrating that the Kosovo Serb population 
still looked to Serbian leadership for consent to participate. This indicates a theme that remains significant 
for Kosovo; namely, the adherence of Kosovo Serbs to Serbian authority rather than either UNMIK or the 
Kosovo Assembly. As the previous chapter discussed, the influence of Serbian authority is especially 
significant in northern Kosovo. The next section therefore deals explicitly with the impact of elections in 
the Serb-majority northern municipalities.  
7.5.3 Official and unofficial elections in northern Kosovo 
Elections seem to characterise the paradoxes and tensions in northern Kosovo, especially during the so-
called north Kosovo crisis in 2011-13. There were three elections during the north Kosovo crisis: northern 
Kosovo’s unofficial referendum (14-15 February 2012); Serbia’s parliamentary, presidential, and local 
elections (6 and 20 May 2012); and Kosovo’s municipal and mayoral elections (3 November 2013).  
7.5.3.1 The unofficial referendum 
On 14-15 February 2012, Northern Kosovo municipal authorities held a referendum on accepting the 
authority of Kosovo. The question on the ballot was: “Do you accept the institutions of the Republic of 
Kosovo?”. This vote was opposed by the Serbian Government, and the report also notes that some Kosovo 
Serbs living in other parts of Kosovo were also against the referendum (S/2012/72: § 12). ‘The organizers 
claimed a turnout of 75.29 per cent, and that some 99.74 per cent of participants responded negatively to 
the question posed’ (S/2012/275: § 8). But ‘UNMIK and other international presences stressed that it had 
no legal consequence’ (S/2012/275: § 8). In this case, the unofficial election was not an instrument for 
greater integration, but an indicator of Kosovo Serb rejection of Kosovo authority. 
7.5.3.2 Serbia’s presidential, parliamentary, and local elections 
While progress was being made in the EU-facilitated talks between Serbia and Kosovo, tension was once 
again observed in northern Kosovo as the Serbian elections approached (S/2012/275: §§ 3-4). The reports 
note that a key cause of this was the question of whether there would be voting in Kosovo for the Serbian 
elections – ‘a lightning rod for unresolved issues and tensions’ (S/2012/275: § 59). UNMIK mediated 
between the relevant stakeholders and advised the Serbian Government not to conduct local elections in 
Kosovo, to which the Serbians agreed (S/2012/275: § 5; § 59). The Kosovo authorities had said ‘they would 
use all available means to prevent’ such a vote, so this was a useful measure for removing a potential cause 
of violence. As with the unofficial referendum, the report here notes that some Kosovo Serbs opposed the 
holding of Serbian local elections in Kosovo – ‘Kosovo Serbs who participate in the Kosovo institutions 
dismissed the need to hold local elections in Kosovo’ (S/2012/275: § 5). It is therefore apparent that 
Kosovo Serbs should not be treated as a homogenous group who all share the same opinion and vote in 
the same way. There are some Kosovo Serbs who do participate in the Kosovo institutions. There is a spatial 
pattern to participation however, with Serb-majority municipalities located south of the river Ibar more 
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likely to participate, and those in the north more likely to reject Kosovo’s institutions (Björkdahl and 
Kappler, 2017). Those Serbs outside of northern Kosovo perhaps have a greater sense of securitas in Kosovo 
than those in the north of the region – their participation would seem to indicate an acceptance of parthood 
within Kosovo. 
The Kosovo government did agree, however, to allow for the Serbian presidential and parliamentary votes 
to include eligible voters in Kosovo. It was agreed that the OSCE would facilitate the Kosovo vote, setting-
up the polling stations and then delivering the ballots to the Serbian Election Commission 
(S/2012/603: §§ 4-5). The Secretary-General reports that the vote in Kosovo was successfully carried out, 
‘in an orderly and peaceful fashion’ (ibid., § 5). This election was thus considered a success.  
7.5.3.3 Kosovo’s municipal and mayoral elections 
Kosovo intended to include northern Kosovo in the 2013 municipal elections (S/2013/444: § 8). As with 
the Serbian vote in the previous year, it was agreed between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina that the 
OSCE would facilitate the ballots in northern Kosovo (S/2013/631: § 4). ‘Serbian leadership has committed 
its strong support for participation by Kosovo Serbs in the upcoming elections’ (ibid., § 5). However, 
continuing the theme of dissent among Kosovo Serbs against the Serbian government, there were ‘public 
campaigns against participation’ in the election (ibid., § 12). The unofficial ‘Provisional Assembly of the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija’ also called for a boycott (ibid., § 14).  With all this tension, 
the Secretary-General placed particular emphasis on the importance achieving a successful election (ibid., 
§ 48). This was the first election held following the implementation of the Brussels Agreement (19 April 
2013). The Secretary-General made it clear that success in this election was crucial to the continued 
implementation of that agreement and the ‘consolidation of peace and stability’ (ibid., § 48).  
The elections were carried out ‘by and large peacefully throughout Kosovo’ (S/2014/68: § 5). In the run-
up to the vote there were two attacks against candidates in northern Kosovo. On the day of voting, ‘two 
OSCE and one EULEX vehicles were stoned by a crowd in Zveçan/Zvečan’ (S/2014/68: § 16). Repeat 
votes had to be held at three polling stations in North Mitrovica municipality, which had been disrupted in 
the initial vote. The re-vote proceeded ‘peacefully and without further incident’ (S/2014/68: § 16). Despite 
the relatively peaceful conduct of the elections, turnout in northern Kosovo was low, averaging about 25% 
(see S/2014/68: § 17).  
The divergence of opinion among Kosovo Serbs regarding the unofficial referendum and the holding of 
Serbian local elections in Kosovo demonstrates a point that it is worth keeping in mind. That, although the 
conflict in Kosovo is evidently in large part ethnic, neither side should be considered a unified homogenous 
political group. This is evidenced here by the fact that some participate in the Kosovo institutions while 
others boycott them; by the fact that they had different opinions on the votes; and by the fact that when 
the Serbian President called for the removal of roadblocks in northern Kosovo, ‘Although this message was 
disregarded by some municipal leaders in the north — notably those belonging to Serbian opposition parties 
— it was heeded by others, and contributed to the removal of roadblocks in Leposaviq/Leposavić 
municipality’ (S/2012/72: § 7).  
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7.5.4 Election of the Assembly, 2019 
The most recent election in Kosovo, at the time of writing, was held on 6 October 2019. The current Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for UNMIK, Zahir Tanin, reported to the Security Council that 
this election ‘has brought forth the most significant change in the political landscape of Kosovo in twelve 
years’ (Tanin, 2019: 1). The election saw the highest voter turnout since 2010, amongst both the population 
as a whole (44.56 % turnout), and also specifically in Kosovo-Serb majority areas (48.6% turnout) 
(S/2020/255: § 4). Tanin sees the turnout of Kosovo Serbs as ‘confirming a trend of active participation by 
this community in Kosovo elections’ (ibid., 2), but also notes that there were some instances of voter 
intimidation recorded in Kosovo Serb areas.  
According to the conceptual framework set out in chapter 4, the increase in participation, particularly in the 
Kosovo Serb areas, can be understood as a positive outcome, in so far as ‘broad civic participation’ 
(Steinberg, 2009: 56) can be read as indicating movement towards peace and security, an acceptance of 
‘parthood’ (Lord, 2017). If parthood is a matter of degree, as suggested in chapter 4, then participation 
among Kosovo Serbs can be understood as a move towards a sense of parthood rather than total rejection 
of parthood. In the 2004 election, by comparison, fewer than 1% of Kosovo Serb’s participated in the vote 
(S/2004/907: § 7), and again in 2007, Serbian authorities called for a boycott of the election and so no votes 
were cast in Serb-majority northern Kosovo (S/2007/768: § 3).  
It is important not to overstate the case, however. While negotiations over forming a coalition are ongoing, 
the party with the highest proportion of votes was Vetëvendosje, an explicitly Albanian nationalist party 
which has, in the past, been associated with the cause of Kosovan unification with Albania (Björkdahl and 
Gusic, 2015). As for the representation of Kosovo Serbs, according to Tanin’s (2019) report the Serbian 
List are likely to take all ten of the seats that are reserved for Kosovo Serb representatives. There is a history 
of animosity between the two parties, and it remains to be seen whether Serbian List would agree to 
participate in an Assembly headed by Vetëvendosje (Stojanovic, 2019). There is a precedent of Serbian 
representatives refusing to take their seats in the Kosovo Assembly (S/2007/134: § 7), and the Serbian List 
is one of the parties that has boycotted the Assembly in the past (S/2005/88: § 11). 
Thus, while higher participation in the election might be welcomed, it could be that, with a government led 
by Vetëvendosje and the Kosovo Serbs represented exclusively by the Serbian List, the result of the election 
simply reflects the division of the state. As such, it is difficult to assert too positive an interpretation of the 
election result as a reduction in factionalism, beyond the basic assertion that it is better for there to be Serb 
participation in the Assembly than not. The Serb List participated in Kosovo’s coalition government 
following the 2017 election (S/2017/911: § 5) – so if they refuse to work with Vetëvendosje, it would be a 
step backwards rather than forwards. 
The struggle to promote the idea of a multi-ethnic Kosovo continues, as indeed does the struggle to develop 
the idea among Kosovo Serbs that their interests are served by the institutions of Kosovo – a sense of 
securitas. ‘In order for objects that once prompted fear to come to mean something totally different, however, 
a whole network of passionate relationships must be transformed’ (Sharp, 2005: 607). Elections in the future 
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may continue to be looked at as an indicator of securitas among the population – but more so if the results 
reflected the development of political movements and parties that were not representative of exclusively 
Serb or Albanian identity. At present, such a development seems unlikely.  
7.6 Conclusion 
The Secretary-General states UNMIK’s aim is ‘to show Kosovo’s minority communities that they can derive 
tangible benefits from engaging in public life’ (S/2001/926: § 35). They want to instil in them a sense that 
the institutions of government will be good for them. This chapter has investigated the role of elections in 
influencing the level of securitas in the population. Elections in Kosovo would appear, in many ways, to 
reflect the ethno-nationalist divisions of the country rather than lessen them. The impact of elections in 
northern Kosovo particularly seems to be an example of ‘rejection of parthood’ (Lord, 2017).Based on 
reviewing the internationally mediated elections reported on in the UN documents, it is difficult to say that 
elections are evidence of securitas or acceptance of parthood. For elections to become reflective of greater 
integration and participation, the source of the change would likely come from elsewhere. That is, the 
elections themselves would not so much produce greater integration than we would see greater integration 
reflected in the elections, should greater integration begin to be achieved.  
I wish to end this chapter with a speculative point, derived from the theoretical accounts of relationality and 
‘parts’ and ‘wholes’. Raymond Williams observes that: 
however dominant a social system may be, the very meaning of its domination involves a limitation 
or selection of the activities it covers, so that by definition it cannot exhaust all social experience, 
which therefore always potentially contains space for alternative acts and alternative intentions 
which are not yet articulated as a social institution or even project (Raymond Williams, quoted in 
Said, 1985: 46) 
The point here is that the ‘whole’ that is asserted by groups that reject their part in broader society, or insist 
on their incompatibility with the other, is in reality never completed. This is not to deny their power, their 
capacity to ‘enforce local norms’ (DeLanda, 2016: 11); but total homogeneity of ideas and action is never 
achieved. In short, difference is never as straightforward as its representation. Even while some political 
actors rely on an ‘ideology of difference’ to justify their actions, such ideological systems can never be 
‘completely effective’ (Said, 1985: 46). This serves as a reminder that there is always the potential for change 
– for a lessening of segregation – even if it can seem totally intractable.  
Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) indicate a possible area in which such change might be observed in Kosovo 
- the protection of cultural heritage sites. In a context of extreme segregation between the majority ethnic 
Albanians and the minority ethnic Serbs, these legally protected sites include monuments of significance to 
both groups (as well as others besides). Notably, the protected sites include several Serbian Orthodox 
churches, which have in the past been subject to demolition and vandalism. Local populations are consulted 
in decision making over how the sites are to be used. They are spaces for education, for local participation, 
and they emphasise the shared cultural heritage of Kosovo over the centuries (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). 
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The authors do not present such initiatives as a straightforward remedy to Kosovo’s problems. But if change 
in politics and society is to be sustained, it must ultimately become part of the institutional patterns 
organising social life. While these patterns might still overwhelmingly reflect division and segregation, that 
does not rule-out exploring and understanding alternatives. Initiatives aimed at how people understand their 
history, their identity, and their relationships with others, could form an important part of a broader set of 
peace policies; they could help provide a more appropriate background, or catalyst, for the development of 







The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the 
needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world. 
- UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali – An Agenda for Peace (1992: § 17). 
~ 
When I began the research for this thesis, I was working on Spinoza’s Ethics and trying to develop an 
understanding of peace based on the relational ontology that Spinoza presents. This understanding posited 
peace as something emergent in mutually enabling relations between people; it was explicitly not an 
understanding of peace as something instituted by states, governments, and legal agreements (see Bregazzi 
and Jackson, 2018). It was only later that I learnt that Spinoza says more or less the opposite in his Political 
Treatise, wherein he emphasises the responsibility of the state for ensuring ‘peace and security of life’ (TP 
5/2), and uses the same relational ontology to justify his claims. 
This tension regarding the responsibility for peace, and where it is located, exists also in the literature on 
geographies of peace. Much of this literature has attended to peace as an everyday, localised process, 
embodied and emotional. And yet Megoran and Dalby (2018) have recently asserted that this focus has 
ignored geopolitics. They write: 
geographies of peace must attend to geopolitics: not instead of the fine-grained, local, thick 
descriptions of peace in specific places, but as well as this (p. 263). 
Their call is therefore to include more traditional geopolitical actors into the study of peace: nation states, 
regional blocks, global organisations, and so on. One such geopolitical actor is the United Nations, and it is 
UN peace operations that have provided the focus for this thesis. The UN is one of those geopolitical actors 
that has not received much attention in the geographies of peace literature.  Where it is discussed, it is usually 
critiqued as a key proponent of the inadequate liberal peace - an imposition of western values parading as 
universal, and one that has frequently failed in its purpose. Yet UN peace operations both contribute to, 
and are shaped by, matters of geopolitics. This thesis has particularly been concerned with the way the UN 
has facilitated autonomy and self-government in Kosovo. The UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) was one of the most comprehensive operations the UN has ever undertaken. The 
production of state institutions in the pursuit of peace, in part facilitated by an external organisation, is a 
phenomenon that connects to questions of territory, sovereignty, transnational political agency, and the 
nature of states themselves. Political geographers therefore are well placed to examine these aspects of UN 
peace operations, and so contribute to understandings of peace as a spatial and geopolitical process.  
To conclude, I wish to summarise the main arguments and findings of the thesis in relation to these broad 
themes of the state, the international political agency of the UN, and peace in Kosovo. This is followed by 
a consideration of the limits of the present thesis, and some avenues for further research. 
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8.1 Key arguments, findings, and contributions of the research 
8.1.1 Spinoza, assemblage theory, and peace 
The theoretical argument in this thesis, laid out predominantly in chapter 4, has been in part an attempt to 
resolve the above-mentioned tension between understanding peace as manifest in local relationships and 
peace as guaranteed by the state. The case I have made is that the two are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
co-constitutive. This claim is based on an understanding of the state as a production of relational processes 
between people, materials, and ideas. A state’s reality is nothing more than the capacities realised in the 
relations between its constituent parts. This view is therefore aligned with contemporary assemblage theory, 
and particularly with applications of assemblage theory to questions of geopolitics and international relations 
(e.g. Dittmer, 2017, 2020; Doucet, 2016; McConnell and Dittmer, 2017). The relevance of an assemblage 
approach to the geographical study of peace, I have argued, is that it opens up productive avenues for the 
inclusion of states and international institutions in the geographical study of peace, while maintaining the 
importance of local forms of peaceful agency as well. Indeed, assemblage theory makes no ontological 
distinctions between ‘local’, ‘national’, ‘international’ etc. To speak of different ‘scales’ of politics ‘should 
refer only to relative scale, that is, to scale relative to the part-to-whole relation’ (DeLanda, 2016: 16, original 
emphasis). The influence of geopolitical actors like states and international organisations is therefore the 
object of analysis in this thesis – but their agency is accounted for not as the rational intent of a unified 
actor, but as the capacities realised in a continual process of interaction and relationality between constituent 
parts. This approach responds to Megoran and Dalby’s call for inclusion of ‘traditional’ geopolitical actors, 
but does so in a way that is sensitive to the interaction and co-constitution of the local, the state, and the 
international.   
This thesis contributes to and extends the literature on assemblage in political geography by considering 
how the ontological commitments of assemblage theory change or enhance an understanding of peace as a 
(geo)political category. To this end, I have drawn particularly from the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, whose 
works provide a rich resource for exploring the political implications of relational ontology. In short, the 
thesis combines Spinoza’s political philosophy with assemblage theory, and proposes a theory of peace 
based on this combination. This ‘Spinoza-assemblage → peace’ formula is developed in two distinct ways.  
First, chapter 4 considers how a state might be understood as contributing towards peace once we accept 
the account of state agency that assemblage theory entails. As a historically produced and contingent entity, 
a state assemblage has no transcendent unitary status; but it does exert ‘downward causal influence’ (DeLanda, 
2016: 18, original emphasis). Chapter 4 derives from Spinoza an understanding of how such ‘downward’ 
causality of states and international organisations might contribute to peace, arguing that the Spinozan 
concept of ‘harmony’ provides the means to articulating a relationship between the state and peace. Based 
on Spinoza’s account of the natural foundations and purpose of the state, I argue that harmony becomes 
the normative measure by which any ‘civil order’ can be assessed. The thesis therefore concurs with Doucet 
(2016) about the utility of assemblage for investigating peacekeeping interventions, particularly those which 
attempt to institute state-building measures. Chapter 4 adds to this a consideration of what peace itself 
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means in relation to states and international organisations, once they are conceptualised as assemblages. 
There is some further discussion of this below, in the reflections on the role of the state. 
The second use of the Spinoza-assemblage combination in this thesis is methodological. Discussed in 
chapter 5, this line of thought regards the place of ideas and texts within an assemblage, and how 
textual/discourse analysis might be altered when texts, and the ideas they contain, are considered as 
component parts of an assemblage. Texts have been the dominant object of analysis in critical geopolitics. 
Indeed, the tendency to focus on deconstructing texts has been critiqued as ignoring the manifestation of 
geopolitics in embodied practices and relations, notably by feminist geographers (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; 
Hyndman, 2001; McDowell, 1999; Pain, 2009). Advocates of ethnographic methods in political geography 
likewise want to ‘re-people’ the discipline (Megoran, 2006: 625; for a critical overview, see Kuus, 2013). In 
foregrounding relationality, and extending agency to materiality and the non-human, assemblage theory in 
fact provides a productive route away from solely analysing texts (Dittmer, 2014a; Müller, 2015). But texts, 
and language/ideas more generally, remain component parts of assemblages, and contribute towards the 
properties and capacities that can be realised within an assemblage.  
In chapter 5, I situated my approach to the texts within Hasana Sharp’s ‘renaturalized’ understanding of 
ideas. Based on Spinoza’s Ethics, Sharp treats ideas themselves as natural entities that require support and 
nurturing in order to thrive and spread. Just as Spinoza’s ontology foregrounds relationality between bodies, 
so too are minds relational, interacting in an ‘ecosystem of ideas’ (Sharp, 2011: 56). I combined this 
renaturalized account of ideas with an assemblage theory understanding of ‘linguistic entities’ (DeLanda, 
2016: 51), claiming that the UN’s public discourse can be understood as coding the ecosystem of ideas within 
the organisation. In the complex ecosystem, the role of doctrinal and policy texts is to try and establish 
coherent understandings of the principles and ideals by which the organisation can function. I therefore 
characterised certain UN documents as providing the parameter of this assemblage of ideas, whilst others 
were characterised as variables within the larger code (DeLanda, 2016). This provided a methodological 
framework with which to analyse the documents, with a clearly articulated understanding of their role within 
an assemblage.  
Overall, the methodological formulation presented in this thesis allows the researcher to take seriously the 
agenda-setting and vision-guiding role of texts and ideas to produce certain outcomes in society, whilst at 
the same time acknowledging that they are only one part of the larger assemblage. A further benefit of 
conceptualising texts as a component part of a broader assemblage is that it may allow connections between 
text-based studies and ethnographic studies to more readily be made– whereby the different methods are 
conceived as focusing on different components of the same assemblage. 
8.1.2 The United Nations, the state, and the intervention in Kosovo 
8.1.2.1 The power of ideas 
The methodology of this thesis therefore attests to the power of ideas, claiming that, given sufficient 
support, they have a capacity to ‘make, remake and unmake the world’ (Anderson, 2019: 1120). As a text-
based study, the main object of analysis has been the ideas contained and promoted in UN public discourse 
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on matters of peace policy. The contributions of this thesis to existing research on the UN as an institution 
are therefore concentrated on understanding UN ideas – what they are and what they do. By characterising 
the UN’s public discourse on peace as a constituent part on an assemblage, the thesis makes a case for the 
continuing importance of UN doctrine. It concurs that UN ideas can and do ‘change the world’ (Weiss, 
2011: see chapter 2), as active agents contributing to the capacities and properties of the assemblages in 
which they exist. The unique role of doctrinal texts in this regard, as stated above, is in their capacity to code 
the ecosystem of ideas. The non-doctrinal texts are also important, as a record of the institutional memory 
from which policy is constructed, showing which ideas change, which remain constant, and which end up 
being reflected as later parameters/codes. A benefit of an assemblage understanding is that the active role 
of texts can be acknowledged and explored, whilst remaining aware of the often-fragmented nature of the 
organisation. Coding is a matter of degree. The consistency of ideals and practice across peace missions that 
the UN seeks to produce in its doctrine on peace operations will never be achieved absolutely; but it can be 
achieved to a greater or lesser degree, and the capacities of the organisation to implement effective 
programmes and agendas will always be in part dependent on the quality if the ideas guiding them.   
Further confirmation of the continuing relevance of, and need to analyse, policy texts in peace research can 
be found in the problems that are caused when there is not sufficiently clear doctrine or guidance for peace 
missions. This was the case, for example, during the rapid increase of state break-down and civil war in the 
1990s, when the UN was trying to respond to forms of conflict that were not accounted for it its Charter 
(Kennedy, 2007). Similarly, Ahmed et al. (2007) argue that many problems faced by peacekeepers have arisen 
precisely because of a lack of coherent policy to guide them. Regarding the difficulty of implementing the 
expanded and multi-dimensional UN mandates in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, they note that ‘it became all 
too clear that there was no guiding vision for these efforts beyond that being fashioned on the ground as 
reactions to daily events’ (Ahmed et al., 2007: 16). More recently, it has been suggested that ‘the current 
portfolio of missions is stretching [the UN’s] core principles to their limit’, and that it may be time for a 
‘Capstone 2.0’ in response (Hunt, 2019). The ideas, policies, and norms promoted by an institution like the 
UN go a long way in setting the agendas that will ultimately be manifest in success and failure in the field. 
There is therefore a continuing necessity for research into where these ideas come from, the effects they 
have, and the prospects for their improvement. 
8.1.2.2 Peace and the State: Sovereignty, de facto statehood, and the transitional administration in Kosovo 
The aspect of UN discourse that has particularly concerned this thesis is how the relationship between peace 
and the state has been conceived, and how these ideas have been made manifest in the peace- and state- 
building policies in Kosovo. The state, as an idea and in practice, has always involved matters of war and 
peace. The very origins of the modern state form are located in a series of peace treaties, the Peace of 
Westphalia. Since then, the ‘sovereign state’ has proved enduring as an ideal form of political organisation. 
And yet, ‘the modern nation-state has never been the absolute, bounded container of politics that some 
realist scholars have portrayed it to be’ (McConnell, 2016: 17-18). The case of Kosovo has provided a 
fascinating and important example through which this thesis has addressed the relationship between the 
UN, the state, and peace.  
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In chapters 1 and 2, I contextualised these themes within geopolitical transformations that occurred 
following the end of the Cold War. New patterns of conflict emerged, and the UN responded by developing 
new ideas and policies regarding the extent of its role in maintaining peace. The original signatories of the 
UN Charter, who pledged their support to the maintenance of ‘international peace and security’ (United 
Nations, 1945: Article 1), would likely not have foreseen that future ‘threats to peace would often be due 
less to external acts of aggression than to internal disintegration and civil wars’ (Kennedy, 2007: 46). The 
increase in instances of just such state disintegration after the Cold War therefore saw the UN struggle to 
develop policy on matters of war and peace that were not accounted for in the Charter. The result was the 
development of ‘multidimensional peace operations’, and an interventionist Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 
1992) that questioned the inviolability of state sovereignty and dramatically expanded the responsibilities of 
UN peace operations. The greatest extent of these interventionist policies was manifest in ‘transitional 
administrations’, wherein a UN peace mission was mandated to assume sovereign-like authority over the 
region in which it intervened. The mission in Kosovo was one such transitional administration. Considering 
the post-Cold War geopolitics of peace, both in general and specifically as manifest in Kosovo, therefore 
raises matters of sovereignty and de facto statehood, the agency and authority of international organisations, 
and the relationship between peacebuilding and state-building.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis was dedicated to exploring the relationship between peace and the state in depth, 
and did so by articulating an understanding of the nature and foundations of ‘the state’ itself. Drawing on 
both contemporary assemblage theory and the political philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, the chapter 
considered the relational process by which a state can be considered as contributing to peace. The argument 
laid out there, most notably that a state can contribute to ‘social harmony’, is derived from an understanding 
of the state as a product of relationality between constituent parts. The state can be conceptualised as an 
‘individual’ in so far as the relations between its constituents produce the effect of a certain level of 
coherence. The capacities of this ‘individual’ act back upon its constituents, and therefore it remains possible 
to refer to the agency of the state without attributing to it a false transcendent unity. This thesis therefore 
agrees that ‘stateness is not an illusion’(2006: 771), which is to say that the influence and agency of state 
institutions and governments cannot be denied. 
As a conceptual measure, the coherence of a state ‘individual’ is similar to what assemblage theory calls 
‘territorialization’ – that is, the degree of delineation from other state assemblages, as well as ‘the degree to 
which an assemblage homogenises its own components’ (DeLanda, 2016: 22). The understanding of state 
independence adhered to by this thesis therefore concurs with the view that statehood and sovereignty are 
matters of degree, rather than binary categories that can either be achieved in full or not at all (Berg and 
Kuusk, 2010; Caspersen, 2015a). Literature within political geography and beyond has drawn attention to 
the various ways in which partially- or non-recognised states are still able to develop sovereignty (Caspersen, 
2012; Fawn and Richmond, 2009; Pegg, 1998; Visoka, 2019) and legitimacy (Caspersen, 2015a, 2015b; Ker-
Lindsay, 2015; McConnell et al., 2012). Indeed, one of the points made in chapter 6 was that the UN’s 
intervention in Kosovo effectively created a newly independent state ‘individual’, even while, at the formal 
level, Kosovo’s independence is not recognised. As discussed in chapter 6, when the Kosovo Assembly 
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declared independence in 1990, it had very little meaning beyond the symbolic, because the region was not 
sufficiently delineated from Serbia. In 2008, however - with the NATO intervention having forced out all 
Serbian authorities, with the Kosovo borders secured and monitored, and with the development of state 
institutions operating distinctly from Serbia – the unilateral declaration of independence had far more 
meaning. Kosovo has achieved a level of empirical sovereignty, even though it has not achieved legal 
sovereignty (Berg and Kuusk, 2010). UNMIK therefore contributed to Kosovo’s functioning as a state 
assemblage, even while it did not formally recognise it as independent. As Fawn and Richmond (2009: 207) 
put it,‘[i]nternational custodians have both denied de jure sovereignty while also contributing to the 
conditions for de facto sovereignty’.  
The agency and authority of UNMIK can therefore be seen as significantly contributing to the development 
of the Kosovo assemblage while under UN administration. The fact that the Assembly unilaterally declared 
independence, however, in violation of the Constitutional Framework (UNMIK, 2001), demonstrates that 
the agency of UNMIK is not synonymous with its rational intention. UNMIK may have had a set of declared 
aims based on the authority of a Security Council mandate – but it could not control all aspects of the 
Kosovo assemblage. Furthermore, the contradictory aspects of the UN’s stance on Kosovo – that it wanted 
to develop autonomy in the region whilst at the same time respecting Serbian sovereignty – created a 
geopolitical tension that could only be sustained for so long. Ker-Lindsay even suggests that the UN 
intervention would never have been able to prevent Kosovo’s increased separation and de facto independence 
from Serbia. He states that: ‘the UN was in fact powerless to act to bring about an alternative status solution. 
Once international intervention had occurred, independence became the only feasible option’ (Ker-Lindsay, 
2012: 393).  
Ker-Lindsay’s point reminds us that agency within an assemblage is simultaneously top-down and bottom-
up (DeLanda, 2016). While international organisations like the UN represent new forms of political agency 
and authority, their capacities are still constrained by the existing geopolitical conditions at the state and 
local levels. This is further demonstrated by the obstacles and resistance experienced by UNMIK in Kosovo, 
whereby its policies and practices were weakened or disabled altogether. One of the most significant sites 
of resistance highlighted by this thesis is in the north of Kosovo, in the four municipalities with Kosovo 
Serb majorities. Many members of the population in this area reject the authority of the Kosovo Assembly, 
and perceive Serbia to be the legitimate authority. This resistance has been implicated in matters of 
democracy in the region. When electing the first Provisional Assembly, for example, voter registration 
among Kosovo Serbs was very low. Only when the Prime Minister of Serbia called upon Kosovo Serbs to 
register to vote did the numbers begin to increase. This raises the further point that, while a political 
assemblage may become more territorialized and delineated, total delineation is an impossibility. What 
happens ‘on the ground’ in the Kosovo peace process cannot be fully separated from what happens in 
Serbia. A further example of this dispersed agency would be the network that the UN mission itself is 
connected to. The UN headquarters are in New York; personnel are contributed by a variety of countries 
from around the world; and a mission receives its legal mandate from the Security Council, itself consisting 
of representatives from 15 states. While this complex network in large part enables UNMIK (and other 
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missions) to operate, it can also constrain their actions. This is demonstrated by Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008. While the USA, the UK, and France immediately recognised Kosovo’s 
independent status, Russia and China did not. Disagreement among the P-5 members of the Security 
Council meant that the Council could provide no guidance as to how UNMIK should respond, thus leaving 
it to the Secretary-General alone. The outcome was a loss of authority for UNMIK, and ultimately a 
significant downsizing of the mission. 
While so much of the UN doctrine asserts the complimentary relationship between developing state 
functions and peace, the Kosovo case demonstrates that there is no straightforward relationship between 
enhancing state capacity and supporting peace. It even seems to exacerbate the division in some cases, as in 
the North Kosovo Crisis (discussed in chapter 6). This tension between state-building and peacebuilding in 
Kosovo has been highlighted by Visoka (2017: 7) who suggests that ‘[p]rogress in one policy area meant 
stagnation and resistance on the other’. While state-building policies, that extended both the Kosovo 
Assembly’s authority and the region’s autonomy, placated Kosovo Albanian leadership, peacebuilding 
policies sought to accommodate ‘the rights and interests of the Serbian community through decentralisation 
of power, special political status and reserved seats in the parliament and government’ (Visoka, 2017: 6).  In 
their assessment of the UN’s mission in Kosovo, then, Franks and Richmond (2008: 100) conclude that: 
liberal peace-building should be discursively decoupled from the concept of state-building, 
removing an important motivation for local cooption to lead to statehood in such cases, and 
reverting to the former focus of peace-building, which was on dealing with the issues of everyday 
life for individuals from the bottom-up in the context of a liberal social contract with meaningful 
institutions. 
Based on the findings in this thesis, such a ‘discursive decoupling’ of peacebuilding and state-building in 
UN peace policy and doctrine would represent a radical change. As the discussion of doctrinal documents 
in chapter 6 demonstrates (see Table 1), the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding is very much coupled 
with ‘[r]estoring the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 25). In 
Kosovo, this coupling of state-building and peacebuilding was taken to an unprecedented extent, with the 
UN mission going so far as to provide the constitution by which the region would be governed, as well as 
securing its borders and running its elections.  
It is in this context that the findings in the 2015 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-
S/2015/490) become relevant. As discussed at the end of chapter 6, the Review suggests that, in contexts 
of severe sectarian fragmentation, facilitating the development and extension of state authority can deepen 
the conflict rather than ease it. It therefore recommends that ‘there is a need to find new approaches that 
understand peacebuilding[…] as having more to do with strengthening local domains of governance than 
with endeavouring to re-establish a strong central authority’ (§ 21). This development in understanding of 
peacebuilding – if it was to gain strength within the ecosystem of ideas constituting UN peace policy – 
would represent precisely the kind of ‘discursive decoupling’ that Franks and Richmond advocate. As stated 
in chapter 6, such a development would come too late to have any impact on the situation in Kosovo. But 
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it does serve to highlight an awareness of the problem, and advocates beginning a process by which doctrine 
in relation to peace and the state might change and become more effective. 
Overall, as politics has become more globalised, the influence of organisations like the UN is unavoidable. 
As Boutros-Ghali said, the theory of absolute sovereignty was ‘never matched by reality’. Adopting an 
assemblage understanding of political organisations would go even further: it is not only absolute 
sovereignty that was never matched by reality, but the transcendent ideal of ‘the State’ itself. Yet recent years 
have seen a growing distrust of multilateralism, and trends towards nationalist politics in many countries 
around the world – a re-assertion of ‘the State’ as an idealised category. It is therefore imperative that political 
advocacy for peace be informed by detailed and realistic analysis of multilateralism’s strengths and 
weaknesses, rather than wishful-thinking or naivety. Through both theoretical and empirical investigations, 
research must continue to explore alternative explanatory frameworks for better apprehending the processes 
contributing to peace and cooperation in today’s globalised politics. 
8.2 Study limits, unanswered questions, and avenues for further research 
8.2.1 Limits of a text-based study 
A limitation of the research presented here is that, as a text-based study, it does not provide the insights into 
people’s thoughts and feelings about peace and conflict in Kosovo that a field-based ethnographic study 
would have allowed. Given that the theoretical framework presented here emphasises relationality and affect 
in its understanding of the state and peace, there would be much to gain from ethnographic fieldwork. It is 
difficult, for example, to assess how far citizens experience a sense of securitas in Kosovo’s institutions 
without support from interviews with citizens themselves. I instead had to look to indirect indicators - 
participation in elections - in order to inform my analysis of whether Kosovo’s institutions are productive 
of a sense of hope or security in the population. This necessarily changes the kinds of claims I have been 
able to make, and I have been cautious in what I have been willing to assert on these matters. My hope, 
however, is that this thesis provides a useful theoretical framework, and demonstrates its utility for the 
analysis of states and institutions, that could usefully inform further study, including ethnographic studies, 
in Kosovo and elsewhere. Just as I have drawn on micropolitical ethnographic research (Björkdahl and 
Kappler, 2017; Gusic, 2019) to inform my text-based analysis of institutionalised peace and the management 
of difference in Kosovo, the work presented in this thesis might also be of use for those peace geographers 
who are conducting local-level research to connect their findings to broader geopolitical themes. This 
connecting between ‘traditional’ geopolitical actors and local forms of agency is what Dalby (2014) called 
for, and this thesis has attempted to show how these connections can be analysed in productive ways, such 
that peace geographies can consider the role of states and transnational organisations as co-constituted along 
with local forms of agency.  
8.2.2 Potential for comparative analysis 
A further avenue for research in this area would be to investigate similar questions, but using a comparative 
politics methodology (Özerdem and Mac Ginty, 2019). In addition to Kosovo, UN peace operations have 
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facilitated independence in Timor-Leste and South Sudan. A comparative analysis of these three cases could 
shed further light on the themes discussed in this thesis. The missions in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste were 
both deployed in 1999. While UNMIK is still present in Kosovo, the last UN peace operation withdrew 
from Timor-Leste in 2012. A comparative study could investigate the reasons why the UN felt it could 
withdraw from Timor-Leste but not from Kosovo. For example, what conditions and criteria were achieved 
in Timor-Leste that were not achieved in Kosovo? The missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste were both 
transitional administrations – that is, they assumed sovereignty over the region and took responsibility for 
administration and governance. The mission in South Sudan, although facilitating independence, is not a 
transitional administration. A comparative study could therefore consider the differences involved in the 
UN developing a state with complete authority, vs. developing a state in partnership with a host government. 
Are the challenges the same? Must the same challenges be dealt with in different ways? Investigating such 
questions would give further insights into the interaction between international organisations and state 
institutions.  
8.2.3 Eurocentrism 
Having focused solely on Kosovo, however, the parameters of the present thesis remain within a European 
context. Furthermore, with Spinoza providing the underlying ontological commitments of the study, its 
theoretical arguments are also grounded in European thought. With a European case study and a conceptual 
framework derived from European philosophy, it is necessary to raise the question of Eurocentrism when 
considering the limitations of this thesis. Eurocentrism is defined in The Dictionary of Human Geography as ‘A 
world-view that places “Europe” at the centre of human history, social analysis and political practice’ 
(Gregory, 2009: 220). Politically, it is ‘the assumption that [Europe’s] cultural and political systems act as the 
bearers of a universal Reason that maps out the ideal course of all human history’ (ibid., 220).  
The latter quotation is especially relevant to the question of Eurocentrism in this thesis, as it arguably 
describes the liberal model of peace with which the UN is associated. If that is indeed the case, then this 
thesis has taken as its object the texts and ideas of a Eurocentric perspective. The idea that peace is 
guaranteed by democratic nation states, whose interactions are governed by legal agreements, is a central 
strand in European political thinking, notably deriving from Kant’s (2009 [1795]) essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’. 
The current ideals of UN peace policy, discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis, are remarkably similar. This is 
why critics of the liberal peace criticise the UN as trying to make universal a ‘Western elites’ concept of 
peace’ (Daley, 2014: 69). Not only has such a model failed to realise its promise of peace, it has also justified 
further violence (Kirsch and Flint, 2011a; Simpson, 2008). Political philosopher James Tully has no 
reservations about calling modern constitutional democracy ‘imperialist’, and explicitly cites the UN Security 
Council as part of ‘a new phase of western imperialism’ (Tully, 2008: 487).  
While this thesis therefore examines what is arguably a Eurocentric worldview, it has not been my aim to 
advocate such a view, or to accept uncritically the liberal model of peace. I have argued for adopting a 
Spinozan understanding of civil order and the relational foundations of the state, but the definition of ‘civil 
order’ derived from Spinoza admits of enormous variety. As discussed in section 4.3.1 of this thesis, a civil 
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order is in place wherever people submit to the communal right that is established by joining together to 
organise and coordinate the group for mutual benefit (TP 2/13-17). The concept is by no means limited to 
the modern understanding of a nation state; there is endless variety in the forms by which people might 
organise and coordinate. Regarding Eurocentrism, the point is that the political philosophy of peace and 
the state advocated in this thesis does not present an ideal model and claim it to be applicable to all societies. 
Such a universal model may indeed be how the UN presents its understanding of a liberal democratic state 
- but this thesis has been an investigation of these ideas and their implication in contemporary geopolitics, 
rather than a justification or advocation of them.  
Nevertheless, the conceptual framework of the thesis is not without its normative aspects. As discussed in 
chapter 4, a civil order is fulfilling its purpose in so far as its laws and institutions promote harmony (concordia) 
among its constituents. Where there is discord and disagreement, the civil order is failing in its purpose. But 
again, this normative measure does not present the ‘liberal European’ state as an ideal, or as somehow 
foundational to defining, understanding, and assessing civil orders. If the search for, and promotion of, ‘de-
imperialized’ (Tully, 2008: 488) forms of constitutionalism can inform new ways of organising societies that 
are less violent and more productive of human flourishing, then that is entirely compatible with the Spinozan 
political normativity foregrounded in this thesis. The caveat is that alternatives to ‘European’, ‘Western’, or 
‘liberal’ ideals would not be advocated for their own sake, but in so far as they promote harmony. Their 
value is not in the fact of their alterity, but in the quality of the affects that they foster among their 
constituents.  
It is my hope, therefore, that the ideas presented here regarding the relationship between the UN, the state, 
and peace, could still usefully inform studies into non-European peace processes, as well as work that seeks 
to de-centre Eurocentric/liberal models of peace. If existing and future studies’ findings indicate the failure 
of the liberal peace and/or the UN, then the ideas in thesis might even provide concepts and measures by 
which such critique can be articulated in new ways. In turn, understanding the meaning of peace and its 
relation to states and international organisations will only be further enhanced and refined when informed 
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